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In recent years, scepticism about democracy’s ability to deliver good 
political decisions has resurfaced. In response, some political 
philosophers have argued that we should replace democracy with 
epistocracy. In this political system, the exercise of political decision-
making powers – including the exercise of the right to vote – is made 
formally conditional on a sufficient degree of political competence.  
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the normative justifiability 
of epistocracy. Whereas most political philosophers firmly reject 
epistocracy and support democracy, I will instead defend an uncommon 
middle-ground view. 
More precisely, I will defend what I call the civic argument for 
epistemic constraints on voting. According to this argument, voters have 
a civic duty (an obligation grounded in the normativity of joint agency) 
to uphold the demands associated with their role in political decision-
making practices and owe each other compliance with this duty. Given 
the distinctively epistemic dimension that characterizes their role, the 
civic duty of voters is to act in an epistemically responsible way by 
exercising a cluster of epistemic capacities. I then contend that some 
limited constraints on participation in voting can be normatively 
justified as a way to ensure, as much as possible, that voters act in an 
epistemically responsible way. 
This view provides a novel contribution to the debate, one that can 
resist some standard egalitarian objections to epistocracy and yet avoid 





In 2013, I voted in the Italian general elections. I remember discussing 
the political situation of the country with several people in the weeks 
leading up to and following the vote. Among all the conversations that 
I had, one stood out. A few days after the election, an acquaintance told 
me about a peculiar experience that he had at the polling station. As he 
went into the voting booth, he found himself in disarray because he was 
given two different papers to mark. This struck him as a strange thing. 
He had no idea what the second paper was meant for. Confused by this 
fact and not knowing what to do with this second paper, he decided to 
mark the symbol of a political party that he had never even heard of 
before because he inferred, from the logo of the party, that it would 
represent a choice aligned with his political views.  
But there was nothing strange in him being given two papers to cross. 
All Italian citizens over the age of 25 are given two papers to mark, the 
reason being that Italian citizens are supposed to elect their 
representatives in the Parliament, which comprises both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. Even more puzzling, the party that my 
acquaintance voted for was not at all aligned with his political views.  
I distinctively remember being baffled at such a naïve attitude 
towards public decision-making. What is the point, I found myself 
thinking, of giving people the power to contribute to the making of 
political decisions if this is how they use this power? Isn’t democracy’s 
value diminished or corroded by such conduct? The concerns just 
mentioned are part of a broader set of worries about the state of the 
public sphere (understood as the context in which members of a 
political community confront each other and their views about political 
issues and values) within contemporary democratic societies. The 
emergence of new information technologies such as social media has no 
doubt contributed to changes in the public sphere, and phenomena 
such as the so-called ‘fake news’ have proved that these changes have a 
2 
 
dark side.  Some fear that the public sphere has become an increasingly 
epistemically vicious context prone to facilitating misinformation, 
biases, prejudices, outright falsities, polarization and so forth. These 
problems impinge also on public decision-making procedures. 
Democracy is a political system that is defined by the fact that ordinary 
citizens act as political decision-makers and contribute, on the basis of 
their political views, to shaping the laws of the community. But if 
ordinary citizens develop and discuss their political views in an 
epistemically vicious public sphere, how can they exercise their 
decision-making powers properly? 
These concerns, marked by scepticism about people’s capacity for 
self-rule, are far from new in the context of political thought. On the 
contrary, they are part of a suspicion that has accompanied democracy 
since its early developments in Ancient Greece. The suspicion is, 
namely, that democracy grants decision-making powers to people who 
do not know enough about politics to make good use of these powers. 
In recent years, this scepticism has been revived and has taken the 
shape of a positive proposal for an alternative to democracy. Some have 
argued that, given the political incompetence of ordinary citizens, we 
should replace democracy with a different political system named 
epistocracy. Even though he opposes epistocracy, David Estlund was the 
first to use this term, which roughly translates as ‘rule of the knowers’.1 
According to a more recent definition, “a political regime is epistocratic 
to the extent that political power is formally distributed according to 
competence, skill, and the good faith to act on that skill”.2 I will call 
epistocrats those who look favourably upon such a political 
arrangement.3 Epistocrats endorse the idea that access to political 
decision-making powers should be constrained by a criterion of 
political competence. More precisely, we have an epistocracy whenever 
                                              
1 Estlund 2003. 
2 Brennan 2016, 14. 
3 Brennan 2016, Caplan 2007, López-Guerra 2014, Mulligan 2015 & 2018. 
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there is a formal institutional mechanism that excludes (or reduces the 
impact of) the input of political decision-makers that fall below a 
certain desired threshold of political competence or information. 
This controversial alternative to democracy is the topic of my 
doctoral thesis. Throughout the pages of this work, I want to provide a 
positive contribution to the debate about its challenge to democracy, 
one that does justice to the concerns of epistocrats about citizens’ lack 
of epistemic capacities in the context of public decision-making while 
avoiding the pitfalls that their theories are fraught with. The result will 
be a middle-ground position between epistocracy and democracy.  
Before explaining the details of this contribution, let me briefly make 
an important preliminary point. A political arrangement can constrain 
the exercise of political decision-making powers on grounds of political 
competence – and hence be an epistocracy – in several ways. For 
example, by delegating political decision-making powers to councils of 
unelected experts, or by predicting or simulating the preferences of the 
citizenry rather than by aggregating them via ordinary voting.4 I will 
focus on one way of instantiating epistocracy, namely on the idea of 
applying competence-based constraints on participation in voting. I will 
understand epistocracy as a political system in which, even if there is 
some kind of voting procedure, incompetent citizens are either barred 
from participating, or their votes count for less than those of more 
competent citizens.5 
                                              
4 It is nevertheless important not to confuse epistocracy with different political systems. 
Importantly, epistocracy is not to be confused with political meritocracy, a political system 
where leaders are selected following criteria of capacity and excellence, rather than through 
electoral procedures. For discussions of political meritocracy, see Bell & Li 2013. 
5 The choice of focusing on voting is motivated by some of the fundamental premises of 
standard arguments for epistocracy. Epistocrats are often accused of mistakenly connecting 
knowledge to a legitimate claim on political authority (Estlund 2008, 3 - 4). However, 
epistocrats claim that this objection rests on a misunderstanding about what epistocrats 
want to pursue. […] As correctly explained by Brennan, “epistocrats need not assert that 
experts should be bosses. Epistocrats need only suggest that incompetent or unreasonable 
people should not be imposed on others as bosses”. (Brennan 2016, 17). An argument for 
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Epistocrats tend to support competence-based constraints on voting 
of this kind for instrumental reasons. In their mind, what ultimately 
justifies putting these constraints on participation in place is the belief 
that this would result in an improvement of the quality of political 
decisions according to the most plausible parameters of assessment. We 
should limit the franchise according to competence because we would 
thus get more justice, more prosperity and, more broadly, because we 
would be more likely to make the right political choices. 
Contrary to this trend, I will argue that some modest epistocratic 
arrangements – modest in that they do not envisage any ‘testing’ of 
voters that might lead to their disenfranchisement – can be justified 
without making appeal to their instrumental contribution to the quality 
of political decisions. My view, which I label the civic argument for 
epistemic constraints on voting, will instead appeal to the notion of joint 
agency in order to argue that participants in political decision-making 
acquire obligations that have a distinctively epistemic content.   
More precisely, I will argue that when we vote we are engaged with 
others in a joint practice that has an overarching shared goal: making a 
decision concerning what kind of policies, priorities and outcomes to 
pursue politically. As people who are engaged in this joint endeavour, 
we have a positive obligation – or as I will call it a civic duty – to provide 
a proper contribution to its underlying goal. As I will explain, this 
entails being epistemically responsible – i.e. exercising a cluster of basic 
epistemic capacities – in how we use our voting powers. Modest 
constraints on participation in voting will be justified because they 
ensure that voters honour this normative requirement, which is built 
into their role as public decision-makers. This can be accomplished, for 
instance, by making the access to voting procedures conditional upon 
undertaking, either prior to voting or as part of the registration process, 
                                              
epistocracy, hence, is best understood as an argument for the exclusion of incompetent 
political decision-makers. I will return on this in section [1.1]. 
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some form of competence-enhancing training. Taking part in this 
training would function as a proxy for epistemic responsibility and 
would qualify the citizen for voting, with no further selection or 
assessment of competence.  
Before explaining the structure and details of this argument, it is 
perhaps worth making a few preliminary points and to mention some 
voluntary omissions. First, for the purposes of this work, I will 
understand the notion of legitimacy in a broad fashion, as the property 
of a political decision, institution or arrangement of being normatively 
justified.6 My aim will be restricted to arguing for the conclusion that 
certain epistemic constraints on voting procedures are legitimate in this 
broad sense: they are normatively justified and we have sufficient 
reason to endorse them. I will not provide a full-fledged theory of 
political legitimacy. This means that I will not consider several issues. I 
will not consider whether political decisions reached as a result of the 
procedures endorsed by my argument are owed obedience, nor the 
impact that my arguments might have on the justification of political 
authority more broadly. Moreover, I will not outline an explicit position 
on the debate between proceduralism and instrumentalism.7 Although 
                                              
6 Political legitimacy is commonly seen as entailing the justification of political authority (e.g. 
Green 1988, Raz 1986). From this standpoint, legitimacy entails the moral right of a 
government or institution to rule and to exercise power over others. Other interpretations 
focus more specifically on the justification of coercive power (e.g. Buchanan 2002, Ripstein 
2004). Furthermore, while some keep the two issues separated, legitimacy is often 
interpreted as also entailing political obligations. Under this interpretation, if a political 
authority is legitimate, then those who live under its jurisdiction have a moral duty to obey 
its commands. Others (most notably Simmons 2000) believe that the justification of a 
political authority should be distinguished from its legitimacy. From this standpoint, 
justification establishes that a state or a government are morally defensible or preferable 
to alternatives on the overall balance of reasons, but it does not establish their right to rule 
and to be obeyed. 
7 For those unfamiliar with the distinction, proceduralism is a label that applies to those 
views according to which political decisions or arrangements draw their legitimacy from 
some feature of the procedures (for instance, equal distribution of decision-making powers) 
by which they are reached or established. Instrumentalism is a label that applies to those 
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my view entails some implicit commitments - a compatibility with 
hybrid views, the rejection of pure instrumentalism, etc. -, I will not 
expand on this issue within the pages of this work. 
Second, in virtue of the non-instrumental nature of my argument, an 
important strand of potential objections to it will not be discussed. 
Namely, I will not engage with epistemic arguments for democracy and 
with their potential objections to my view. Epistemic democrats like 
Heléne Landemore or Robert Goodin argue that democracy is 
epistemically superior to alternative arrangements.8 Consequently, they 
would probably argue that democracy has already enough epistemic 
quality to make the epistemic constraints on voting that my argument 
supports either unnecessary or perhaps even damaging, as they might 
have epistemically detrimental effects such as reducing the diversity of 
voting inputs, to give one example. The reasons behind their position 
are not devoid of controversy. There is no consensus on the epistemic 
quality of democracy within the literature. However, although I hope to 
be able to expand on how my views relate to this particular strand of 
democratic theory in the future, I will set the issue aside for the time 
being. The work conducted in this thesis is meant to discuss whether 
some competence-based restrictions on participation in voting could be 
justified, and I will argue that they could by appealing to non-
instrumental reasons pertaining to the obligations that participation in 
public decision-making generates. Whether the epistemic qualities of 
standard democratic decision-making practices undermine this 
justification is an issue that is tangential to the one addressed in this 
thesis. 
Third, I will not discuss the political implications associated with 
implementing the arrangements envisioned in this thesis in our 
societies. I will provide only a few modest remarks about the 
                                              
views according to which political decisions or arrangements draw their legitimacy from the 
quality of their outcomes, regardless of any feature of the decision-making procedures.  
8 Goodin & Spiekeramann 2018, Landemore 2012. 
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institutional form that epistemic constraints on voting should take. As 
already mentioned, the primary example of an epistemic constraint on 
voting that I will employ is making voting conditional upon 
undertaking, either prior to the voting procedure or as part of the 
registration process, a competence-enhancing training meant to secure 
an epistemically responsible agency from voters. I will also explain that 
disenfranchisement, understood as the loss of the right to vote, is not 
supported by the premises of my argument. 
But even if my proposal is arguably less radical than some of those 
advanced by standard epistocrats, it would nevertheless raise several 
worries about its political implications under real-world circumstances. 
For instance, if implemented, an arrangement such as the one just 
mentioned would make voting procedures more demanding and raise 
the cost of participation. This might discourage demographics who are 
already marginalized from engaging with public decision-making 
procedures. Or it might grant those who design the competence-
enhancing training with the power to construct it in biased ways, or use 
it to surreptitiously promote specific political views, pieces of 
information or agendas.  
Many more examples of this kind can be provided. Discussing these 
problems falls outside the scope of this thesis. I have no doubt that this 
appears a puzzling choice. Why construct an argument for a 
contentious idea and then refuse to engage with its contentious 
implications? The choice of not discussing the political implications of 
my view is motivated by two factors, one that pertains to the framing of 
this work, and one that pertains to an implicit assumption about the 
scope and aims of political philosophy. 
Regarding the first factor, the ambition of this thesis is to provide 
what I take to be a persuasive picture of the normativity that regulates 
participation in voting practices, highlight its epistemic components 
and explain its implications on the design of political decision-making 
procedures. I am obviously convinced of the plausibility of these claims, 
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but I also recognize that my work on these issues is far from over and 
that several questions will remain open. Until those questions have 
been fully answered, I think it is best to postpone the discussion about 
implementation issues and their political implications. Moreover, if my 
conclusions are plausible, then I doubt that their value would be 
diminished by their controversial implications.  
This claim leads us to the second factor behind my choice, which 
pertains to an implicit stance on the scope and aims of political 
philosophy. The work conducted in these pages assumes that engaging 
critically with issues of political legitimacy is a valuable thing to do 
regardless of its implications in real-world circumstances and assumes 
that a normative theory can be convincing, and yield an accurate picture 
of what we should do even if real-world circumstances discourage or 
even prohibit us from acting accordingly. In other words, I have no 
intention of denying that some of the conclusions reached here are 
indeed problematic, from a political point of view. Nevertheless, I will 
work under the assumption that, if they are accurate, the fact that they 
might be politically problematic should not be taken as a reason to 
dismiss their philosophical and theoretical value. 
Having established these preliminary points, I now present the 
structure of the thesis and anticipate the content of its chapters. 
In chapter 1, after having framed the debate around epistocracy, I will 
provide a critique of the standard contemporary argument for 
epistocracy as formulated in recent contributions.9 I will argue that, as 
a consequence of its radical instrumentalism, the standard argument 
for epistocracy is unable to provide a convincing account of the 
epistemic responsibilities of ordinary citizens in voting. Hence, it 
cannot justify the claim that incompetent citizens can be permissibly 
disqualified from participating in voting practices. As a response to 
these shortcomings, I introduce a non-instrumental alternative. 
                                              
9 Most notably in Brennan 2016.  
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The two central chapters of the thesis will be dedicated to the 
discussion of this alternative theory, the civic argument for epistemic 
constraints on voting. Chapter 2 will provide an account of special 
obligations called civic duties. By employing the normativity of joint 
agency, I will argue that participation in an institutional practice 
generates individual obligations for participants, conditioned on the 
willingness of the participation and on the moral acceptability of the 
practice. More precisely, I will argue that, by engaging in an 
institutional practice, participants commit themselves to contributing 
to the overarching shared goal of the practice according to their role in 
it, and that this generates a duty to uphold the norms of action 
associated with the role. 
Chapter 3, which represents the core of my doctoral thesis, will apply 
the normative considerations just mentioned to voting practices. I will 
argue that voting can be understood as a form of institutional practice 
to which the normativity of joint agency applies. Hence, those who 
participate in voting procedures commit themselves to contributing to 
the shared goal of the practice – i.e. determining which course of 
political action the community should pursue – and acquire a civic duty 
to uphold whatever responsibility flows from their role within it. I will 
then show that the civic duties10 associated with the role of voters have 
an epistemic dimension. More precisely, since voting is an agency with 
distinctively epistemic features analogous to those of assertion-making 
and bound by similar norms, voters have a civic duty to be epistemically 
responsible and exercise a minimum of epistemic capacities. I will then 
argue that, in virtue of these considerations, although permanent 
disenfranchisement is excluded, modest epistemic constraints on 
voting are justified. These should be understood as institutional 
mechanisms designed for the purpose of ensuring that, as much as is 
feasible, voters act in an epistemically responsible way. For instance, by 
                                              
10 In this thesis, I will not study other civic duties that might be associated with voting. 
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making voting conditional upon previous participation in competence-
enhancing exercises or training. 
In chapter 4, I will explain how my view can resist some objections 
that are commonly raised against epistocracy on grounds of political 
equality. I will focus, in particular, on the public disrespect objection 
and on the hierarchy objection. The former rejects competence-based 
restrictions on participation in voting because they are deemed 
disrespectful towards citizens’ capacity for political judgement, while 
the latter rejects them as part of a commitment to avoiding social 
hierarchies between citizens. I will argue that my theory can resist both 
of these objections. Against the disrespect objection, I will argue that 
the civic argument is immune to it because it does not rely on any 
disrespectful comparative assessment of the political competence of 
citizens. Against the hierarchy objection, I will argue that the civic 
duties associated with voting outweigh the concerns about the 
reciprocal standing of citizens in society that prompt the objection in 
the first place. 
11 
 
Chapter 1 – The Standard Argument for Epistocracy 
In this first chapter, my goal will be to frame the discussion on 
epistocracy and prepare the ground for my own contribution to the 
debate. The most significant part of this preparatory work will consist 
in providing a reconstruction and critique of the standard 
contemporary argument for epistocracy. I will argue that the standard 
argument for epistocracy fails to provide a convincing case for excluding 
incompetent citizens from voting procedures and that it fails precisely 
because of its radical instrumentalism. The shortcomings of the 
standard argument pave the way for a non-instrumentalist alternative 
to it, one that is driven by concerns about the obligations that apply to 
us when we participate in political decision-making procedures rather 
than by concerns with the quality of political outcomes. 
The chapter will be structured as follows: 
In section [1.1], I reconstruct the main issues surrounding 
epistocracy, explaining the roots of the debate and how contemporary 
arguments for epistocracy are best understood as arguments about the 
justifiability of exclusionary mechanisms that bar incompetent citizens 
from participating in political decision-making procedures. In section 
[1.2], I reconstruct the standard argument for epistocracy and highlight 
its instrumentalist commitments. In section [1.3] I explain the 
shortcomings of the standard argument. I argue that the purely 
instrumentalist strategy pursued by the standard argument is untenable 
in light of the epistemic circumstances of political decision-making1 and 
because it is unable to provide a convincing account of the epistemic 
responsibilities of ordinary citizens in voting. Without such an account, 
the argument cannot justify the claim that incompetent voters ought to 
be prohibited from participating in voting practices. I conclude the 
chapter with section [1.4], in which I explain how the shortcomings of 
                                              
1 I borrow this expression from Peter 2016(a). 
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the standard argument pave the way for a non-instrumentalist 
alternative. 
[1.1] Epistocracy and Voting: A Preliminary Reconstruction 
As anticipated in the introduction to this thesis, an epistocracy is a 
political system in which political decision-making powers are 
distributed according to some criterion of political competence. This 
may happen in either one of two ways. A first option would consist in 
granting political decision-making powers exclusively to people who 
manage to meet a certain desired threshold of political competence. 
Under this arrangement, those who fail to meet the desired threshold 
are excluded altogether from contributing to political decision-making 
procedures. A second option would consist in granting more political 
decision-making powers to more competent people. Under this second 
arrangement, less competent people would not be entirely excluded 
from decision-making procedures, but their inputs would have less 
influence than those of more competent decision-makers. 
Both arrangements have quite authoritative forefathers. The first 
arrangement has its roots in Plato’s Republic.2 For Plato, philosophers 
should be the rulers of an ideal polis, and the justification for their 
ruling lies in their superior wisdom. Only philosophers have developed 
the kind of intellectual faculties that grant them access to the domain 
of the Forms (the domain of objective unchangeable truths) and, in 
particular, to knowledge of the Good. This exclusive access makes them 
uniquely positioned to exercise political decision-making powers. The 
second arrangement has its roots in John Stuart Mill’s Considerations 
on Representative Government.3 Contrary to Plato, Mill did not believe 
that political decision-making powers should be accessible only to an 
                                              
2 Plato 2000. 





elite group of philosopher kings. Yet Mill questioned the idea that all 
citizens should have the same degree of political decision-making 
powers. More precisely, Mill argued for a system of plural voting in 
which more educated citizens would be able to cast more votes than 
their less educated peers. Once again, the justification for this unequal 
distribution of political decision-making powers rests on the superior 
political competence of educated citizens. In Mill’s view, this is 
supposed to act as a counterweight to the misinformed preferences of 
the uneducated masses. 
These two views display the key elements that are representative of 
most epistocratic arguments: a concern with the substantive quality of 
political decisions; the idea that some people are better positioned to 
make high-quality political decisions than others; and the idea that this 
difference justifies a differential distribution of political decision-
making powers. But although the theories of Plato and (especially) Mill4 
still represent valuable sources of inspiration for some, the 
contemporary discussion on epistocracy has more recent origins. 
Contemporary epistocrats are best understood as critics of democracy 
that took concerns associated with the epistemic turn in deliberative 
democracy5 to their extreme conclusions. This development in 
democratic theory was chiefly characterized by a renewed attention to 
the truth-tracking properties of democratic decision-making as well as 
to the substantive quality of democratic decisions.  
Let me briefly reconstruct the features of this development. Roughly 
speaking, the deliberative tradition in democratic theory holds that 
political decisions ought to be reached via fair and rational discussion 
of competing political arguments between citizens, prior to any voting 
procedure. The distinctive virtue of democratic societies and 
procedures lies in their ability to grant a space for deliberation within 
                                              
4 Mulligan 2018. 
5 Landemore 2017, Peter 2016(b), Urbinati 2014. 
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the public sphere. Democratic decisions, from this standpoint, are 
legitimate because, and insofar as, they are the product of a process of 
deliberation that allows for the exchange of reasons and of competing 
arguments between citizens. However, it is important to dispel a 
potential source of confusion concerning this last claim. Despite this 
emphasis on the value of discussion and rational debate, the 
deliberative tradition originally adopted a largely proceduralist 
approach to the justification of the authority of democracy. That is, 
deliberative democrats remained largely reluctant to defend the 
epistemic value of deliberation; refrained from employing any reference 
to the ability of deliberative practices to facilitate correct or 
substantively good decisions in their defences of democracy; and 
remained faithful to the idea that deliberative democratic procedures 
draw their normative justification from their ability to reflect values 
such as political equality or fairness.6 This core idea is well summarized 
by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson: “democratic deliberation […] 
offers a moral response to moral conflict”7, and its resolution should not 
be understood as having the status of a correct or true answer to the 
issue at stake. 
Part of this reluctance in appealing to the correctness or substantive 
qualities of democratic decisions has its roots in Rawlsian political 
philosophy and in its attention to pluralism and persistent political 
disagreement. From this standpoint, disagreement is seen as a 
permanent feature of societies that are inhabited by a wide variety of 
comprehensive doctrines, each entailing specific and incommensurable 
stances on fundamental issues of value (e.g. what are the features of a 
morally desirable and good life, the meaning of human existence, the 
correct ends of society, religious issues, etc.). On these matters, even 
people who debate in good faith and conduct their inquiries responsibly 
                                              
6 Among many, see Gutmann and Thompson 1996, Manin 1987, Waldron 1999. 
7 Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 41. 
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will very likely not find any agreement. Controversy will persist, partly 
due to what Rawls called the burdens of judgement. These are “the 
many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of 
our powers of reasons and judgement”8 such as the controversial status 
of evidence, disagreement about how to interpret them, the presence of 
valid claims on both sides of a debate, etc. Political issues are not 
immune to this kind of persistent disagreement. On the contrary, they 
are one of the most fertile soils for it.  
This commitment to taking persistent disagreement seriously led to 
an approach to debates concerning the justification of political 
authority and of political decisions according to which these 
justifications ought to be framed in a way that avoids any reference to 
their truth or correctness. From this standpoint, supporting democratic 
decisions by invoking their substantive correctness or their truth would 
defeat the purpose of organizing our social and political coexistence 
around principles and considerations that are neutral with respect to 
the reasonable, and yet diverging, views citizens hold about issues of 
value. 
Epistemic theories of democracy9 broke away from this reluctance in 
appealing to the substantive correctness of democratic decisions and to 
the truth-tracking properties of democratic decision-making. As Joshua 
Cohen defines them, epistemic conceptions of democracy are 
characterized by the following three assumptions: “(1) an independent 
standard of correct decisions – that is, an account of justice or of the 
common good that is independent of current consensus and the 
outcomes of votes; (2) a cognitive account of voting – that is, the view 
that voting expresses beliefs about what the correct policies are 
according to the independent standard, not personal preferences for 
                                              
8 Rawls 1993, 56. 
9 Among many, see Estlund (1993, 1997, 2008), Gaus 1996, Goodin (2003 and 2008 with Kai 
Spiekermann), Landemore 2012, Ober 2010, Peter 2009 and Talisse 2009. 
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policies, and (3) an account of decision making as a process of the 
adjustment of beliefs, adjustments that are undertaken in part in light 
of the evidence about the correct answer that is provided by the beliefs 
of others.”10 
The first of these assumptions is key. In contrast with the deliberative 
approaches referenced above, epistemic approaches to the justification 
of democracy assume that there is a procedure-independent standard 
of correctness.11 That is, they assume that there exists a standard of 
correctness in politics (justice, the common good, etc.) that is valid 
independently of the procedures by which political decisions are made 
and that this standard represents a criterion by which the legitimacy of 
political decisions (and of political decision-making procedures) can be 
assessed. From this standpoint, the value of deliberation does not stem 
from the fact that it offers a morally justified response to conflict but it 
is, instead, derivative from its contribution to a correct or good decision. 
As David Estlund puts it, why should we value deliberation and the 
exchange of reasons within democratic procedures, if not because we 
think that they bring us some epistemic benefits, such as making the 
better reasons emerge?12 To paraphrase Helene Landemore’s 
reconstruction of the issue, epistemic democrats believe that when we 
deliberate (and consequently vote) we must be doing so because there 
is something that needs to be figured out and because deliberation gets 
us closer to the right answer.13 Epistemic accounts of the authority of 
                                              
10 Cohen 1986, 34. 
11 The influence of Rousseau’s political philosophy and of the Condorcet Jury Theorem have 
both played a fundamental role in the development of the epistemic approach to 
democratic legitimacy. The former provided a philosophical framework for the claim that 
properly conducted democratic procedures are a reliable tool for meeting a procedure-
independent standard of correctness such as the common good (or, in Rousseau’s terms, 
for making the general will of the assembly emerge). The latter provided a widely employed 
mathematical model in support of the claim that, when certain conditions obtain, 
democratic electorates are comparatively more likely to make the correct decision than a 
small group of experts. 
12 Estlund 1997. 
13 Landemore 2017, 285. 
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democracy are characterized by this assumption and, moreover, by 
their adherence to the idea that democratic decision-making 
procedures, when properly constrained, are capable of yielding 
decisions that meet or approach this procedure-independent standard 
of correctness. In other words, they believe that under proper 
circumstances democracy can make the right decisions, figure out the 
common good, yield just outcomes and so forth. This epistemic quality 
plays a key role in making democracy a legitimate political 
arrangement. 
In reintroducing this concern with truth, correctness and substantive 
justice to the debate about the justification of democratic authority, 
however, epistemic theories of democracy invite an instrumentalist 
approach to political legitimacy. The label ‘instrumentalism’ identifies 
those theories in which the legitimacy of a political decision-making 
procedure or institutional order depends on the substantive quality, 
correctness or justice of its decisions and outcomes.14 According to 
political instrumentalism, if a political decision-making procedure or 
institutional order P delivers substantively better political decisions 
than an alternative Q, then P holds a more justified claim to legitimate 
political authority than Q does. In other words, once we introduce the 
idea that some political decisions or outcomes are better and some 
others are worse, then it becomes normatively important for the 
justification of a political decision-making procedure or order that it 
can effectively deliver the better decisions.  
The relationship between epistemic approaches to political 
legitimacy and political instrumentalism is a complicated issue. Not all 
epistemic democrats are instrumentalists. Some of them incorporate 
epistemic concerns within non-instrumentalist frameworks.15 Indeed, 
in this thesis I will adopt a similar approach. I will defend the legitimacy 
                                              
14 Arneson 2003, Raz 1995, Wall 2007. 
15 Estlund 2008, Peter 2009, Talisse 2009. 
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of constraining participation in voting on grounds of competence by 
resorting to a non-instrumentalist justification and through an 
argument that is not driven by concerns with the quality or correctness 
of political outcomes or decisions.   
That said, epistemic democrats share the belief that meeting a 
threshold of epistemic quality – if not at the level of political outcomes, 
at least at the level of the process by which the political outcomes are 
determined – is one of the conditions of legitimacy for a political 
procedure or arrangement. It is within this context that the challenge 
of epistocracy re-emerged. If we admit the idea that there are objective 
standards of justice or correctness in political decision-making and that 
meeting them is important; and if it is fair to assume that some people 
are broadly speaking more knowledgeable about them than others, then 
why not grant exclusive or greater power to this subset of ‘wiser’ people, 
exactly in the same vein as Plato’s Republic and Mill’s plural voting? 
Precisely because of the connection with instrumentalism, the danger 
of sliding into epistocracy has always been regarded as implicit in the 
epistemic turn described above. As Steven Wall puts it, an 
instrumentalist might be indeed “prepared to recommend politically 
inegalitarian institutions if it can be shown that they would yield better 
political outcomes over time”.16 Hence, if epistocracy is indeed capable 
of yielding better political decisions and outcomes, why not endorse it? 
Epistemic democrats have always firmly rejected epistocracy. Some 
propose mixed views in which other procedural considerations block 
the slide into epistocracy.17 Others argue for democracy on the basis of 
the procedural epistemic values that democratic decision-making 
procedures represent18, and others by providing instrumental 
                                              
16 Wall 2007, 416. 
17 Estlund 2008. 
18 Peter 2009, Talisse 2009. 
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arguments for the epistemic superiority of democratic arrangements.19 
Nevertheless, in recent years, arguments for epistocracy have 
resurfaced.20 While they have kept faithful to the instrumentalism 
underlying the theories of their predecessors, these arguments have 
acquired a different and more up-to-date shape. Contemporary 
epistocrats do not argue for the instantiation of a platonic Republic. 
Most of them seem to take for granted that political decision-making 
procedures within contemporary societies ought to contain some kind 
of input from the citizenry. What they question is the idea that the right 
to provide such input should be granted to all citizens regardless of their 
political competence. Contemporary arguments for epistocracy are 
based on what Jason Brennan calls the anti-authority tenet: “when some 
citizens are morally unreasonable, ignorant or incompetent about 
politics, this justifies not permitting them to exercise political 
authority”.21 As a result of this approach, they are best understood as 
arguments in support of the key claim that lack of political competence 
legitimately disqualifies people from the right to exercise political 
decision-making powers in the form of voting. 
In this thesis, I will adopt a similar approach. I will understand 
epistocracy as a political system in which, like democracy, some kind of 
voting procedure takes place; but in which, unlike democracy, failure to 
possess or to master a sufficient level of political competence 
disqualifies from participation in the procedure. I will first reconstruct 
the standard argument for epistocracy and highlight its instrumentalist 
approach. I will then move on to show why this argument is defective. 
[1.2] The Standard Argument for Epistocracy 
The standard argument for epistocracy is chiefly defined by its 
adherence to political instrumentalism. What justifies epistocracy, from 
                                              
19 Goodin & Spiekermann 2018 and Landemore 2012 are the chief examples. 
20 Brennan 2016, Caplan 2007, López-Guerra 2014, Mulligan 2015, 2018. 
21 Brennan 2016, 17. 
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the standpoint of the standard argument, is the fact that epistocracy is 
deemed more likely to deliver good political outcomes – according to 
any plausible parameter such as substantive justice, the common good, 
economic prosperity, etc. – than alternative arrangements are. As is well 
put by Jason Brennan, the case for epistocratic arrangements rests on 
the idea that by constraining the exercise of voting powers in ways that 
either bar incompetent participants or enhance the power of more 
competent ones, political outcomes would be “better, more efficient, 
and more substantively just” than the ones produced through ordinary 
democratic voting.22 The belief in its instrumental superiority over 
democracy is at the heart of most contemporary arguments for 
epistocracy, regardless of other differences.23 The most structured 
formulation of the standard contemporary argument for epistocracy 
remains, however, the one provided by Jason Brennan in Against 
Democracy.24 For the sake of simplicity, I concentrate on his argument, 
as it is  representative of the standard contemporary case for 
epistocracy.  
Brennan’s argument for epistocracy has three premises. The first 
premise consists in dismissing procedural justifications of democracy. 
The second step, the competence principle, serves the purpose of 
establishing that political decisions are legitimate and authoritative25 
only if they are produced through a decision-making procedure that 
meets certain criteria of competence. As a corollary, decision-making 
procedures that are more likely to meet these criteria are to be preferred 
over those who are less likely to do so. The competence principle paves 
the way for the third step of the argument: since democracy has a 
tendency to allow incompetent decision-makers to influence the 
                                              
22 Brennan 2017, 53. 
23 See Mulligan 2018, 288 and López-Guerra 2014, 24. 
24 Brennan 2016. 
25 Brennan understands legitimacy as the moral permissibility to coerce, and authority as 
the moral power to create duties (Ibid., 149-150). 
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decision by allowing them to vote, it is likely to perform worse than 
epistocracy in this regard. Hence, epistocracy is to be preferred as it is 
more likely to avoid these downfalls and thereby yield better political 
outcomes. 
Let me present, in more detail, the first step of the standard 
argument for epistocracy. The first step consists, quite 
straightforwardly, in dismissing the belief that there are valid 
procedural grounds to prefer democracy over epistocracy. Brennan 
dedicates a significant part of his efforts to this task and tries to rebut, 
one by one, the most common procedural justifications of democracy. 
He dismisses the idea that democratic rights are significant for any kind 
of personal empowerment or that they embody any sort of symbolic 
value such as public respect.26 An individual vote has an infinitesimally 
small ability to effectively influence the outcome of a given political 
decision. For Brennan, it is hence unlikely to empower a specific 
individual in any way that is not purely symbolic. But concerns with 
symbolic values such as public respect are also misplaced, in light of the 
high-stake character of most political decisions.27 Political decisions 
have a coercive dimension, and they can very easily have momentous 
consequences over the lives of people. What is at stake is way too 
important to let fairness, equality, respect and so forth get in the way of 
the more urgent goal of making the best possible decision. 
More broadly, Brennan’s rejection of proceduralism rests on the ideal 
of a division of socio-political labour in which citizens contribute to the 
common good of the community, develop their moral powers and 
pursue valuable life plans through other and much more efficacious 
means than by engaging with political decision-making.28 From this 
standpoint, political decision-making should not be treated differently 
from any other instance of decision-making in which the stakes are very 
                                              
26 Brennan 2016, 85 - 88 and 119 - 132. 
27 Ibid., 122. 
28 Ibid., 208 - 211. 
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high. The priority is securing good outcomes. For example, in a medical 
emergency the priority is the patient’s health. The best way to secure 
the patient’s health is letting healthcare professionals handle the 
relevant decisions. Those who are not healthcare professionals cannot 
reasonably feel disrespected by the fact that they are not given a voice 
in the decision. In a similar fashion, delivering the best political decision 
is the priority in the context of political decision-making. If one is not 
qualified to contribute to the decision in an appropriate way, being 
denied the right to influence the decision is no more disrespectful or 
disempowering than being denied the right to influence a medical 
decision. 
The second premise of the standard argument is the competence 
principle. The principle states that “political decisions are presumed 
legitimate and authoritative only when produced by competent 
political bodies in a competent way and in good faith”.29 The 
competence principle serves primarily as a disqualifier of democracy. It 
is meant to establish that imposing on someone a decision that is the 
product of an epistemically flawed procedure is generally wrong. The 
more important the decision; the higher the stakes and severe the 
consequences, the more we should demand that it is reached in ways 
that avoid incompetence, biases, negligence and other epistemic vices. 
We want political decision-makers to avoid these vices as much as we 
want jurors in a trial to, just to give an example. Democracy grants the 
power to make high-stake political decisions to ordinary citizens. From 
the standpoint of the competence principle, this spells trouble because 
ordinary citizens tend to be, allegedly, epistemically mediocre decision-
makers. This latter point is backed up by empirical studies about the 
competence of average voters in contemporary democratic societies.30 
This is not the place to discuss the conclusiveness and reliability of 
                                              
29 Brennan 2016, 142. 
30 See for example Achen & Bartels 2016. For a recap of these studies, see Somin 2013, 
chapters 1 & 2. 
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these studies, but let us assume that it is indeed correct that a large part 
of the electorate is politically incompetent. According to the 
proponents of the standard argument, the upshot is that democracy 
violates the competence principle. Democratic decision-making 
procedures are at a high risk of bringing about suboptimal political 
decisions and, consequently, are generally illegitimate.31 
Now, as Brennan himself recognizes, even if we were to successfully 
establish that democracy violates the competence principle, this would 
not necessary imply that epistocracy is justified.32 In order to reach this 
conclusion, we need a further premise, and this is where the 
instrumentalist approach of the standard argument emerges most 
strikingly. Brennan believes that if there are no reasons to value a 
certain political decision-making procedure P1 in virtue of its 
procedural features, then the value of P1 is purely instrumental. That is, 
P1 is valuable only insofar as it is a reliable tool for bringing about good 
political results.33 But if P1’s value is merely instrumental, then there is 
no reason not to employ an instrumentally superior decision-making 
procedure P2, instead of P1, whenever available.34 
The implications for the debate at stake are the following. If there is 
reason to believe that a political decision-making procedure with 
epistocratic features – i.e. one in which the exercise of decision-making 
powers is restricted or shaped by criteria of political competence – 
performs better than a democratic one, then we should favour the 
epistocratic procedure. Assuming that a higher degree of political 
competence positively changes the quality of political preferences35, 
then there are presumptive (although not conclusive) reasons to think 
that an arrangement that bars incompetent citizens from participating 
                                              
31 Brennan 2016, 14 and 21 - 22. 
32 Ibid., 165 - 166. 
33 Ibid., 204 - 207. 
34 Ibid., 155 - 162. 
35 Ibid., 33 - 34. In the next section, I will return on the contentious stance on political 
disagreement entailed by this position. 
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in political decision-making procedures would perform better than 
democracy. We should therefore favour epistocracy and, at least, 
implement it at an experimental level. 
Having presented the standard argument for epistocracy in its key 
premises and claims, the rest of the chapter will be dedicated to the task 
of assessing the overall success of the standard argument, and whether 
it does provide a convincing justification for barring some members of 
the political community from participating in voting procedures. I will 
conclude that, as a result of both an untenable stance on the epistemic 
circumstances of political decision-making and of an implausible 
account of the epistemic responsibilities of ordinary citizens in voting, 
the standard argument for epistocracy cannot provide any plausible 
justification for the exclusion of incompetent citizens. 
[1.3] The Shortcomings of the Standard Argument 
In this section, my goal will be to argue that the standard argument fails 
to deliver a convincing justification for epistocracy, and that it fails 
precisely because of its radical instrumentalism. Bearing in mind that I 
understand epistocracy as a political arrangement that employs 
competence based restrictions on participation in voting procedures, I 
will argue that the standard argument fails to justify these restrictions 
because (a) its purely instrumentalist strategy is untenable in light of 
the epistemic circumstances of political decision-making; (b) because it 
cannot provide a plausible account of the epistemic responsibilities of 
ordinary citizens in voting that could ground their exclusion from 
voting practices. 
The most important premise of the standard argument for 
epistocracy is the competence principle, which provides a good point of 
departure for my analysis. The principle states that political decisions 
are legitimate only if they are reached in a competent way. Conversely, 
political decision-making procedures that fail to meet the desired 
criteria of competent decision-making cannot yield normatively 
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justified outcomes. As Brennan himself admits, the competence 
principle works primarily as a disqualifier.36 That is, its function is to 
delegitimize democratic decision-making procedures, in that the 
competence principle establishes a necessary condition for legitimacy 
that democracy allegedly fails to meet. But having supposedly 
delegitimized democracy does not prove that epistocracy is justified. 
The argument for epistocracy needs one final step. It needs to move 
from the delegitimization of democracy to a claim in support of the 
legitimacy of epistocracy.  
Standard epistocrats like Brennan seem to believe that this last 
argumentative step follows as a corollary of the previous ones. In their 
accounts, epistocracy (understood as an arrangement in which 
incompetent voters can be legitimately excluded from voting practices 
for failing to meet a desired threshold of political competence) is 
therefore justified because delivering good political outcomes is all that 
matters. From this standpoint, once the competence principle has 
disqualified democracy, it follows as a corollary to it that we should 
favour epistocracy in virtue of its instrumental superiority. We do not 
need to provide any further ground or justification for the exclusion of 
incompetent citizens from political decision-making practices. We only 
need to prove that, without their input, the resulting political decisions 
will be better. The move from a negative argument against democracy 
to a positive justification for epistocracy and for competence-based 
restrictions on the franchise is left entirely on the shoulders of the claim 
that, once these restrictions will be implemented, we will have better 
political outcomes. 
This approach is, however, quite problematic, in light of the 
epistemic circumstances in which most political decision-making 
procedures take place. Most political decision-making and voting 
procedures take place under epistemic circumstances that are 
                                              
36 Brennan 2016, 166. 
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dominated by epistemically justified disagreement. That is, they take 
place under circumstances in which, even if we accept that there is a 
procedure-independent standard of correctness by which to judge the 
quality of political decisions, we can make no appeal to this standard. 
This is because even competent decision-makers (and possibly experts) 
disagree on what political choice best approximates the standard or 
disagree on the properties of this standard itself. In other words, even if 
there is a truth to the matter in a political choice between A and B, its 
status as ‘truth’ might not be accessible to us when we make the choice. 
We might disagree on epistemically justified grounds on what range of 
properties qualifies the ‘true’ or correct choice. We might not be in the 
position to grasp all the possible implications of the political issue at 
stake. We might assess the possible implications differently depending 
on our moral commitments, and so forth. 
This is not to say that all political disagreements are significant. For 
instance, political disagreements that originate from faulty reasoning or 
lack of information are not significant and they just show that one of 
the sides of the debate is wrong and has not assessed the issue correctly. 
But, unless we take a problematic objectivist stance according to which 
political disagreement is always the product of one side’s improper 
assessment of the reasons that weigh in favour or against the political 
options at its disposal, then we will encounter epistemic circumstances 
like the ones just described in the context of political decision-making. 
Why is this an issue for the standard argument for epistocracy? 
Because the epistemic limitations just described impact also our 
assessment of the quality of the political outcomes yielded by a political 
decision-making procedure and, hence, the claims of instrumental 
superiority on which the standard case for epistocracy rests. As soon as 
we go beyond a small set of self-evident claims (we want to avoid 
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poverty, we want social justice, etc.37), any appeal to the quality of a 
certain specific political outcome is bound to be controversial and 
subject to the epistemically justified disagreement described above. 
Again, we do not need to endorse political nihilism38 in order to see this. 
It is enough to notice that human beings disagree on issues of value in 
virtue of all sorts of epistemic limitations that weigh on the exercise of 
their cognitive and moral powers, even in circumstances in which they 
reason in an epistemically appropriate way.39 Unless standard 
arguments for epistocracy are capable to refute the relevance of this 
problem, and more generally the Rawlsian lesson about the burden of 
judgements that weigh on our political decision-making practices and 
capacities, they will face issues. 
Take the following case. Suppose that the same political decision-
making procedure, say a referendum, is conducted simultaneously 
through two different procedures: a democratic decision-making 
procedure D and an epistocratic procedure E in which incompetent 
voters are not allowed to cast their ballot. From a purely instrumentalist 
standpoint, E is justified only insofar as it delivers better outcomes than 
D would, and that is the sole reason that might justify the exclusion of 
incompetent citizens. Now we have already explained that, setting aside 
a very small set of obvious desiderata, there is widespread disagreement 
about what qualifies an outcome as “better”. If all of this is true, how are 
we supposed to make this retrospective evaluation? If we have no 
epistemic access to which option is the correct one nor to the range of 
properties that qualify it as correct and if we will not find any agreement 
on the matter in the near future, then, once the two procedures have 
been conducted, the epistocrat will not be able to justify the claim that 
                                              
37 This may include Estlund’s requirement (Estlund 2008, 160 - 166) of avoiding primary bads 
such as war, famine, collapse of state infrastructures, systematic violation of human rights, 
and so forth. Notice that democracies tend to deliver quite well on this desideratum. 
38 Political nihilism denies that there is such a thing as truth or substantive justice in politics. 
39 Ottonelli 2012(a), 87. 
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the epistocratic procedure yielded a better outcome – if not at the price 
of scoffing aside epistemically justified political disagreement.40 This is 
no small problem for the standard argument for epistocracy. If we take 
seriously the claim that the choice between democracy and epistocracy 
comes down exclusively to which one turns out to be instrumentally 
optimal, then the justification for competence-based restrictions on 
voting proposed by the standard argument will depend entirely on this 
retrospective, hopelessly controversial (when not profoundly 
ideological) assessment which is doomed to repeatedly encounter the 
problem of justified political disagreement. 
These remarks show us that following a purely instrumentalist 
strategy takes us back to square one. Even if the competence principle 
were capable of genuinely establishing democracy’s lack of legitimacy, 
it does not follow immediately that epistocratic arrangements are 
legitimate. The attempt at justifying them merely through appeal to 
their beneficial effects on the quality of political outcomes leaves the 
argument dependent on claims that are, at best, speculative. 
Thus, we are still short of a justification for epistocratic restrictions 
on the franchise. Given that we cannot appeal only to the alleged 
improvements of political outcomes that these restrictions would yield, 
an alternative and intuitive option would be to rely on the idea that 
these restrictions are justified because voters have, qua political 
                                              
40 The point that the epistocrat would be best positioned to make, is that the epistocratic 
procedure was able to deliver a decision conducted on more epistemically responsible 
terms, without committing to any further claim about the quality of the outcome. This, 
however, would reshape the argument for epistocracy significantly. More precisely, the 
case for epistocracy would have to acquire a shape similar to what Rawls called imperfect 
proceduralism (Rawls 1971, 74 - 75), rather than the pure instrumentalism advocated by 
Brennan. Imperfect proceduralism makes room for epistemic considerations without having 
to accept that getting it right is everything that matters for the justification of a decision-
making procedure. From this standpoint, if the decision-making process by which the 
decision is reached has been conducted on epistemically responsible terms, then we did the 
best we could, and legitimacy is satisfied even with an incorrect decision. Puzzlingly enough, 
Brennan does not consider this possible framework, which is supported by the analogy with 
jury trials that he employs. 
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decision-makers, certain epistemic responsibilities that ought to be 
met. Incompetent voters ought to be excluded if and because they fail 
to meet these epistemic responsibilities. This option would be 
compatible with the competence principle, which disqualifies decision-
makers not on the basis of the substantive content of their decisions, 
but on the basis of the epistemic processes by which they reach their 
decision.41 It would be compatible also with the anti-authority tenet, 
and with the correlated idea that the argument for epistocracy calls for 
a justification for barring people from participation in political decision-
making on grounds of incompetence.  
However, such a justification would require an account of the 
epistemic responsibilities of ordinary citizens in voting. This account 
would have to sustain the claim that those who fail to meet these 
responsibilities should be denied political decision-making powers. As 
I argue now, the only plausible candidate provided by standard 
epistocrats in this regard – the account given by Brennan himself in a 
previous book titled The Ethics of Voting42 – is unsatisfactory. 
In that book, which is aimed at reconstructing the moral obligations 
of voters, Brennan argues that incompetent voting is wrongful. 
Whether it takes the form of unexcused harmful voting or the form of 
fortuitous voting, voting in an incompetent way is wrongful because it 
either harms the community or exposes the political community to 
unnecessary risk of harm.43 Brennan attempts to establish the moral 
                                              
41 See Brennan 2016, 155: “the competence principle does not disqualify jury decisions on 
the basis of their substantive content. It disqualifies jurors based on the kind of reasoning 
(or lack thereof) the jury used to arrive at its decision.” 
42 Brennan 2011. 
43 Ibid., 68. In the former case, a voter casts his ballot for a candidate or choice that is very 
likely to cause harm to the political community with no valid epistemic justification. In the 
latter case, a voter casts her ballot for a good candidate or option but also with no valid 
epistemic justification. In both cases we have a form of negligence (Ibid., 82). In the former 
case, we have a negligence that harms the community. In the latter case, we have a 
negligence that runs the risk of harming it. 
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wrongfulness of incompetent voting by postulating what he calls the 
clean hands principle. This states that “one has an obligation not to 
engage in collectively harmful activities when refraining from such 
activities imposes no significant personal costs”.44 In other words, 
voting in the ways mentioned above is wrong because it runs contrary 
to a general moral duty not to engage in collective activities that are 
potentially harmful – provided that this abstention does not come at an 
unacceptable personal price – when one’s contribution is at risk of being 
detrimental. Voters who participate in a ballot without being 
competent enough to provide valuable input act wrongfully because 
they engage improperly in a high-stakes decision-making process, 
thereby exposing the political community to an increased risk of 
suboptimal political outcomes. These normative considerations yield 
an ethics of voting centred around a negative duty not to vote 
incompetently. Political decision-making procedures have high stakes. 
Ordinary citizens, since they are on average unlikely to be competent 
enough to provide a good contribution to political decision-making, 
ought to avoid unnecessary risk imposition by abstaining from voting 
and leave political decision-making in the hands of those who are 
capable of handling it properly.  
This approach is coherent with the division of political labour that 
Brennan employs to dismiss procedural arguments for democracy.45 
Despite Brennan’s insistence that maximizing instrumental optimality 
is not always required46, the standard argument is likely to favour a 
demanding threshold of political competence as a prerequisite to the 
                                              
44 Brennan 2011, 73. 
45 Brennan 2016, 43 - 44. 
46 Ibid., 141. Brennan does not thoroughly justify this claim and given how he adamantly 
dismisses the value of any non-instrumental consideration it is not clear what could indeed 
block this maximizing strategy in his account. 
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exercise of political decision-making powers.47 The epistemic threshold 
required to access political decision-making powers that the standard 
argument seems to favour would be something like the expertise 
possessed by social scientists: knowledge of economics, sociology, 
political theory, international relations, law, etc.48 If the epistemic 
standards that are required to provide a meaningful contribution to 
political decision-making are this demanding, it goes almost without 
saying that it would be implausible to expect ordinary citizens to be able 
to meet them. From this standpoint, the epistemic responsibilities of 
ordinary citizens in public decision-making can be accounted for only 
in negative terms. Ordinary citizens have no duty to provide a valuable 
contribution to political decision-making practices. This is not part of 
what can be expected of them as functioning members of a political 
community. 
The following issue arises from this account. An epistocracy is not a 
political system in which incompetence is merely socially reproached 
and in which incompetent citizens are invited to abstain from political 
decision-making procedures. An epistocracy is a political system in 
which incompetent citizens are actively excluded from participating in 
political decision-making procedures precisely because of their political 
incompetence. And as Brennan himself recognizes, a duty not to vote 
unless competent does not necessarily imply that there is such a thing 
as a right to exclude incompetent voters.49 No matter how evidently 
wrong it is for someone to engage in a certain activity, it does not 
necessarily follow that the person should be barred from engaging in 
that activity. It is evidently wrong of me to cheat on my partner, but it 
does not follow that my deed should be fined or that I may legitimately 
                                              
47 Brennan does not explicitly address this issue, but this seems to be the path most 
coherent with the premises of his framework. If epistocracy is good and justifiable only 
insofar as it is more likely than democracy to produce good political decisions, then the 
more likely this is to happen, the better. 
48 Brennan 2016, 28. 
49 Brennan 2011, 5 - 7 and 107 - 110. 
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be prohibited from cheating via coercive means. Similarly, incompetent 
citizens who participate in voting practices might be acting wrongfully, 
but it does not follow from this alone that they can be barred from 
participating. In other words, a negative approach to the ethics of voting 
can support a negative moral conclusion against incompetent 
participation in political decision-making procedures, but it provides 
no help in the context of an argument for the conclusion that 
incompetent citizens should be formally excluded from voting 
practices. Recall that we need a justification for excluding any 
individual voter who fails to meet the designated threshold of political 
competence. We need to justify an institutional procedure that assesses 
the prospective voter on that basis and that responds to his 
shortcomings in this sense with a reduction of decision-making powers. 
The competence principle could be employed to disqualify the political 
decision-makers that fail to meet their epistemic responsibilities. Yet 
Brennan’s account of voting ethics denies altogether that there can be 
any such responsibility for ordinary citizens, because the property or 
standard necessary to access voting powers is defined as expertise, a 
standard that ordinary citizens cannot plausibly have any responsibility 
to meet. The argument’s move would thus become problematic: if 
ordinary citizens have no epistemic responsibilities as political 
decision-makers, then how can they be barred from participating based 
on the claim that they failed to meet these responsibilities? Hence, a 
justification for exclusion based on the epistemic responsibilities of 
political decision-makers would require a very different account of 
these responsibilities than the one proposed by Brennan. 
Of course, Brennan and other standard epistocrats could reply that 
none of this matter. After all, they never intended to pursue such an 
argumentative strategy in the first place. For them, the issue is not 
about the epistemic responsibilities of voters but rather about securing 
the best feasible outcomes. I can be legitimately excluded from 
performing open heart surgery even if I never had any duty to master 
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the skills necessary to perform well on the operating table in the first 
place, because there is an ideal outcome that needs to be secured and I 
am not qualified enough to give any contribution to it. On the contrary, 
I am very likely to do significant damage in this sense. This is what 
justifies denying me access to the operating table. For standard 
epistocrats, the same goes for voting.  
The problem with this reply is that it leads us straight back to the 
problems highlighted in the previous paragraphs concerning the 
epistemic circumstances of political decision-making. These 
circumstances undermine the analogy employed just above. In the 
operating room, there is a clear ideal outcome that we want: the success 
of the operation and the restoring of the patient’s health. We all agree 
on the desirability of this outcome and on what range of properties 
qualifies a successful surgery. In the context of political decision-
making, alas, we do not agree.  
Consequently, the fact that an argumentative strategy grounded in 
the epistemic responsibilities of ordinary citizens is not available to 
them is indeed a problem for standard epistocrats. With this path 
precluded to them, standard epistocrats are left with a theory driven 
more by the speculation that epistocracy will yield better outcomes 
than a democracy – something that can hardly be proved or disproved 
– rather than by a proper justification for it. In other words, the standard 
argument for epistocracy falls into a vicious circle precisely because of 
its commitment to a radical form of political instrumentalism. The 
justification for competence-based restrictions on voting that it 
proposes (which is exclusively based on the appeal to instrumental 
benefits) is untenable in light of the epistemic circumstances of political 
decision-making. The most plausible alternative would be to rely on the 
idea that incompetent voters can be legitimately excluded because they 
fail to meet their epistemic responsibilities. But, in this respect, the only 
account of the epistemic responsibilities of ordinary citizens in voting 
provided by standard epistocrats undermines the justification of their 
34 
 
exclusion, rather than supporting it. This leads the argument into a 
blind alley. The standard argument for epistocracy, therefore, must be 
rejected. 
[1.4] A Non-Instrumental Alternative? 
In the previous section, I argued that the standard argument for 
epistocracy fails to provide a plausible justification for excluding 
ordinary citizens from voting procedures. Should we then conclude that 
there is no plausible case to be made for restricting the access to voting 
procedures on grounds of political competence? Not necessarily. If the 
standard argument failed precisely because of the problems associated 
with its radically instrumental approach, then perhaps a non-
instrumental alternative will provide a more convincing case. 
This alternative will obviously have to avoid the same pitfalls that the 
standard argument is fraught with. If what leads the standard argument 
to failure is its commitment to a radical instrumentalism and its 
subsequent incapacity to attribute any epistemic responsibility in 
voting to ordinary citizens, what we are looking for is an argument that 
can indeed attribute positive epistemic responsibilities in voting to 
ordinary citizens. Furthermore, the argument should  provide a 
convincing justification for constraining participation in voting 
practices on the basis of such epistemic responsibilities, all without 
resorting to the contentious and unverifiable claim that the quality of 
political outcomes will be improved as a consequence of these 
restrictions on the franchise. 
In the rest of this thesis, my goal will be to present and discuss such 
an alternative. In this section, I give a broad overview of how I intend 
to proceed in this sense. I label the alternative to the standard argument 
that I propose the civic argument for epistemic constraints on voting. Let 
me reconstruct, in broad strokes, the premises that constitute it and 
that will be defended in the following two chapters. 
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I will interpret epistemic responsibility in voting as the requirement 
to exercise a cluster of basic epistemic capacities such as gathering 
knowledge of relevant political facts (and of the debate surrounding 
them when the facts are disputed); gaining a decent understanding of 
political concepts, issues, policies and institutions; being willing to 
engage with public affairs; acknowledging the complexity of political 
issues, and so forth. This requirement, I will argue, is built into the 
institutional role of voters and flows from the specific tasks and powers 
that characterize it. Moreover, this requirement represents the content 
of what I call a civic duty of voters, a positive duty that befalls voters and 
that is grounded in the normativity of joint agency.50 On this view, 
epistemic responsibility in voting is a practical norm with an epistemic 
content that voters ought to comply with because, by participating in 
the practice of public decision-making, they are jointly committed to 
contributing to the underlying goal of the practice according to their 
role, thereby becoming mutually answerable for their behaviour. Based 
on these normative considerations, certain modest constraints on the 
exercise of voting powers can be justified. These arrangements will be 
defined as epistemic constraints on voting: institutional procedures 
aimed at securing epistemically responsible participation in voting 
through proxies such as making the exercise of voting powers 
conditional upon undertaking previous competence-enhancing 
training. 
Breaking away from an instrumentalist approach will yield the 
following advantages. First, it will allow for a more plausible stance on 
the ethics of voting. More precisely, the civic argument does not ask 
voters to do anything that they cannot be plausibly regarded as having 
a duty to do. The argument will start, in this sense, from a familiar claim: 
a certain degree of competence is part of the demands associated with 
                                              
50 As I explain in chapter 2, my main reference will be Margaret Gilbert’s joint commitment 
theory as reconstructed in Gilbert 1989, 2000, 2006, 2013 and 2018. 
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the role of participants in public decision-making. A significant part of 
the work conducted in this thesis will be devoted to explaining what 
exactly gives an epistemic dimension to the role of voters (i.e. I will 
argue that voting consists in the performance of an epistemic agency 
analogous to assertion making) and on what grounds the requirement 
to be epistemically responsible is binding (i.e. because we owe it to each 
other and have a standing to demand it of each other as a collective 
engaged in the effort of making a decision together, as a group).  
By showing epistemic responsibility as a requirement built into our 
public decision-making role, and by grounding the need to uphold this 
requirement in the normativity of joint agency, the civic argument will 
allow us to value things such as being informed, careful and attentive in 
voting without making any reference to their impact on political 
outcomes. From the standpoint that will be defended in this thesis, 
being epistemically responsible in voting is valuable because it 
represents a normatively appropriate response to the fact that we have 
a role to play in the collective endeavour of political-decision making, 
without having to commit to any further consideration about the 
contribution (or lack thereof) that this gives to the epistemic 
correctness of political outcomes. 
This, in turn, will make it possible to construe a valid justification for 
epistemic constraints on voting that will not be driven by any 
contentious speculation about their conduciveness to better outcomes, 
but rather by the non-instrumental claim that, as people who share a 
commitment to engage in the collective endeavour of public decision-
making, we have a shared right to demand a certain degree of security 
that the decision will be reached on proper terms. Notice how, from this 
standpoint, epistemic constraints on voting would remain justified as “a 
proxy for good epistemic conduct”51, even if we concede that the 
                                              
51 Peter 2016(a), 143. 
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epistemic circumstances of political decision-making forbid or hinder 
any appeal to procedure independent standards of correctness. 
Conclusions of Chapter 1 
In this chapter, I have explained why the standard argument for 
epistocracy is defective and suggested that a non-instrumental 
alternative will provide a better justification for constraining 
participation in voting practices on the basis of political competence or, 
to use my own terminology, epistemic responsibility. This alternative 
argument, labelled the civic argument for epistemic constraints on 
voting, will be presented and defended in the following two chapters. 
Chapter 2 will present a general account of civic duties, whereas chapter 
3 will apply the account to voting practices. 
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Chapter 2 – The Civic Argument, Part I: An Account of 
Civic Duties 
In the previous chapter, I analysed the standard argument for 
epistocracy and argued that it falls short of its own goals. More 
precisely, I argued that the standard argument is untenable in light of 
the epistemic circumstances of political decision-making and because 
it reduces the epistemic responsibilities in voting of ordinary citizens to 
a negative duty not to vote incompetently. As a result, it cannot justify 
restricting participation in voting on grounds of competence. I then 
suggested that these shortcomings pave the way for a different and 
more plausible argument, one that avoids instrumentalism and portrays 
epistemic responsibility in voting as a positive duty. 
I will now start to reconstruct and assess this alternative argument. I 
will advance the following set of claims. Those who participate in the 
practices of a political institution are under a special type of positive 
obligations called civic duties. Civic duties require that participants in 
these practices comply, in a thick and substantive sense, with the 
responsibilities associated with their role. These obligations are 
grounded in the normativity of joint agency: by participating with 
others in a collective institutional practice, we take on a commitment 
to contributing to its shared practical goal on the basis of the tasks 
associated with our role, and this makes us answerable to one another 
for our conduct in this regard. In the context of voting, one of our civic 
duties is to vote in an epistemically responsible way. This normativity 
justifies the application of epistemic constraints on voting procedures. 
An epistemic constraint on voting should be understood as a formal 
mechanism meant to ensure – as much as feasible – that voters 
effectively discharge their civic duty of epistemic responsibility. As 
anticipated, I will refer to this cluster of claims as the civic argument for 
epistemic constraints on voting. 
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The reconstruction of the civic argument will be undertaken in two 
steps, which correspond to the next two chapters of the thesis. The first 
step, detailed in the present chapter, consists in giving an account of 
civic duties. My aim is to provide an account that explains the crucial 
and most relevant elements of a civic duty, with no presumption to be 
able to successfully exhaust all its possible implications and normative 
significance. The second step, detailed in chapter 3, consists in applying 
the account of civic duties to voting practices, with the purpose of 
explaining why it justifies epistemic constraints on participation in 
voting procedures. 
This chapter will have the following structure:  
In section [2.1], I explain the basic features of a civic duty. I argue that 
a civic duty is an obligation that applies to those who participate in the 
practices and procedures of a political institution and which requires 
them to abide by the responsibilities and norms of action entailed by 
their role. Section [2.2] expands on the content of a civic duty by 
providing a general framework for its identification as well as some 
useful examples. Sections [2.3] and [2.4] are both dedicated to the task 
of grounding civic duties and explaining the sources of their normative 
bindingness. In section [2.3], I suggest that civic duties could be 
grounded in moral principles such as the value of shared citizenship or 
the principle of fairness, but ultimately express caution with respect to 
this idea. In section [2.4], I will instead defend the idea that that civic 
duties are best understood as grounded in the normativity of joint 
agency. In section [2.5], I will consider some issues that my argument 
for civic duties might give rise to. In particular, I will discuss a few 
preliminary conditions for incurring a civic duty, such as willing 




[2.1] Civic Duties: The Basic Features 
In this section, my purpose is to give a preliminary account of the basic 
features of civic duties. To reiterate and clarify, the claims that I present 
in the first two sections of the chapter are just meant to describe the 
structural elements of civic duties. I will not provide any argument for 
their normative bindingness until sections [2.3] and [2.4].  
Civic duties are obligations1 that apply to those who participate in 
the procedures and practices of the political institutions of a certain 
community. I will start by presenting a generic definition of what I take 
a civic duty to be. 
Generic Form of a Civic Duty: whenever X is 
acting in an institutional capacity within a 
political institution, X ought to abide by the 
norms entailed by that capacity. 
Let me explore the definition and clarify its key elements. Whenever 
we talk about a normative directive of some kind – and assuming that 
the arguments for its reason-giving force are effective – what needs to 
be determined at first is to whom it applies (its subjects) and what it 
demands (its content). In the case of civic duties, the key notion for 
determining both these elements is that of ‘acting in an institutional 
capacity’. I understand someone as acting in an institutional capacity 
insofar as their agency is authorized by – or arranged according to – 
some institutional set of rules that specify a role for that agent. Having 
a role can be defined as possessing or having been assigned a cluster of 
specific tasks and powers that applies squarely because – and only 
insofar as – one acts within the boundaries of an institutional practice.2 
                                              
1 I do not distinguish in a significant sense between ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’. What I mean by 
both is a directive that has normative force and that outweighs other practical 
considerations as well as our desires and inclinations. 
2 See Applbaum 1999, 46, Hardimon 1994, 334 and Searle 2005, 22. 
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From here onward, I will use the terms ‘institutional capacity’ and 
‘institutional role’ interchangeably. 
Let me explain in some more detail the framework that I am working 
with. Let us assume that an institution is a complex social structure 
constituted by an articulated set of interdependent practices. This set 
of practices has established itself in a widely recognized way and 
reproduces itself over time with the purpose of fulfilling a socially 
relevant end.3 Political institutions are the subset of institutions whose 
social end is to contribute to the governance of a community of people 
who live in a shared territory. For instance, police forces count as 
political institutions, as they contribute to governance by guaranteeing 
law enforcement within the boundaries of the community. Another 
example is the Treasury, whose function is to manage and distribute 
public finances. To perform such functions, political institutions need 
to coordinate the agency of multiple individuals into a stable pattern of 
behaviour.  This kind of large-scale co-ordination is usually achieved 
through the constitution of a set of rules relative to the institution and 
its practices. These rules constrain what individuals within it may or 
may not do. Quite commonly, they also comprise a division of labour 
and the determination of roles for those who act in the practices of the 
institution. As explained above, this means that some individuals 
acquire certain specific tasks and powers. For instance, police forces, in 
order to fulfil different aspects of law enforcement, will apply to some 
individual agent the role of police officer and to some other the role of 
detective. Individuals acting in these institutional capacities will have 
tasks and powers that are unique to them and that apply to them only 
insofar as they act within the boundaries of the practices of the 
institution under consideration. 
                                              
3 Searle 2005, 21 - 22. I am including a functionalist and teleological language that Searle is 
largely critical of. I do not intend to delve in any significant way into this debate. For a 
defence of teleological accounts of institutions, see Miller 2010. 
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I have stated that the notion of an institutional capacity or role is key 
also for what concerns the content of a civic duty. Why that is the case 
should be quite straightforward. In the generic definition that I have 
given, those acting in an institutional capacity have a civic duty to abide 
by the norms entailed by the capacity in question. In my account, those 
who act in an institutional capacity ought to comply with the norms of 
action that enable them to fulfil the responsibilities associated with 
their role in the institution. In the following pages, I will say more about 
what this means and provide normative reasons in support of this claim. 
What is important, for now, is that the content of a civic duty follows 
from the pragmatic features of an institutional role and of the political 
institution to which the role is associated. Any attempt at identifying it 
will need to take into consideration these pragmatic (and contingent) 
features, such as the organization of the institution, its social function, 
etc. 
Before moving on to the task of giving more details about the content 
of civic duties, let me briefly clarify some important points. The norms 
associated with institutional roles that determine the content of a civic 
duty are sometimes referred to as role obligations. The best definition 
of this term is the one provided by Michael Hardimon. He defines a role 
obligation as “a moral requirement, which attaches to an institutional 
role, whose content is fixed by the function of the role, and whose 
normative force flows from the role.”4 Although Hardimon focuses on 
social institutions in general rather than merely on political institutions 
as I do, there is an evident similarity with the account that I am 
attempting to articulate. In both cases, what is being described are 
requirements that apply to a subject X squarely because X is acting in a 
certain capacity.5 Moreover, both Hardimon and I ultimately want to 
show that acting in an institutional capacity changes the reasons for 
                                              
4 Hardimon 1994, 334. 
5 Ibid., 335. 
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action that are normatively relevant for an agent, setting up certain 
binding expectations as well as giving them a specific content that 
would not otherwise exist. In this sense, it is perfectly adequate to 
interpret civic duties as a special case of role obligations, namely the 
role obligations that arise within institutions of governance rather than 
within social institutions at large.  
But if this is the case, then one might ask, why not just use the notion 
of role obligation in the first place? I will not employ this notion because 
I want to avoid a potential confusion related to the normative points 
that I will make in the following sections. The standard view in political 
philosophy is sceptical regarding the normative significance of role 
obligations, for a number of reasons.6 Institutional roles might generate 
certain requirements and entail certain norms of action functional to 
their fulfilment, but it does not necessarily follow that these 
requirements are normatively relevant and that there is any genuine 
duty to comply with them. Institutional roles might be part of 
oppressive institutional practices or they might require immoral 
actions, etc. I will return to these issues in section [2.5]. For the time 
being, the point is that, if we accept that the responsibilities associated 
with institutional roles do not always have independent normative 
force, as it seems reasonable to do, then any account that attributes 
automatic normative significance to them must justify this move and 
explain the sources or grounds of this normative significance. As 
anticipated, I will argue that joint agency provides such grounds for 
some role obligations. Furthermore, it is worth anticipating that I will 
concede that there cannot be any civic duty to comply with the norms 
of action associated with an institutional role if this would entail 
supporting morally repugnant actions. 
Hardimon’s position on these issues is instead more ambiguous and 
problematic. Rather than trying to identify the sources of the normative 
                                              
6 Simmons 1979, 16 - 24. 
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significance of role obligations, Hardimon seems to regard them as 
having independent and freestanding normative force. Hardimon takes 
the institutional capacity in which an agent is acting to be itself the 
source of a duty to comply with the relative requirements, at least as 
long as the capacity is acceptable upon rational assessment.7 For 
instance, he criticizes the principle of fairness exactly for failing to 
account for the normative independence of roles.  
As it will be clear from later sections, this is not a position that I 
endorse. Ultimately, my aim is to defend the claim that those who act 
in institutional capacities within the practices of a political institution 
ought to uphold the requirements associated with their roles because 
this is what their civic duty consists in. But the reason for which such a 
duty subsists does not come, in my view, from the capacity itself. To 
avoid any confusion between my position and Hardimon’s, I will not be 
using his terminology. 
[2.2] The Content of Civic Duties 
In this section, I will expand on the content of civic duties. Recall that, 
in my definition, a civic duty requires us to abide by the norms of action 
entailed by the institutional capacity in which an agent is acting. As 
explained above, this means that the content of a civic duty follows from 
the kind of institutional capacity under consideration and depends 
upon the specific tasks and powers associated with that capacity. Again, 
what I am looking for is, ultimately, something normatively binding. 
The idea is that those who act in a certain role ought to honour the 
demands associated with it because this is what their civic duty consists 
in. For the time being, however, I will not yet discuss the normative 
grounds of civic duties and limit myself to a clarification of their 
content. 
                                              
7 Hardimon 1994, 344 - 345. 
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I will proceed through a generalization. If the content of a civic duty 
follows from the pragmatic features of the institutional capacity under 
consideration and from the features of the institutional practice in 
which the capacity is located, proceeding through a generalization 
seems inevitable. Political institutions vary in their contingent features, 
in their organization and internal division of labour, and so does each 
role within them. Determining the precise content of the civic duties 
associated with any institutional role would require us to engage in an 
extensive case-by-case analysis. I will undertake such an analysis 
regarding voting in the next chapter. In this section, I will limit myself 
to presenting a general account and testing its plausibility through a 
couple of relevant examples. 
In my interpretation, a civic duty demands that one abide by the 
norms associated with an institutional role in a thick sense. What this 
means is that discharging a civic duty requires more than a formal 
fulfilment of the tasks associated with the role. Discharging a civic duty 
requires that we perform the tasks and exercise the powers associated 
with the role in a way that is substantively satisfactory. The specifics will 
vary according to the role but, broadly speaking, the thought is the 
following: those acting in an institutional capacity ought to act in ways 
that are substantively coherent with the purposes and values underlying 
the role and the institution of which it is part. 
Let me explain this thought in a more detailed fashion. Acting in an 
institutional capacity entails a cluster of constitutive norms of action 
that determine what counts as performing that role in a certain context, 
a cluster that cannot be forfeited without forfeiting the role itself.8 This 
cluster, which is usually formally and legally specified, establishes what 
those acting in the institutional capacity are allowed or not allowed to 
do as occupants of their roles. For instance, the police code will specify 
                                              




this cluster for those who act as members of the police force, 
determining their assignments as well as the legal boundaries of their 
powers. 
But while these constitutive norms of action are fundamental to 
determining the content of a civic duty, they do not exhaust it as they 
mostly pertain to the sphere of legal and political obligations. What 
interests us is the broader sense in which one can uphold a role and 
abide by its requirements. Suppose I am assigned a certain task. For 
instance, suppose my housemates entrust me with buying groceries for 
the whole household. They will of course expect that I carry out the task 
and bring home the groceries. But that seems to tell an incomplete story 
about what I am expected to do. There are ways in which I can fall short 
of acting properly that have nothing to do with me fulfilling or not the 
task. For instance, my housemates will also expect me to be careful in 
what I buy, that I don’t overspend unnecessarily, that I try to 
accommodate everyone’s dietary preferences as much as feasible, etc. 
In other words, when entrusted with a certain task, formal fulfilment of 
the task will not be the only relevant dimension of assessment.  
Let us apply this thought to acting in an institutional capacity. We 
explained that X is acting in an institutional capacity when X holds a 
cluster of tasks and powers that apply to her insofar as she acts within 
the boundaries of an institutional practice. If the claims offered above 
are correct, an occupant of that role X will not be expected to merely 
‘tick the box’ and fulfil the tasks formally attached to the role. X’s 
conduct will be also assessed according to further standards. For 
instance, if X is assigned certain powers, how these powers are exercised 
will obviously matter. Is the exercise coherent with the underlying 
pretext of the position that X has been entrusted to occupy, or does it 
clearly clash with it? When we act in an institutional capacity, there is 
clearly something more at stake than formal satisfaction of the tasks 
associated with the role. In my view, a civic duty demands more. It 
demands a conduct that is coherent with the rationale of the role and 
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with the ‘spirit’ of the institution as a whole. Having a civic duty means, 
therefore, that one is required to act in ways that uphold the norms and 
requirements associated with an institutional role in a thick, 
substantively demanding sense that cannot be reduced to abidance by 
formal duties.9  
This twofold account of the duties of institutional actors finds 
support in the literature. In a recent paper, Leslie Green seems to think 
about the requirements associated with the role of judges in a way that 
employs a similar twofold account and explicitly addresses the issue in 
terms of the substantive expectations that apply to judges in virtue of 
their station within judiciary institutions.10 Green is discussing Michael 
S. Moore’s claim that the application of the law constitutes and exhausts 
the responsibilities associated with acting as a judge.11 Green challenges 
this claim. Against Moore’s view, he argues that the discretion allowed 
to judges in the use of their powers12 binds them to further substantive 
criteria that are not formalized by the law, but that are still part of what 
being a judge entails from a substantive point of view. Green identifies 
three families of requirements in this sense: law-applying obligations, 
law-improving obligations and law-protecting obligations.13 Law-
applying obligations correspond to what I have identified as the 
constitutive requirements of the role. They are what being a judge 
consists in. Law-improving and law-protecting obligations extend 
                                              
9 Indeed, it can be the case that the substantive demands of a civic duty end up conflicting 
with the formal requirements of a role. Law enforcement institutions such as the police 
provide us with very forceful examples in this regard. It is quite easy to imagine a case where 
police forces receive orders - which they supposedly have a formal obligation to obey - that 
clearly go against the values in name of which their role exists, such as being ordered to 
violently repress a peaceful demonstration. In such a case, their civic duty conflicts with 
their formal requirements. Which one wins out is a complex matter that deserves further 
work which I cannot undertake here. 
10 Green 2016, 329 - 332. Again, as Green immediately recognizes, this does not necessarily 
say anything about whether these norms have genuine normative force.  
11 Ibid., 324. 
12 Ibid., 334. 
13 Ibid., 335 - 336. 
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beyond that. They require judges to use their powers in a way that 
upholds the judiciary institutions in a more robust sense, by behaving 
in ways that improve it and safeguard its integrity.  
The recent work on political corruption conducted by Emanuela 
Ceva and Maria Paola Ferretti explores extensively the nature of the 
demands associated with institutional roles and leads to a similar 
twofold account.14 The two authors discuss the following examples. 
Take the case of a politician who has clientelistic relations with the 
electorate. Even though such behaviour is not strictly speaking 
unlawful, from a substantive point of view it clearly contradicts the 
rationale of the institutional role that the agent occupies.15 Ceva and 
Ferretti also consider  the case of doctors who work for the national 
health-care system in Italy.16 As in other countries, they are allowed to 
refrain from performing abortions by appealing to their conscience. But 
even if they do so, they are still required to give extensive support to the 
patient, for instance by providing information about alternative 
facilities. Doctors are allowed some margin of discretion in how to fulfil 
the latter requirement and, quite often, they act in ways that are 
substantively incompatible with the rationale of their role. For instance, 
they manipulate information, they make themselves difficult to reach 
out to, etc. Ceva and Ferretti explain in good detail how, for instance, 
this has made it extremely difficult for women in many areas of Italy to 
obtain proper care in this respect.17  
In both these accounts, the norms of action entailed by institutional 
roles are conceived in a thick way. Exactly as I did above, they are 
conceived as entailing the requirement to exercise whatever power is 
                                              
14 Ceva & Ferretti 2014 & 2018. According to Ceva and Ferretti, political corruption occurs 
whenever a public official bends institutional rules with the purpose of advancing a 
surreptitious agenda (2018, 219). From the standpoint of this work, political corruption 
would be interpreted as a particularly serious instance of violation of civic duties. 
15 Ibid., 221. 
16 Ceva & Ferretti 2014, 132 - 140. 
17 Ibid., 133 - 134. 
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associated with the role in a way that is substantively coherent with the 
values and ends of the role, and of the institutional practices of which 
the role is part. This general twofold framework is not meant to excuse 
us from case-by-case work, but it will hopefully facilitate the 
reconstruction of the content of civic duties. Identifying the content of 
a civic duty will nevertheless be a complex matter, bound to be open to 
various disputes. There will be disagreement about what it means to act 
in a way that is substantively coherent with the spirit of one’s 
institutional capacity, the correct view of the ends of an institution, the 
rationale of an institutional role, how to distinguish behaviours that are 
substantively compatible with it from those that are not, etc. But, 
hopefully, the examples provided suffice to show how the framework is 
generally plausible. 
[2.3] Civic Duties as Moral Obligations 
Up to this point, I have just explained what I take a civic duty to be. I 
have argued that it should be understood as the obligation to uphold – 
in a thick and substantive sense – the norms of action associated with 
the institutional capacity in which an agent is acting. Having described 
civic duties does not mean, however, to have argued for them. I have 
yet to discuss the normative grounds of these duties. I turn to this task 
now. 
Let me offer a methodological remark first. In this work, I defend a 
peculiar position with respect to the normative grounds of civic duties. 
I argue that civic duties are grounded in joint agency. The reason why 
those acting in institutional capacities ought to comply with the norms 
of action associated with their role in the institutional practice at stake 
is that participation in a collective agency jointly commits them to 
contributing to the overarching shared goal of the practice according to 
their role, and this generates mutual answerability between them. That 
said, I recognize that the desired conclusion – civic duties do exist and 
are genuinely binding – can be supported in different ways. The thought 
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should be acceptable and plausible even for those who will not find the 
specific defence that I propose to be convincing.  
In this section I will explore two possible arguments for viewing civic 
duties as moral obligations. The first argues for civic duties as 
associative moral obligations. From this standpoint, civic duties draw 
their normative force from the moral value of the relationship with our 
fellow citizens. The second interprets civic duties as obligations of 
fairness. From this standpoint, civic duties draw their normative force 
from the moral principle of fair play. In this section, I will reconstruct 
and assess both these arguments, explaining the issues that they leave 
open and why we should be cautious in endorsing them. 
Let us start with the interpretation of civic duties as associative moral 
obligations. An associative moral obligation is a moral requirement that 
derives its force from the existence of a special relationship between two 
or more agents. A moral obligation is associative if its force is derived 
from the sheer existence of a certain morally valuable relationship 
rather than from other independent considerations.18 There are some 
implications that follow from this. First, an associative duty is a moral 
requirement that does not exist prior to the constitution of the relevant 
relationship and its practices. Second, it is owed only to those with 
whom the relevant relationship is present and not to people in general. 
Third, it is a non-voluntary duty that obtains regardless of whether the 
relevant relationship has been freely entered. The relationships that are 
commonly cited as sources of these duties are those between friends, 
family and members of other collectives such as organizations and, 
importantly for us, political communities. 
Given how I characterized them, it is quite easy to see how civic 
duties might be interpreted as associative moral obligations. Let us 
momentarily set aside the issue of their anti-voluntarism, as it deserves 
                                              
18 Scheffler 2001, 4 - 5. Ronald Dworkin (1986, 195) defines them as “the special 
responsibilities social practice attaches to membership in some biological or social group, 
like the responsibilities of family or friends or neighbours”. 
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a more thorough discussion, which will be undertaken in [2.5]. Civic 
duties clearly share the other two features of associative moral 
obligations. Like them, civic duties do not exist outside the background 
of a political community with institutional practices that determine the 
roles in which an agent might act. Furthermore, they too have 
normative relevance only among the subset of those who happen to be 
involved in those practices. 
Having established these similarities, an associativist argument for 
civic duties would take the following shape. The first claim would be 
that the relationship obtaining between citizens of the same political 
community is a good that is worth upholding and that has moral 
bearing on how we ought to act.19 Ronald Dworkin provides what is 
arguably the most influential account of the moral value of shared 
citizenship. According to Dworkin, genuine political communities – 
those in which citizens commit to a basic set of principles and values 
because they recognize themselves in them rather than for mere 
convenience – create bonds of fraternity, special concern and unique 
regard between its members.20 Suppose a premise of this kind or a 
similar alternative establishes the point. Political institutions and their 
practices represent a significant part of the context in which this civic 
relationship develops itself and through which its value is sustained. If 
this is correct, those who act in an institutional capacity acquire 
particularly weighty responsibilities in this regard. Granted this, it could 
be argued that they have a civic duty to honour the demands attached 
to their institutional role because this is fundamental for the flourishing 
of the civic relationship21 or, alternatively, because this is part of what 
                                              
19 This relationship is usually valued non-instrumentally. That is, it is valued as a distinctive 
good, to be appreciated regardless of the contribution that it gives to other valuable goods 
(Mason 2000, 42 - 63). 
20 Dworkin 1986, 201 - 202. 
21 Bhikhu Parekh (1993), for instance, argues on similar lines for a moral duty to act in ways 
that safeguard the moral and cultural capital of a community. 
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honouring the relationship itself is about. For instance, Seth Lazar 
argues that compliance with one’s associative duties is morally required 
because being in a morally valuable relationship is a fact that deserves 
a morally appropriate responsiveness from those involved.22 From this 
standpoint, a valuable relationship commands recognition for its value 
and this, in turn, places those involved in it under a moral duty to act 
in ways that reflect such a recognition. This moral duty would take, for 
those who act in an institutional capacity within political institutions, 
the particular form of a civic duty. On this view, we ought to uphold our 
institutional roles in a thick and substantive sense because not doing so 
would show neglect and disregard for the value of the relationship that 
binds us to our fellow citizens. 
The second possible argument for civic duties that I suggest appeals 
to the moral principle of fairness. Originally formulated by Hart and 
later expanded upon by Rawls, the principle of fairness is strictly 
connected with the notion of reciprocity. The principle establishes, 
roughly, that if X participates in a collective enterprise that provides her 
and others with certain benefits, then X has a duty to reciprocate and 
contribute in sharing the fatigues or burdens of the enterprise.23 If, 
overall, I do benefit from a certain cooperative scheme, quid pro quo I 
ought to do what is necessary for properly doing my part in upholding 
the scheme. Otherwise, my conduct would be unfair towards others 
who are either directly involved in the scheme or indirectly dependent 
upon its functioning. As Rawls himself puts it: “we are not to gain from 
the cooperative labour of others without doing our fair share”.24  
Applied to our case, an argument for civic duties based on the 
principle of fairness could take the following shape. Assume that the 
political institution in which X is acting meets, upon assessment, a 
certain threshold of justice or moral acceptability. X has distinctive 
                                              
22 Lazar 2016. 
23 Hart 1955, Rawls 1964, Klosko 1992.  
24 Rawls 1971, 112. 
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tasks and powers within the institutional practice and has acquired 
certain responsibilities as a result. X has a civic duty to comply with the 
norms of action associated with her role because not to do so would be 
unfair and wrong towards both other participants in the practice and 
other citizens in general. It would be unfair because it would represent 
a parasitical conduct that forces others to compensate for X’s lack of 
effort, and it would be unfair because X would be failing to deliver on 
the institutional responsibilities that she has been entrusted with as an 
occupant of that specific institutional role, thereby betraying the 
legitimate expectations that other citizens have with respect to her 
conduct. 
Grounding civic duties by appealing to either of these two moral 
arguments has advantages. For instance, they are both intuitively 
powerful and fit a certain common-sense moral psychology. We do tend 
to regard those who fail to honour the responsibilities associated with 
their institutional roles as acting in a morally questionable way, and 
common-sense morality tends to explain this by calling upon either the 
value of citizenship or fairness. Yet both arguments raise controversies 
that should make us cautious about them. Some of these issues 
(voluntarism and the morality of institutional practices) also affect the 
argument from joint agency that I will discuss in the next section, so 
they will be dealt with later. Both these arguments, however, raise more 
immediate and distinctive issues.  
On one hand, associativist arguments depend upon the premise that 
a civic relationship has a moral value that commands recognition. As 
observed elsewhere, this appeal to the moral value of citizenship and to 
the mutual regard that it supposedly creates might represent an 
unnecessary (or unwarranted) idealization of the nature of civic 
bonds.25 Moreover, it might raise the suspicion that what is doing all 
the work is some independent notion of justice or a general concern 
                                              
25 Simmons 2000, 78 - 79. 
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with equality, making the appeal to the value of the civic relationship 
completely redundant and – with it – the special nature of the duties 
resulting from it.26 A similar issue emerges from the argument from 
fairness. Such an argument would require an account of what fair 
reciprocation consists in. This, in turn, would make the argument 
dependent upon a thicker theory of justice that provides us with some 
criterion to adjudicate what a fair distribution of responsibilities and 
benefits is27, which is exactly the reason why Rawls himself pursued the 
research agenda that led to A Theory of Justice. In the next section I will 
explain how a more pragmatic argument, one in which joint agency 
rather than some abstract morality provides the relevant normative 
grounds for civic duties, can deliver on the intuitions of these moral 
arguments without falling prey to the same difficulties. 
[2.4] Civic Duties as Obligations of Joint Agency 
I concluded the previous section by highlighting the difficulties 
generated by the attempt to ground civic duties in moral principles. In 
this section, I will pursue an alternative argument, one that I take to be 
better equipped to support the conclusions that civic duties are 
normatively binding. I will first present the argument and then return 
to its advantages at the end of the section. 
My proposal is that we should understand civic duties as obligations 
of joint agency. I propose that the practices that articulate a political 
institution should be conceived as complex cases of joint agency and, in 
the same way as it can be shown that participation in standard cases of 
non-immoral joint agency grounds at least pro tanto individual duties 
on participants, the same goes for acting in an institutional capacity. 
More precisely, I argue that agents acting in institutional capacities 
have a civic duty to uphold the norms of action entailed by their roles 
                                              
26 Consequently, civic duties would become an example of what Rawls calls “natural duty of 
justice”, which commands support for just institutions. See Rawls 1971, 115. 
27 Horton 2010, 92. 
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because participation in a collective practice jointly commits them to 
contributing to the overarching shared goal of the practice in 
accordance to their role within the practice.  
The idea that joint agency can ground duties for participants has 
been defended in various philosophical accounts.28 Their common 
claim can be roughly summarized as follows: pursuing a common action 
or joint endeavour with others creates sufficient practical reasons for 
acting according to the constraints required by the nature of the action 
and, absent special circumstances, thereby mutually obligates the 
parties involved. The account that best helps us in understanding this 
normativity and how it applies pertinently to political institutions is 
Margaret Gilbert’s joint commitment theory, which will be the main 
reference in what follows. 
Gilbert’s theory revolves around the central concept of joint 
commitment, which she understands as an everyday social 
phenomenon.29 For Gilbert, a joint commitment is not simply the 
coincidence of two or more isolated wills. Rather, a joint commitment 
is constituted when two or more people express their readiness to act 
together and pursue together a common action or plan.30 In other 
words, two people coincidentally sharing the same objective in their 
isolated actions are not jointly committed. They are jointly committed 
when there is some underlying sense in which they are pursuing an 
overarching practical goal together, as a collective or group, and 
recognize such goal to be theirs. 
                                              
28 See Alonso 2009, Bratman 2014, Gilbert 1989, 1993, 2000, 2006, 2013 & 2018, Pettit & 
Schweikard 2006, Roth 2004. In the pages of this thesis, I will not be able to address all 
sources of scepticism concerning the normative force of joint agency. I will nevertheless 
indirectly address some of these issues in [2.5] and, for what concerns voting, in [3.1] and 
[3.4]. 
29 Gilbert 2000, 51. 
30 Gilbert 2006, 134 - 136. 
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Gilbert’s basic case of joint commitment, two people walking 
together31, is still one of the best ways to understand the concept and 
how it can ground normative claims. Suppose that two agents are 
walking together. This might be something they have planned to do by 
explicitly agreeing to it, but it need not be the case. It might be 
something that has just happened contingently, by chance. What 
matters is that, as long as agents have at least a basic understanding that 
they are doing this thing together, that this is their action, then a certain 
relationship or standing between them is created. Namely, by walking 
together, the two parties have implicitly taken it upon themselves to act 
in ways that contribute to this activity properly and that are coherent 
with its overarching shared goal.32 For instance, they have taken it upon 
themselves to maintain the same pace. Similarly, they have taken it 
upon themselves not to behave in ways that are detrimental to the 
purpose, such as running off on their own. And the reasons for not 
doing this will not be merely a matter of avoiding inconsistent 
behaviour. The crucial point is that, if one of the parties were to start 
running, the other would be in the position to rebuke the action or at 
least demand a valid justification for it.33 Given that the two parties are 
doing something together, they both have the standing to expect and 
require – all else being equal – that their actions are conforming to what 
they were supposed to do in the first place. 
This mutual answerability, as Gilbert pertinently calls it34, sustains 
the rationale of the practice in which the parties are engaged. A practice 
that requires the joint agency of multiple individuals requires 
participants to be in the position to expect conforming conduct from 
each other. If this assurance cannot be given, the practice would be 
                                              
31 Ibid., 102. 
32 Gilbert 2000, 16 - 18. 
33 Gilbert 2018, 170 - 171. 
34 Gilbert 2000, 158 - 159 and Gilbert 2006, 153. 
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constantly in danger of being undermined at the arbitrary discretion of 
one of the parties involved.35 Under such circumstances, it would be 
reasonable to question why we should even engage in the practice in 
the first place. The constant possibility of jeopardizing its original 
purpose would make undertaking the relevant actions together a 
somehow pointless endeavour.36 The normative crux of Gilbert’s 
account of joint commitments is therefore the claim that, as long as 
there is a shared sense37 that they have set themselves out to do P, the 
participants are required to contribute to, and act coherently with, the 
overarching shared goal of P; unless valid reasons to the contrary – such 
as the immoral nature of P – apply.  
More precisely, Gilbert claims that when joint commitments do 
occur, individual agents constitute a plural subject38, whose goals and 
intentions are deemed to have normative priority over those of the 
individuals who have constituted it.39 I will not delve much into the idea 
of a plural subject. As observed elsewhere40, this might not be necessary 
to cash out the main feature of this interpretation of the normativity of 
joint agency: in virtue of the fact that they have opted into the pursuit 
of a common action with its pragmatic goals and characteristics, 
                                              
35 This is not to deny that there might be valid reasons to exit an instance of joint agency 
and hence to withdraw from the correlated commitments. As I will explain in the next 
section, in my account blatantly immoral practices do no generate normatively significant 
joint commitments. 
36 Similar reasoning can be found in Sandford Goldberg’s account of what he calls “practice 
generated entitlements to expect” something of someone. See Goldberg 2018, 150 - 156. 
37 For Gilbert, a vague understanding that you and I are doing P together is enough to 
constitute a joint commitment to P. See Gilbert 2006, 120 and 140 - 141. 
38 Ibid., 144 - 145. 
39 Ibid., 203. 
40 Pettit & Schweikard (2006, 32) correctly observe that the idea of a plural subject 
contentiously requires consistency of judgements and intentions among the individual 
agents of a group and that this is not necessary to understand the mutual answerability 
entailed by joint agency. Michael Bratman (2014, 118 - 120 and 128 - 131) similarly argues 
that a group of agents can be jointly committed to a specific action without there being any 
plural subject underlying their actions. 
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participants are answerable for how they handle themselves, at least as 
long as they act within the boundaries of the joint agency.41  
I should make clear that the expression ‘opting into’ is crucial for 
understanding where the normative bindingness comes from. Gilbert’s 
account of the normativity of joint agency has been pertinently defined 
as a “nonvoluntarist contract theory”42 and as yielding a “quasi-
contractual”43 normativity. The notion of joint commitment 
incorporates the idea that some form of willingness to participate in a 
practice is necessary for normative constraints to materialize. I will 
return to this more extensively in section [2.5]. The important point is 
that the normative bindingness, in this account, comes from the fact 
that by willingly taking part in a joint action or practice one has – as 
implicitly and subtly as this might have come to happen – taken it upon 
oneself to contribute to the fulfilment of its overarching practical goal. 
It is implied in the participation that an agent has underwritten the set 
of behavioural rules and mutual expectations functional to the 
performance of the practice. These are now limits to his discretion44, 
and others have gained a standing to advance normatively valid 
demands on his agency with respect to those rules.45 
Gilbert’s joint commitment theory has been developed, over the 
years, into a sophisticated theory of political obligation. In her account, 
joint commitments are the structure of all cases of joint agency.46 This 
leads to the interpretation of political societies as plural subjects, whose 
members are jointly committed to upholding the institutions of the 
society and have political obligations in virtue of this.47 Gilbert’s 
                                              
41 This answerability can also be explained in terms of mutual betrayal, reciprocal trust and 
owing each other something. See Gilbert 2006, 149 - 156. 
42 Simmons 2000, 73. 
43 Peter 2012, 600. 
44 Gilbert 2006, 134 - 138 & Gilbert 2018, 236 - 237. 
45 Gilbert 2006, 146 and 156 - 157. 
46 Ibid., 100 - 101. 
47 Ibid., 14. 
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interpretation of political societies as plural subjects is complex, 
sophisticated and controversial. Again, we do not need to endorse her 
whole framework to support the argument for civic duties.  
Even without full adherence to a plural-subject theory of political 
obligation, it is not uncommon to interpret political societies as 
cooperative joint schemes whose backbone is constituted by a network 
of political institutions.48 Correlatedly, it seems acceptable to interpret 
political institutions as joint practices revolving around a set of 
associated rules that are in place with the purpose of coordinating the 
interlocking agencies of the participants. These associated rules, on the 
basis of certain immanent features and aims, specify a division of 
institutional labour that determines different institutional capacities. 
Acting in these capacities burdens their occupants with specific 
expectations, tasks and responsibilities that are meant to contribute to 
the shared goal of the practice. The joint commitment approach helps 
us to understand why there might be a civic duty to meet these 
responsibilities: the duty stems from the implicit commitment to 
contribute to the overarching shared goal of the practice that an agent 
takes on board through participation. 
Let me explain the reasoning with more detail, as it is particularly 
important for my purposes. Let us call a political institution ‘P’. 
Participation in the practices of P is participation in a collective 
endeavour. P is not something that an agent X does on her own. It is a 
practice that has immanent features, including a certain division of 
labour, and that requires coordination between various agents. 
Provided that a few conditionals – to which I will return in the next 
section – obtain, then, by participating, X takes it upon herself to concur 
with others in the fulfilment of the collective action; and this commits 
X to contribute to P’s overarching shared goal (in this case the 
performance of an institutional function within the political body of 
                                              
48 Rawls 1971 and Hart 1955 are good examples in this regard. 
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society). The act of participating entails, as a latent normative feature, 
that X underwrites the set of immanent institutional norms necessary 
to uphold P, including those related to specific roles. These are now 
norms that apply to her as well and, importantly, X is now answerable 
to others for how she performs her part within the dynamics of P. From 
this standpoint, X has placed herself in a situation where there is a 
collective action unfolding, shared among many parties and that 
contains certain overarching goals. These goals have normative bearing 
on her agency for, as long as X’s actions take place within the 
boundaries of the practice, X cannot ignore that something collective is 
at stake in his individual agency. A normative standing, characterized 
by mutual answerability, is thereby instantiated between the 
participants in the institutional practice. This might not determine in a 
conclusive way what X has reason to do49, but it nonetheless weighs 
quite significantly and places X under certain obligations. 
An example might further help in cashing out this point. During my 
PhD, for a couple of years, I have been one of the organizers of a cycle 
of seminars in my Department. This was (and still is) an institution of 
the Department. It is a stable set of practices with associated rules, 
including a division of labour with specific roles and correlated 
expectations. When I first became involved in this endeavour, I did not 
swear an oath or sign any contract. And yet by taking part in a practice 
that was itself part of a larger institutional dynamic, I acquired a certain 
role within that dynamic. I acquired a cluster of specific tasks and 
powers that are functional to the fulfilment of certain responsibilities 
and made myself answerable for how I handled myself in that situation. 
Others counted on me to act in ways pertinent to my role and to the 
function of the institution in the Department. Misbehaviour on my part 
would have given others the authority to at least demand justification. 
                                              
49 Gilbert (2006, 257 - 260) argues that obligations of joint commitment give sufficient but 
not conclusive reasons for action. I return on this in section [2.5]. 
61 
 
The reason for which I had a duty to uphold the norms relevant to my 
role as organizer is hence not the sheer fact that this was my job 
description. I had a duty to fulfil my job description because this was 
entailed by willingly embarking upon a collective commitment. By 
taking it upon myself to be a part of that commitment, I recognized a 
certain cluster of expectations as something relevant for my agency and 
became answerable on the basis of these expectations. 
Now, going back to political institutions, their difference with the 
case of my involvement in a Departmental practice is a difference in 
scale and implication, not a structural one. The normative 
considerations that are relevant for simpler and small-scale cases of 
participation in collective practices are even more relevant for 
participation in the practices that underlie political institutions, given 
their impact on our communal lives. As citizens living together in a 
political community our individual actions will often be limited by 
collective institutional practices. These will contain certain immanent 
rules and expectations that alter what we may or may not do once we 
act within their boundaries. The quasi-contractual approach to the 
normativity of joint agency employed by Gilbert can give us a plausible 
explanation of why we have a civic duty to uphold the requirements 
associated with whatever institutional role we are entrusted with.50 We 
have such a civic duty because this is what we are in the position to 
expect – and have a standing to demand – of each other as agents who, 
in concert with others, have committed ourselves to the pursuit of a 
certain practical goal that underlies our collective action. 
Before moving on to further tasks, let me briefly conclude by making 
explicit what I take to be the main advantage of this line of argument 
compared with the associativist and fairness-based lines mentioned in 
the previous section. The advantage is the following: grounding civic 
                                              
50 Gilbert 2006, 156 - 163. 
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duties in joint agency, I believe, delivers on the associativist and 
reciprocity-based intuitions of the moral arguments mentioned in 
section [2.3] in a more pragmatic and less idealized way.51 The argument 
for civic duties that I have defended in this section locates the source of 
their normative bindingness in a pragmatic fact pertaining to our social 
interaction. We have certain institutional practices in place; these 
practices have goals to be accomplished. Provided that these practices 
are not morally repugnant, once we acquire a role within them, these 
goals place us under a duty to act in ways that are coherent with the 
spirit of the collective endeavour at stake. From this standpoint, what 
generates civic duties is something that we can point our fingers to: a 
collectively relevant practice is taking place, we are visibly involved in 
it as participants who have acquired specific tasks, and, because of this 
involvement, certain individual obligations follow. Rather than a 
moralistic appeal to the value of citizenship or fairness, it is the 
pragmatic fact that we are trying to accomplish something together, as 
a group of people, that generates the relevant duties. 
[2.5] Voluntarism, Underlying Awareness & Immoral Roles 
Thus far, I have kept referring to the idea that civic duties apply – and 
hence that the claims advanced in the previous section are correct – 
only if a few conditionals are in place. I have yet to specify what these 
conditionals are. I will turn to this task in this section, which is also 
meant to address some potential issues raised by my argument and to 
clarify some of its most controversial aspects. 
In the account defended thus far, civic duties are portrayed as 
obligations attached to institutional roles and grounded in joint agency. 
More precisely, I have argued that civic duties apply to those who act in 
an institutional capacity, that they require upholding the norms of 
action associated with the role, and that they apply because 
                                              
51 Ibid., 264 - 266. 
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participation in an institutional practice implicitly commits the agent 
to contributing to its overarching practical goal.  
This argument might raise a few standard worries.52 The first can be 
defined as the morality worry: something like a civic duty can exist only 
if the institutional capacity in which an agent is acting – as well as the 
requirements associated with it – meets a threshold of moral 
justifiability.53 The second can be defined as the voluntarism worry: 
something like a civic duty can subsist only if the agent has voluntarily 
subscribed to the institutional capacity (and practice) in which they are 
acting. Unless my account can satisfactorily dispel these worries, the 
conclusion that acting in institutional capacity entails genuine civic 
duties will be fragile.54 
Let me start with the morality worry. As critics often point out, even 
if acting in an institutional capacity entails certain responsibilities as 
well as norms of action functional to their fulfilment, these have no 
normative strength – and consequently there is no such thing as a civic 
duty to meet them – unless both the role and the institution of which it 
is part meet a threshold of moral acceptability.55 If the set of 
institutional practices in which I am involved has an immoral 
overarching shared goal or if my role requires me to do something 
morally repulsive, then how can there be anything like a civic duty to 
comply with those responsibilities or to contribute to that goal? There 
is indeed an overwhelming abundance of examples in which political 
                                              
52 For noteworthy accounts of these and similar worries, see Applbaum 1999, Scheffler 2001 
and Simmons 1979. 
53 Simmons 2000, 95 - 96. 
54 Simmons raises these worries against associativist positions in general (Ibid., 71) and does 
not make distinctions between associative moral obligations and quasi-contractual 
obligations of joint agency. 
55 Simmons 1979, 16 - 23. Despite his claim that institutional roles have freestanding 
normative force, Hardimon’s account of role obligations shows again some ambiguity, in 
that it comprises also a similar requirement of acceptability, according to which the 
responsibilities associated with institutional roles are normatively binding only if they are 
acceptable upon an assessment that shows the role to be “(in some sense) meaningful, 
rational, or good” (Hardimon 1994, 348). 
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institutions ask unspeakable things of those acting in institutional 
capacities. Think about those who act in the institutional capacity of 
executioner in penal systems that employ the death penalty. Sure, they 
have joined the institutional collective practices that constitute the 
penal system and they have thereby committed to doing their part, 
which entails certain norms of action. But how can there be a genuinely 
normative and reason-giving civic duty to act faithfully to their role and 
to the ends of the institution as a whole, given that such rationale 
involves the killing of convicts, which is arguably morally repugnant? 
Gilbert’s position on this issue is complicated. She argues that the 
obligations generated by a joint commitment do not conclusively 
determine what an agent ought to do but that they are nevertheless 
genuinely binding. This entails that even if they can only be trumped by 
a different obligation and not by inclinations or self-interest 
considerations, they do not conclusively settle the question of what one 
morally ought to do.56 I will not follow her. I will instead be more 
concessive: in my view there are no civic duties if a joint institutional 
practice is immoral or repugnant or if a role requires morally repugnant 
actions from its occupants. The normativity of joint agency fails to 
ground a genuine obligation to comply with the requirements 
associated with an institutional role in those circumstances in which 
this would entail supporting morally repugnant actions or practices. 
The present account does not need to be overambitious. I want to keep 
the door open to the possibility that political institutions might 
generate requirements that no joint commitment to pursue a shared 
collective goal could justify.57 In these – perhaps not uncommon – cases,  
no civic duty to uphold these requirements occurs. 
                                              
56 Gilbert 2006, 257 - 260. 
57 At the same time, it is important to notice how someone who is acting in an institutional 
capacity cannot be discharged of her civic duty for just any moral reason whatsoever. 
Whether a proposed reason is sufficiently weighty to cancel the requirement of a civic duty 
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Let me now turn to the second worry, voluntarism. This term 
identifies the idea that even if a certain practice or relationship 
generates special requirements or responsibilities that do not otherwise 
exist, this says nothing of normative relevance unless the agent has 
expressed some voluntary undertaking of these responsibilities.58 This 
goes for civic duties as well. From this standpoint, X has a civic duty 
only insofar as X has provided a significant expression of voluntary 
acceptance of her particular role and of the norms associated with it.59 
If no such expression has occurred, then the agent has no normatively 
significant duty60 binding her to those norms, let alone a duty to uphold 
them in the substantive and thick sense that I have described in my 
account. From this standpoint, the argument for civic duties that I have 
provided might be seen as quite problematic. More precisely, the 
argument for civic duties employs a notion (Gilbert’s joint 
commitment) that does not make room for a robust expression of 
intentionality. In Gilbert’s interpretation of the normativity of joint 
agency, an agent can opt into a shared practice in very subtle and 
implicit61 ways, ranging “from a sort of very informal or tacit agreement 
to a loose, rather vague mutual understanding”.62  
This is a pertinent and important challenge. However, a lot of its 
force hangs on what we take the voluntary clause for assent or 
acceptance of a role to consist in. I will advance the following view. 
                                              
is something that needs to be shown case-by-case and cannot be petitioned out of principle. 
The burden of proof, therefore, is on the refuter of a civic duty and it is quite significant. 
58 Jeske 2002. 
59 I discuss the conditional of a significant understanding of the responsibilities associated 
with a role right below. 
60 Simmons maintains (2000, 95) that we might have institutional obligations also because 
acting in an institutional capacity might help us discharge an independently justified natural 
duty of justice. 
61 See Gilbert 2018, 198 - 200 and 215 - 216. For instance, according to Gilbert the 
recognition that one is indeed part of a large-scale joint commitment, such as that of a 
political institution, can be expressed through means as subtle and implicit as referring to 
the institution as being ‘ours’. See also Gilbert 2006, 242 - 245. 
62 Simmons 2000, 74. 
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While participation in a practice needs to be willing in some modest 
sense for a civic duty to be incurred, voluntary acceptance of the role 
through an explicit pledge or act of consent is not necessary. Suppose 
that X is acting in the institutional capacity of tax collector within the 
institution of the Treasury. I have argued that X ought to act in ways 
that are faithful to her role and to the ends of the institution of the 
Treasury as a whole because she has a civic duty to do so grounded in 
her joint commitment to contribute to the overarching goal of a shared 
practice. Voluntarist critics would claim that this is true only if X has 
voluntarily assented to act as a tax collector. My take is that whether 
this is a valid point depends on how we flesh out the notion of 
‘voluntarily’. 
On a restrictive interpretation, the notion entails some kind of 
contract or promise. This would lead to the claim that X has the civic 
duty mentioned above only if X has “freely promised or contracted”63 to 
act in the capacity of tax collector. This seems an excessively strong and 
simplistic position. Simmons himself discards it while discussing 
Hardimon’s account of role obligations. He agrees with Hardimon at 
least on the fact that not all institutional duties are acquired through 
direct promissory or contractual acts and even acceptance of the 
correlated responsibilities need not be explicit.64 So let us assume that 
voluntariness should not be taken in its strongest form and interpreted 
in an excessively narrow sense, as necessarily entailing an oath or some 
kind of explicit pledge.  
Even if this is true, the challenge still has some force to it. While an 
explicit contractual or promissory act might not be necessary, 
something like a civic duty cannot simply befall us. If X acting as tax 
collector is just the result of the role being imposed on her through 
threats of violence, then it is hard to see how X can have any genuine 
                                              
63 Simmons 2000, 94. 
64 Ibidem. See also Hardimon 1994, 356 - 357. 
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duty to comply with the responsibilities associated with her role, let 
alone to do so in a thick sense.65 We must therefore find some middle 
ground or compromise between the plausible intuition that 
institutional roles cannot generate civic duties if they are simply 
imposed on us, and the equally plausible intuition that accepting a role 
does not require an explicit contractual pledge.  
My proposal is to introduce a willingness clause.66 I use ‘willingly’ as 
a term that stands for anything that gets X in the role as a result of the 
exercise of X’s conscious agency. X does not need to explicitly assent to 
taking on a certain role nor does he need to accept all its norms in order 
to satisfy this clause. It is enough, from this standpoint, that X perform 
an act that results in X becoming a participant in the practice. In other 
words, X is exempt from his civic duty only if it can be shown that he 
did not perform any such action.  
If we accept this weaker formulation of the voluntariness clause, then 
the voluntarist challenge takes the following form: agent X is bound to 
a civic duty only if X has incurred it as a result of a willingly performed 
act that pushes his agency into the boundaries of an institutional role 
and practice. What will count as an act that meets this clause will 
depend on the role under consideration and, in the next chapter, I will 
explain how to meet it in voting. Notice, for the time being, that in the 
case of most institutional roles there are easily identifiable ways to 
satisfy the clause. Depending on how an institutional practice is 
structured, there are many relatively clear ways in which one signals 
willingness to participate. We enter the boundaries of institutional 
capacities usually through easily identifiable actions. We enlist in the 
army, we apply for a job at the Treasury, etc. 
If we take this willingness clause as plausible, then grounding civic 
duties in joint agency does not seem to pose that much of a problem. 
                                              
65 As well put in Scheffler 2001, 54: “one cannot simply find oneself with such 
responsibilities without having done anything at all to acquire them”. 
66 I thank David Estlund for suggesting the use of this terminology. 
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The need for some kind of willingness in ‘joining’ or ‘opting into’ a role 
is explicitly recognized by the argument, and this seems to provide that 
balanced middle-ground solution that we were looking for. On the one 
hand, the argument recognizes that participants in a collective 
endeavour are not bound to their civic duties without some form of 
commitment on their part. On the other hand, it allows for thinner and 
more implicit ways of expressing such commitment. In this sense, the 
fact that an account of civic duties based on a Gilbertian interpretation 
of the normativity of joint agency incorporates both contractual and 
associative elements seems to be a virtue rather than an inconsistency. 
It allows us to resist the difficult thought that we might incur a civic 
duty to uphold an institutional role regardless of any willingness or 
expression of commitment on our part. But it allows us to resist the 
equally difficult idea that such willingness needs to be somehow 
explicitly stated in the form of an agreement to participate in the 
institutional practice and to all its immanent norms. 
Supporters of a more robust form of voluntarism might still argue 
that willingness is not enough, as it can give us only thin acquiescence 
rather than anything definable as an actual engagement to do our part. 
In other words, willingness to go along is neither agreement nor 
consent.67 But this does not seem a valid reply when pitted against my 
argument. Recall that I am borrowing elements from Gilbert’s account 
with the intention of making a point about the normativity of 
participation in institutional practices rather than about political 
obligations at large. In this sense, recall the example that I gave above, 
the one about my role as organizer of a cycle of seminars. Suppose that, 
halfway through the academic year, I had started to deny that I had any 
obligation to fulfil my responsibilities by saying that my acts should not 
have been understood as anything more than mere acquiescence, and 
that I did not express any explicit intention to acquire the role and the 
                                              
67 Simmons 2000, 75. For Gilbert’s own replies to this point, see Gilbert 2006, 266 - 274. 
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responsibilities associated with it. I cannot see how that could have 
counted as a normatively robust excuse not to fulfil my responsibilities. 
To recap, the analysis conducted in this section should lead us to the 
following conclusion. An agent acquires a civic duty to abide by the 
norms entailed by the institutional capacity in which they are acting 
only if the following conditions obtain: 
 The practical goal of the joint practice 
must not be morally repugnant. Call this 
the morality condition. 
 The parties to the joint practice must 
have willingly expressed some readiness 
to participate. Call this the willingness 
condition. 
In the next chapter, I will focus on how these conditions are satisfied 
in the context of voting and explain how voting is a practice that 
grounds civic duties on participants. But, before moving on, there is one 
final issue that my account of civic duties needs to deal with. Some 
might argue that even if you willingly acquire a role R, it is not 
straightforward that this results in your incurring the responsibilities 
associated with it if you had no way to know that R came with these 
responsibilities. In other words, one cannot be said to have incurred a 
civic duty to φ unless, upon participation or acquisition of the role, it 
was clear to them that φ-ing would be among the norms of action that 
would follow. Call this the underlying awareness worry. Hence, it might 
be argued that an agent is bound to her civic duties only if a further 
condition applies. Namely, only if the parties to the joint practice are 
aware of the fact that they are taking on a role in a collective 
institutional practice with a shared practical goal and are aware of the 
norms that follow from this. 
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This worry is going to be particularly important in the context of 
voting, but it is nevertheless worth spending some words on the issue 
now. I am willing to concede that underlying awareness is necessary to 
incurring a civic duty. But we should be clear that only the first of the 
layers of awareness mentioned above is truly necessary. Awareness of 
having the role – of having been assigned a cluster of institutionally 
defined tasks and powers – is indeed necessary before one can incur a 
civic duty. If I do not know that I have entered an institutional practice 
with a shared practical goal with a role to play, then I have no civic duty. 
I cannot be obligated to fulfil responsibilities that I had no idea that I 
had in the first place. But once this first layer of awareness is in place, 
this is enough to commit us to what follows from it.  
The reason is the following. A civic duty is a normative constraint 
that is meant to regulate the performance of the tasks and powers 
associated with an institutional role. As explained above, a civic duty 
entails more than mere formal compliance. A civic duty requires 
honouring the role, so to speak, and taking seriously the tasks and 
powers that come with it (at least, again, assuming that the practice of 
which the role is part is not an immoral practice). Consequently, it 
seems quite clear that being aware of the norms of action and 
responsibilities entailed by the role is not a condition without which a 
civic duty fails to apply; it is part of the content of the civic duty itself.  
To be more precise, unless it is unreasonable to expect some degree 
of underlying awareness concerning what the institutional role consists 
in, failure to understand the norms of action that follow from it is not 
exculpating. It represents, rather, a further normative shortcoming: in 
exercising an institutional role without awareness of the responsibilities 
that flow from it, one is already falling short of one’s civic duty. If I am 
aware of having incurred the role – or if this is a fact that is easily 
accessible to me and of which I should be aware – then I cannot claim 
ignorance of my responsibilities, or of what it would take to fulfil them, 
as an excuse. Doing so would signal that I failed to take the role 
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seriously in the first place, and that I hence already violated my civic 
duty. This thought seems to capture our intuitions about the norms that 
regulate the performance of institutional roles. After all, even if it were 
to be the result of ignorance, we would never justify or excuse the 
conduct of a member of the police force that abused their powers or 
that employed them arbitrarily, just to make a rather poignant example. 
Conclusions of Chapter 2 
In this chapter, I have provided an account of civic duties. I have argued 
that a civic duty is an individual obligation that applies to those acting 
in institutional capacities within the practices of a political institution. 
A civic duty requires its subjects to abide by the norms of action 
associated with their role in the practice, and to do so in a thick sense, 
by acting in ways that are substantively coherent with the goals, values 
and ends of the role and of the institution as a whole.  
I have then explained that civic duties are grounded in the 
normativity of joint agency, understood in Gilbertian terms. According 
to this view, participation in a collective institutional practice generates 
a joint commitment to contributing to its overarching shared goal 
according to the specific requirements associated with one’s role, and 
this creates a relationship of mutual answerability between the 
participants in the practice. 
In the next chapter, I show how the account of civic duties applies to 
voting and what follows from this application. I will argue, in particular, 
that voters have a civic duty to be epistemically responsible and that 




Chapter 3 – The Civic Argument, Part II: Epistemic 
Responsibility & Epistemic Constraints on Voting 
In the previous chapter, I argued that acting in an institutional capacity 
generates special obligations called civic duties. They demand that an 
agent uphold, in a thick sense, the norms of action entailed by the 
institutional role she is occupying. Civic duties are a particular instance 
of obligations of joint agency. X ought to uphold the civic duties that 
apply to her because, upon joining a collective institutional practice, X 
takes it upon herself to contribute to the overarching shared goal of the 
practice. As long as the practice is not morally repugnant, its goal 
weighs normatively on how X ought to act, and X becomes committed 
to contributing to this goal in accordance with her role, becoming 
answerable to the other participants for her behaviour. 
In this chapter, my purpose will be twofold. First, I will show the 
epistemic dimension of the civic duties associated with voting. More 
precisely, I will argue that, as part of their civic duties1, voters have an 
obligation to be epistemically responsible. Epistemic responsibility in 
voting is best understood as the requirement to exercise of a cluster of 
basic epistemic capacities. These will comprise gathering knowledge of 
relevant political facts (and of the debates surrounding them when the 
facts are disputed); gaining a decent understanding of political 
concepts, issues, policies and institutions; being willing to engage with 
public affairs; acknowledging the complexity of political issues, and so 
forth. Secondly (but no less importantly), I will argue that, once applied 
to voting, the normativity of joint agency on which civic duties are 
grounded justifies what I call epistemic constraints on voting: 
institutional mechanisms designed for the purpose of ensuring as much 
as feasible that voters act in an epistemically responsible way. I will 
explain in more detail what kind of institutional mechanisms count as 
                                              
1 In this thesis, I will not explore other civic duties that might be associated with voting. 
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epistemic constraints on voting, but one straightforward example 
would be making voting conditional upon participation, either prior to 
voting or as part of the registration process, in competence-enhancing 
exercises or training. 
The chapter is structured as follows:  
In section [3.1], I will explain how and why the normativity of joint 
agency applies to voting practices and, hence, why voting is a practice 
that generates civic duties. I will defend the idea that voting is a practice 
whereby the members of a political community concur in upholding a 
shared practical goal, namely determining which course of political 
action the community will pursue. In section [3.2], I will turn to the 
specific role of voters within such a practice. I will defend the view that 
acting in the institutional capacity of voter is to perform an activity with 
distinctively epistemic features. More precisely, I will suggest that the 
role of voters is to perform an act of political advocacy.2 An act of 
political advocacy is best understood as being analogous to the uttering 
of assertions: it consists in adjudicating what course of political action 
the community should pursue through the affirmation of one’s beliefs 
on the matter. In section [3.3], I will argue that, in light of the 
considerations mentioned thus far, acting in the institutional capacity 
of voter entails a norm of epistemic responsibility, which subsequently 
shapes the content of a voter’s civic duty. More precisely, I will argue 
that, as much as ordinary assertions are regulated by epistemic norms, 
so are acts of political advocacy such as voting. Any plausible account 
of these norms will feature epistemic responsibility, defined as the 
requirement to exercise the cluster of basic epistemic capacities 
mentioned above. In section [3.4], I will focus on explaining a few details 
concerning the civic duty of epistemic responsibility. In particular, I will 
focus on explaining how the conditions for incurring a civic duty that I 
presented in the previous chapter are met in the context of voting 
                                              
2 The account is, as we shall see, in debt to the work conducted in Estlund 1990. 
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practices. In section [3.5], I will defend the conclusive and crucial claim 
of the civic argument. I will argue that the normative considerations put 
forward throughout the work provide normative support to epistemic 
constraints on participation in voting procedures. After having 
introduced the notion and explained what kind of arrangements fall 
within this category, I shall argue that such arrangements are justifiable 
because the civic duty of epistemic responsibility is, at least to a certain 
degree, enforceable. 
[3.1] Voting as a Joint Practice 
In the previous chapter, I argued – using Margaret Gilbert’s joint 
commitment theory as my main reference – that civic duties draw their 
normative force from the normativity of joint agency. In my account, 
what grounds a civic duty is the fact that, by engaging with others in an 
institutional activity that has a certain pre-existing practical goal, we 
take on a commitment to contribute to such goal and to uphold, in a 
thick sense, the norms of action entailed by our role in the practice.  
In section [2.5] I argued that acting within a joint institutional 
practice would generate such an obligation only if a few preliminary 
conditions obtain. These pertain to issues such as the moral 
acceptability of the practice, as well as the degree to which the 
participant’s engagement is willing and aware. The discussion of these 
conditions requires reference to the content of the civic duties that 
voters incur. Hence, I postpone it until section [3.4]. 
There is, however, another preliminary condition that needs to be 
discussed, which I call the shared goal condition. This states that, in 
order to incur civic duties, the parties to the practice must be pursuing, 
at least to a certain degree, a common goal or objective. This condition 
is even more important for the present discussion. Without it, the very 
idea that the normativity of joint agency applies to voting, and hence 
grounds civic duties for those who take part in voting practices, cannot 
be sustained.  
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The normativity of joint agency, at least in its Gilbertian form, 
establishes that certain obligations incur as a result of participation in 
a joint agency because, by opting into a collective practice, agents 
implicitly commit to contributing to its overarching shared goal. For 
this to happen, however, it is not enough that many agents perform the 
same set of actions coincidentally and simultaneously. Nor is mere 
strategic coordination enough. The normativity of joint agency requires 
something more. It requires the presence of a shared practical goal, of a 
common objective that justifies the thought that participants in an 
institutional practice are doing something together.3 The same applies 
to voting. Participation in voting generates civic duties only insofar as 
there is some shared objective that voters are pursuing together as a 
group of people, to which they are implicitly committing to 
contributing by participating, and that places certain demands on each 
of them. 
In the context of voting, the presence of a shared objective of this 
sort is far from straightforward. Many might see voting as a practice that 
has no clear overarching goal that all participants share. It might be 
argued that, when we vote, there is no practical goal that we are 
pursuing together as a group because each participant might see the 
practice as serving a different purpose even if they are performing the 
same set of actions. Furthermore, people participate in voting with all 
sorts of personal intentions, ranging from protection of their personal 
or group interests to the desire of tackling a specific political issue. This 
makes it difficult to attribute to voters any shared intention or a 
                                              
3 Gilbert 2013, 34: “each one is acting in a way appropriate to the achievement of that goal, 
where each one is doing this in light of the fact that the goal is their collective goal”. As 
already explained in Chapter 2, Gilbert’s account of the normativity of joint agency relies on 
the idea that participants in a joint practice constitute a plural subject, a new entity with 
unity of intentions and consistency of judgement. As anticipated, I shall not expand on this 
controversial aspect of Gilbert’s account. 
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common practical goal to which they can all be said to become 
committed by participating. 
I believe that this challenge, although serious, can be overcome.4 
More precisely, I will suggest that if we postulate a minimalistic account 
of its practical goals, then it is quite difficult to deny that voting is an 
instance of a joint practice that grounds civic duties, pace the previous 
criticism. My proposal, in this sense, is the following. We should 
conceive the overarching practical goal of voting – and hence the shared 
objective to which voters become committed by participating – as the 
determination of which course of political action the polity should 
pursue. A course of political action is a set of political proposals, 
priorities and desired political outcomes, usually unified in a coherent 
way within a political project or agenda, and usually attached to a party 
or candidate. What we are doing together, when we vote, is deciding 
which, among the various possible courses of political action available, 
will be pursued by the governing bodies of the political community.5 
Modern societies are characterized by the presence, among people 
living in them, of a wide variety of beliefs and political interests. Such 
plurality leads to disagreements and genuine conflicts. Some people 
think that certain political priorities should be pursued, some others 
will think differently. Various political projects and agendas, with 
different ideas and priorities concerning how to live together, stem from 
these disagreements. This conflict needs to be settled through some 
political decision-making procedure. The shared practical goal 
underlying voting practices is nothing more than exiting the situation 
                                              
4 Anna Stilz, in her account of democracy as collective action, deals with a similar objection, 
which she calls the “no clear goal objection” (Stilz 2009, 192 - 195). She overcomes it by 
portraying political decision-making in a broadly Rousseauian fashion, as the attempt of a 
community to collectively determine a set of just laws. 
5 Even though I will not consider this option, it is worth noting that an even more narrow 
and minimalistic conception of the practical goal of voting could be postulated, for instance 
by resorting to a Schumpeterian view according to which voting is just a tool for the 
selection of political leaders. 
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of conflict so that one of these agendas – with the goals, priorities, 
policies and outcomes that it involves– can be said to have obtained 
some form of collective endorsement. 
Let me illustrate this view with an example. The next general 
elections in Italy are supposed to take place in 2023. As things stand 
right now (and with some significant degree of oversimplification), they 
will likely see two coalitions opposed. One led by the League, a 
souverainist right-wing party. The other led by the Democratic Party, a 
standard centre-left party. According to my account of the practical 
goals of voting, even if Italian voters might be going to the ballots for 
all sorts of different reasons, there is indeed a clear sense in which they 
are pursuing a common practical goal and doing something together. 
Namely, the Italian voters are engaged in settling which course of 
political action the government of their country should follow. The 
Italian voters are determining together whether it should pursue the 
agenda of the League, and hence a set of nationalist and conservative 
policies or, instead, pursue the agenda of the Democratic Party and 
hence a set of more progressive policies. In making this decision, they 
are choosing to steer the community towards certain prospective 
outcomes rather than others. For instance, choosing the course of 
political action associated with the League is very likely to lead to 
restrictive policies concerning migration, to a less progressive taxation 
policy and to a far more tense relationship with the EU than the 
alternative option. 
This understanding of the practical goals of voting applies to both 
referenda and representative elections. This might not be evident at 
first glance. While it is clear how the account applies to direct voting 
procedures – a referendum is meant to settle a specific issue – the case 
of elections is slightly more complicated. It might be argued that the 
practical goal of voting, in the case of regular elections, is not to choose 
what course of political action to pursue, but rather to select who 
should make that choice on behalf of the collective. Now, while I am 
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happy to concede that the present account applies more intuitively to 
direct decision-making procedures6, I do not think this is a major 
problem for my argument. Electoral choices take place against a 
background of different projects, proposals and desired outcomes, even 
in representative political systems. Unless it can be shown that the 
choice of a representative can be disconnected from the choice of the 
proposed course of action in name of which the representative 
supposedly stands – an idea that I frankly cannot see how to plausibly 
support – my remarks concerning the practical goal of voting practices 
are left unscathed. 
Let me now explain why I believe that portraying the practical goal 
of voting in this way helps us to resolve the issues mentioned above. 
The idea is that the account makes the nature of voting as a joint 
institutional practice emerge without committing us to excessively 
controversial implications. Conceiving the overarching practical goal of 
voting as the determination of which course of political action to pursue 
does not require us to believe anything particularly substantive about 
the purposes of voting, besides the simple fact that voting is a decision-
making practice aimed at settling a collective political issue. Nor does 
it imply a specific view concerning what kind of interests – personal or 
communal – should motivate voters into making the choices that they 
make. The argument only requires us to accept something that should 
be easily accessible upon reflection. Namely, that voting consists in 
providing a contribution to a decision that is not merely the decision of 
a single person, but rather a decision that concerns what kind of things 
the government of a certain political community will do. Whatever 
motivates us to join the procedure and provide our input to it, that 
                                              
6 A potential implication is that the epistemic requirements that voters ought to meet might 
be more burdensome in direct decision-making procedures rather than in a regular election. 
The thought would be that, in referenda, voters are making a direct contribution to the 
determination of which course of political action the community should pursue. 
Consequently, since they act as “direct signatories” of coercive laws, their civic duties 
become more stringent. For an interesting exploration of the topic, see Serota & Leib 2013. 
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input is part of a collective decision-making practice, which generates a 
decision concerning policies, political priorities and prospective 
outcomes that is (at least de facto) binding for the whole community. 
Any political community needs an institutional mechanism for 
making decisions on behalf of the collective, and voting is one of them. 
That is the whole story about the shared goal underlying the practice of 
voting: contributing to a paradigmatic case of collective decision-
making. This need not imply any contentious collectivism. The point is 
rather, as is well put by both Christopher Kutz and Eric Beerbohm, that 
voting is a practice in which my individual intention to act within it can 
be made sense of only insofar as we assume that others will have a 
similar intention. When I participate in an election, “I intend to cast my 
vote as my part of our election”7, and my action is simply not intelligible 
if not “against the background commitment to a shared enterprise”.8 
As long as its practical goal is not portrayed in an excessively 
controversial way, this is all the shared commitment that voting 
requires. The fact that a voter joined the practice for a personal reason 
cannot override the fact that her actions are contributing to an 
overarching and pre-existing goal, essentially understood as steering 
the political community towards one political agenda rather than 
another. If this is correct, this practical goal bears on how individual 
voters ought to behave as participants. Therefore, participation in 
voting grounds civic duties. 
[3.2] The Role of Voters: Voting as an Act of Political Advocacy 
In the previous section, I have clarified why voting is an instance of joint 
institutional practice that grounds civic duties. Voters, who are acting 
in an institutional capacity, ought to abide by the norms of action 
entailed by their role in the practice. I will now concentrate my efforts 
                                              
7 Kutz 2002, 487. 
8 Beerbohm 2012, 47. 
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on arguing for the conclusion that being epistemically responsible is 
among the civic duties associated with voting. In other words, I shall 
argue that doing certain epistemically valuable things (being informed, 
being competent, considering evidence, listening to opposite views, 
etc.) is among the norms that voters ought to abide by in order to 
uphold their role and properly contribute to the overarching shared 
goal of the practice of voting. 
The argument will be reconstructed over the next two sections of the 
chapter. In this section, I shall focus on defending the claim that the 
role of voters within the practice of voting has a distinctively epistemic 
dimension. More precisely, I shall argue that the role of voters has 
distinctively epistemic features because to vote is to perform an act of 
political advocacy. An act of political advocacy consists in adjudicating 
what course of political action the community should undertake 
through the affirmation of one’s beliefs on the matter, and it should be 
understood as being analogous to the uttering of epistemic assertions. 
Recall that I defined a role as a cluster of specific tasks and correlated 
powers that applies to an agent squarely because – and only insofar as 
– she acts within the boundaries of an institutional practice. Our inquiry 
must hence start with an account that explains what specific tasks and 
powers are associated with the institutional capacity of voter. Now, this 
might look like a trivial issue. The natural thought is, in fact, that the 
role of voters is that of acting as public decision-makers. This is almost 
tautological. The specific cluster of tasks and powers associated with 
being a voter is that of contributing to a political decision-making 
procedure by providing a personal input that will be later aggregated to 
the one provided by other voters.  
Although correct, this thought is underdetermined and does not 
explain in detail what it means to act as a political decision-maker, let 
alone its epistemic dimension. In order to proceed, we need an account 
that explains, with additional details, the nature of the personal input 
that each voter provides to the collective decision-making procedure. 
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In other words, we need to explain exactly what kind of action a voter 
performs when she provides her individual input to a voting procedure. 
For the sake of clarity, such an explanation is meant to be plausible from 
a theoretical and normative point of view, rather than from an empirical 
one. That is, what I am after is not a description of what actual voters 
take themselves to be doing when they cast their ballot, but rather a 
description of what their votes amount to or of how they are best 
understood from a theoretical point of view. 
Before presenting what I take to be a valid option in this sense, let 
me briefly discuss and dismiss a possible alternative. Among social 
choice theorists and political scientists, it has been quite common to 
interpret voting as the expression of an individual preference.9 
According to this interpretation, a voter fulfils her responsibility as 
public decision-maker through the expression of her preference 
between various political options. I believe this interpretation of voting 
to be unsatisfactory. There are several reasons for this scepticism. Here 
I shall mention the one that I take to be the most relevant. Namely, an 
interpretation of voting as merely the expression of a preference entails 
a profoundly reductive view of the political agency of voters, one that 
ignores its potential variety and depth. The analysis of preferences 
provided by social choice theory is, in fact, heavily reliant on welfarist 
and utilitarian assumptions. As a result, self-interested choices aimed 
at maximizing personal utility are taken as being the standard model of 
any choice, including social ones.10 However, acting as a political 
decision-maker is something that touches upon, involves or is 
motivated by a wider array of normative reasons and values, ranging 
from moral principles to considerations about rights. Conceiving the 
exercise of this agency as merely the expression of a personal and self-
interested inclination towards a certain political option seems to whittle 
                                              
9 The roots of this approach to voting can be traced back to Arrow 1963. 
10 For a useful reconstruction of this critique, first outlined by Sen, see Peter 2009, 25 - 27. 
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this variety down to what is merely one of its many components. As 
correctly observed by Hélène Landemore, this portrays the political 
decision-making role of voters in a very impoverished way. From this 
standpoint, voters would be, at best, mere conveyors of an individual 
interest and, at worst, consumers who approach politics in the same 
way as they do their groceries.11 
So much for the interpretation of voting as the expression of 
individual preferences. Given its inadequacy, we need to move in a 
different direction. And the key idea here is that if voters are faced with 
the task of settling a specific public issue, their inputs on the matter 
must be thought of as expressing something stronger than a mere 
preference towards the issue. On the contrary, by going to the polling 
station and casting their ballot, voters address the public issue at stake 
and take a position with respect to it. 
This point is captured well by what David Estlund calls the advocative 
force of votes.12 If voters are indeed faced with a public decision-making 
task with a specific objective at stake – which I argued is the 
determination of what course of political action the community should 
                                              
11 Landemore 2012, 186. 
12 Estlund 1990, 398. Estlund argues that a plausible interpretation of voting needs to meet 
two further conditions, aggregability and activity. The aggregability condition requires an 
interpretation of voting to be able to explain how a set of different inputs such as votes can 
be aggregated into a single output or final decision. For this condition to be met, Estlund 
argues, we must conceive individual votes as addressing a common object and as expressing 
something about a common issue in a sufficiently similar way (Ibid., 403). Without this 
assumption in place, it would not be clear what the aggregation of votes represents, making 
it impossible to identify what it is that the procedure has effectively selected. The activity 
condition requires a theory of voting to conceive a vote as an action performed by an 
individual (Ibid., 406 - 407). If democracy is defined as rule by the people, the procedure 
that brings the exercise of political authority about cannot be one in which citizens are 
passive. As Estlund explains, an imaginary method for political decision-making that gathers 
the political choices of the people without them performing any action is not democratic, 
and the final output of the procedure could hardly be defined as the decision of that group 
of people. This, for instance, seems to disqualify political decision-making procedures that 
simulate the choices of the electorate on the basis of surveys or projections about what 
their judgement would be under conditions of optimal information, such as Jason Brennan’s 
proposal of a government by simulated oracle (Brennan 2016, 220 - 222). 
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pursue –, then their inputs must be thought of as expressing, at the very 
least, some kind of support or opposition towards the options that they 
are faced with. With this, I mean that a vote for P entails that the agent 
supports P and calls for P rather than Q to be the course of action that 
should be implemented.13 Now, this support or opposition need not be 
conceived as one of complete endorsement or alignment with the 
option. Quite clearly, voters often have to choose between options that 
don’t have their full support or endorsement. But if we think that a 
voter’s role is contributing to settle the issue of what course of political 
action should be implemented, then the decision of the voter to vote for 
P rather than Q must be thought of as an action that entails ‘taking a 
stance’ on the public issue at stake. We must think of the voter’s action 
as entailing that she takes P to represent, overall, the option that is 
worthier of being pursued among the existing ones.  
Estlund correctly claims that if votes did not possess at least a certain 
degree of advocative force, then the outcome of a voting procedure 
would be devoid of any indication about what to do next. In other 
words, it would not signal anything about what should follow from its 
result. Without recognizing an advocative force to votes, even 
unanimous outcomes would leave the electorate’s decisions 
undetermined, leading to the paradox of a procedure of political 
decision-making that is not indicative of any underlying collective 
political choice.14 In other words, if votes for P were taken to be devoid 
of some degree of support for P and if they were taken not to entail the 
idea that P has been called for by those who voted for it, then it becomes 
unclear why we should take P as being any more representative of the 
public’s decision than Q. This would greatly call into question, if not 
undermine, the very rationale of having something like a collective 
decision-making procedure in the first place. 
                                              
13 Estlund 1990, 419. 
14 Ibid., 404. 
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The fact that votes have advocative force is a key step towards 
understanding the epistemic dimension of the role of voters, because it 
makes visible the analogy between voting and asserting. Acting in the 
institutional capacity of a voter, I suggest, is to contribute to the goal of 
settling what course of political action the community should pursue 
by performing what can be defined as an act of political advocacy. An 
act of political advocacy is best understood as being analogous to an 
assertion in that the individual input provided by each voter equates to 
a statement or affirmation of their stance and their beliefs about the 
public issue at stake. 
Before I explain this thought in more detail, it is important to make 
two preliminary clarifications. When I state that the act of voting is 
analogous to the uttering of an assertion, my intention is indeed to 
construct an imperfect analogy. I am not defending the claim that votes 
and ordinary assertive utterances – such as a public statement of the 
likes of “we should do P” – are the exact same act. My claim is only that 
the two acts are sufficiently analogous to justify treating them as 
exercises of a similar epistemic agency and, as we shall see, as being 
bounded by similar norms. Secondly, it is important to clear the floor 
from a potential confusion that might stem from using the term 
‘political advocacy’. The term advocacy alludes to making the case for 
something. It could be argued that this makes it a rather inadequate 
term for an apt depiction of the act of voting because, when they cast 
their ballot in a public procedure, voters are no longer making the case 
for the option that they vote for. What voters do at the ballot box is, 
instead, give voice to their decision. At this stage, the process of making 
the case for the chosen option is already over, so to speak.15 
In response to this concern, we should keep in mind the following 
point. In using the term ‘political advocacy’, my intent is just to 
highlight a specific aspect of votes that, as I will soon explain, prompts 
                                              
15 I thank Robert Goodin for pressing me on this problem and for very useful comments. 
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in a particularly evident fashion their affinity with assertions and their 
epistemic dimension. When I say that voting should be understood as 
performing an act of political advocacy, my point is not that advocacy 
captures all that voting is about. My point is, rather, that whatever else 
voting is, it is also an act with a distinctive advocative force to it. This 
thought is compatible with what I said above. Even if it is correct that, 
in voting for P, V is not strictly speaking ‘making the case’ for P, the vote 
does nevertheless give voice to V’s choice or decision concerning the 
public issue at stake. The vote is nevertheless a tool through which V 
does something similar to communicating or making explicit the fact 
that she supports P over Q or R. What matters for my purposes is just 
the fact that V’s act has this aspect of expressing some support for P 
built into it and, consequently, that it embodies a position or stance 
towards the public issue at stake in the voting procedure. 
With these clarifications in place, let me provide some more details 
to the thought. Suppose a certain political constituency must decide 
between two political representatives, P and Q. These stand for two 
different courses of political action. The voting procedure is meant to 
settle whether the community should pursue the political course of 
action associated with P or the one associated with Q. The role of a voter 
in the procedure is that of contributing, with her individual input, to 
this collective decision. I have argued that if this is correct, then by 
providing her input in the form of a vote for P rather than Q, the voter 
is performing an act that has advocative force. Her action entails at least 
a certain degree of support towards the set of policies, priorities and 
outcomes that are associated with P. 
This is where the analogy between voting and assertion-making – 
and hence where the epistemic dimension of the role of voters – 
emerges. Take the case of an ordinary assertion uttered as a response to 
a question such as “should we do P or Q?” The act of asserting “we 
should do P” is commonly regarded as entailing that the asserter 
believes the content of her assertion to hold. The same applies to votes. 
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Voters are faced with the task of contributing to settle a public issue. If 
this is what they are expected to do, and the thoughts concerning the 
advocative force of votes mentioned above are correct, then their 
contribution to this collective decision – whether they realize it or not, 
as I explain in section [3.4] – entails something thicker than a mere 
expression of a preference for P rather than Q. Their contribution is best 
understood as an answer to a question concerning public decision-
making. When a voter votes for P, she performs an action that entails, 
at least to a certain degree, that she takes it to be the case (or to be true) 
that, all in all, the course of political action associated with P is the one 
that ought to be pursued or enacted (given the options available). Her 
action, subsequently, contains an implicit affirmation of her belief 
concerning the public issue at stake in the political decision-making 
procedure.16  
I will further support this point with an example. Consider the 2016 
Brexit referendum. In that context, British voters were called upon to 
settle a specific public issue: whether or not the United Kingdom should 
remain a member of the European Union. By participating in the 
referendum, voter V’s specific task is to contribute to settling this 
collective issue. Suppose V votes to leave the European Union. The 
thought is that although she is doing so in a weaker and less explicit 
way than in ordinary assertion-making, voter V is indeed affirming 
something about the option that she has chosen and, more generally, 
about the public issue at stake. Her vote entails at least a basic 
normative support for a certain course of political action, namely the 
                                              
16 It might be argued (Christiano 1995, 406 - 410) that strategic voting is an example to the 
contrary: someone might vote for P not because she judges that P represents the course of 
political action to be followed, but only in order to hinder Q’s victory. I will not be able to 
address the matter extensively. I will limit myself to observe how, even a strategic vote for 
P entails a statement of belief about the communal issue at stake, namely the belief that 
the course of political action Q should not unfold under any circumstance. The vote, in this 




United Kingdom ceasing to be a member state of the European Union.17 
Through her vote, V is calling for this outcome to obtain. Faced with 
the task of ‘providing an answer’ to a certain issue that pertains the 
governance of her community, V is exercising the powers associated 
with her role to fulfil this task. And the action she is performing entails 
an implicit affirmation of her belief. Faced with the question concerning 
the membership of the UK within the EU, she performs an action that 
entails that she takes it to be the case that the UK should leave the EU. 
She might not be doing exactly the same thing as publicly asserting the 
proposition “the UK should no longer be a member of the European 
Union”. But she is performing an act that is sufficiently analogous to 
warrant treating it as the exercise of a similar epistemic agency. 
We now have a more precise picture of what it means to exercise the 
specific tasks and powers associated with the role of voter. Acting in the 
institutional capacity of voter is to act as a public decision-maker. But 
if the role is fulfilled by performing an act of political advocacy as I have 
suggested, then we cannot ignore how the role has an epistemic 
component built into it. In other words, the role of voters within 
decision-making practices has an epistemic dimension because 
fulfilling the specific tasks associated with it requires the exercise of an 
agency that has distinctively epistemic features. As members of a 
community involved in the endeavour of trying to settle a certain public 
matter, we contribute to this goal by ‘declaring’ what we believe to be 
the solution to the matter, or, at least, the option worthier of support 
among the existing ones. 
                                              
17 The task of determining what it means to leave the EU has notoriously proved to be 
problematic and has spawned a huge debate in the United Kingdom. It could be reasonably 
argued that there is something illegitimate in putting to the electorate a ‘social question’ 




[3.3] The Civic Duty of Voters: Political Advocacy, Norms of 
Assertion & Epistemic Responsibility 
In the previous section I have discussed the epistemic dimension 
associated with the tasks and powers that attach to the role of voters. I 
have argued that, if votes have an advocative force, and if they 
constitutively express a stance on the political courses of action at hand, 
then voters perform their role by means of an act of political advocacy 
analogous to the uttering of an assertion. Voting for P is an action that 
equates to an implicit affirmation of the voter’s belief concerning the 
public issue at stake, namely the belief that P rather than Q is the course 
of political action that should be pursued. 
In this section, I will build upon this interpretation of voting to 
support the conclusion that voters have a civic duty to be epistemically 
responsible. I will do so through the following argument. If voters, as 
part of their role as public decision-makers, are called upon to perform 
a distinctively epistemic agency, this agency will be performed in a 
substantively satisfactory manner only by complying with some 
epistemic norms. And any plausible account of these norms will entail 
at least something along the lines of what I define as epistemic 
responsibility. Being epistemically responsible in voting, I propose, 
should be understood as the requirement to exercise a cluster of basic 
epistemic capacities. These will most likely comprise gathering 
knowledge of relevant political facts (and of the debate surrounding 
them when the facts are disputed), gaining a decent understanding of 
political concepts, issues, policies and institutions, being willing to 
engage with public affairs, acknowledging the complexity of political 
issues, and so forth. Being epistemically responsible, therefore, is a 
substantive requirement that follows from the role of voters within 
political decision-making practices. Hence, it constitutes the content of 
a voter’s civic duty.  
Let me start with the first point, the idea that certain epistemic 
norms apply to the act of voting. This point can be cashed out, again, 
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by recalling the analogy between acts of political advocacy such as 
voting, and assertions. I have previously argued that civic duties entail 
a substantive dimension. X discharges her civic duties by performing 
the tasks and using the powers associated with her institutional role in 
a substantively satisfactory manner. If the task that X is called upon to 
perform in her role as voter is that of contributing to a public decision 
by means of an act of political advocacy, and if an act of political 
advocacy is indeed an agency with epistemic features analogous to the 
uttering of assertions, then the task will be performed in a substantively 
satisfactory manner only if X meets certain epistemic norms similar to 
those that apply to assertions.18 
The epistemic normativity that regulates acts like the uttering of 
assertions is the object of a significant debate. The aim of such debate 
is to identify both the epistemic features that qualify an utterance as an 
assertion and the grounds on which assertions are warranted. The latter 
is the issue with most significance for our purposes because it yields 
criteria for an epistemic evaluation of asserters. Some epistemologists 
argue that only knowledge warrants assertion: you can assert P only if 
you know that P.19 Some others have contested this norm and argued 
that it should be replaced with a norm of justifiability: an assertion is 
warranted only if the agent uttering it can provide some form of 
justified belief or epistemic support for it.20 Some others have argued 
for a norm of safety: an assertion is warranted only if the agent utters it 
                                              
18  The present account benefitted from Fabienne Peter’s work on the relevance of the 
literature on practical reasoning for political normativity. On this, see Peter 2019. 
19 Timothy Williamson is the most notable proponent of this theory. He claims that it finds 
compelling evidence in conversational practices. When someone asserts P, partners 
involved in the conversation can ask for validation of the claim by enquiring how that person 
knows that P, showing that knowledge acts as the standard enabling factor of an assertion. 
See Williamson 1996, 505 - 506. 
20 Jennifer Lackey defends this position (Lackey 2007, 610 - 611). Jonathan Kvanvig similarly 
believes that justifiability provides a more plausible criterion, as it allows for frequent 
revisions of epistemic appraisal. See Kvanvig 2011, 242 - 243. 
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on an epistemic basis that could not have easily lead to a false 
assertion.21  
Let us set aside, for the time being, who is right in this debate and 
approach the issue ecumenically. The crucial point is that the uttering 
of assertions is something that is the object of epistemic evaluation and 
that there is consensus on the idea that some assertions are 
unwarranted and have insufficient grounds to be uttered. If voting, as 
argued above, is an act with analogous epistemic features, whereby we 
contribute to a public decision through the affirmation of our beliefs, 
then a similar point applies: there will be conditions that, if not met, 
would make voting for P an epistemically unwarranted act.22 
If I have been indeed correct thus far in suggesting that voting for P 
is an act analogous – but not identical – to uttering an epistemic 
assertion such as “P is what should be done”, then voting is likely to 
trigger epistemic norms that are similar to the ones triggered by 
ordinary assertions, only weaker. Some of these norms, such as an 
equivalent of the knowledge norm, will probably be overdemanding, 
given the epistemic circumstances of political decision-making, where 
uncertainty and deep disagreements are rampant.23 However, less 
stringent conditions such as some equivalent of justifiability or safety 
seem prima facie more promising. From this standpoint, a vote for P 
would be epistemically warranted only if it has sufficient epistemic 
                                              
21 Pritchard 2014. 
22 I am taking for granted a metaethical assumption about the status of normative 
statements, namely that they admit distinction along the lines of truth or falseness. 
Although some metaethical positions - most notably emotivism - deny this, I will 
nevertheless proceed without discussing this issue. Notice only that my position does not 
require moral realism either. My argument goes through as long as normative statements 
can be regarded as more than judgements of taste. This need not imply that they are indeed 
judgements about “moral facts”. I thank David Estlund for pointing out this problem to me.  
23 No voter will ever be warranted in making her advocative statement under such a 
stringent condition. After all, when we vote we make a prediction about the future of a 
political community, about how things will turn out to be, etc. Knowledge - at least in an 
epistemic meaning of the term - is not available to us. We might be extremely likely to be 
right, but we cannot know that P is the right course of action in the same way in which we 
know that 2 + 2 = 4. I thank Jacob Hinze for an important discussion on this point. 
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support. In the case of a justifiability norm, the epistemic support 
mustered would have to be strong enough to give the voter good reason 
to believe that P is the right political choice. In the case of a safety norm, 
the epistemic support mustered would have to be strong enough to 
allow the voter to avoid the risk of being completely misguided in her 
affirmation. 
In any case, what I defined as epistemic responsibility in voting will 
be part of the conditions under which such epistemic support could be 
mustered, and hence of the conditions under which voting for P could 
be warranted. Recall that epistemic responsibility in voting requires 
knowledge of relevant political facts and of the disputes concerning 
their interpretation. Furthermore, it requires the tools necessary to 
make a comparative evaluation of political options, such as a certain 
degree of understanding of what these political options entail and of 
their likely impact on the community. Finally, and more complexly, 
epistemic responsibility in voting requires some degree of receptiveness 
to the issues that the communal life faces, as well as some degree of 
engagement and reflection concerning what is at stake in them and how 
they relate to previous states of affairs. 
The reasons in support of this last set of claims are quite 
straightforward. Ordinary assertion-making is the exercise of an 
epistemic agency. Regardless of what specific epistemic normativity we 
employ, it seems quite clear that such agency will be properly 
conducted only if the subject performing it acts within a range of 
minimal agential capacities or competences. For what concerns 
assertion-making, any plausible epistemic theory would consider an 
utterance concerning what ought to be done that has been formulated 
without knowledge of the relevant facts, or without weighing the 
options available, as an utterance that falls below conditions of 
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sufficient epistemic support and hence of warranty, perhaps to the 
point of making the asserter epistemically negligent.24 
If this is true for epistemic agency in general, and if voting is indeed 
the exercise of an agency with epistemic features analogous to 
assertion-making, then any conception of the epistemic support that 
voters ought to muster in order to perform this agency properly will 
entail at least something along the lines of what I defined as epistemic 
responsibility. This is not to say that this requirement constitutes 
everything that is relevant for a substantively satisfactory performance 
of the role of voter. The point is just that it will nevertheless quite 
plausibly be part of any account of this kind. 
This is all that is needed for our present purposes, which is to define 
the content of one of the civic duties associated with voting. If votes are 
indeed acts of political advocacy, acting in the institutional capacity of 
voter has an epistemic dimension. It requires us to contribute to settling 
a publicly relevant issue through the affirmation of our beliefs on the 
matter. And in order to affirm our beliefs on a certain issue in an 
epistemically warranted way, epistemic responsibility is necessary. If 
this dimension is structurally part of this institutional role, an agent will 
perform the specific tasks and powers that characterize the role – and 
contribute satisfactorily to the shared practical goal of voting 
procedures – only by taking this dimension seriously and by meeting 
the epistemic requirements that follow from it. 
Let me conclude this section with a couple of clarifications that are 
necessary to dispel some potential misunderstandings. First, it is 
important to safeguard the argument from any confusion concerning 
the sources of normativity within the civic argument. In the civic 
argument, joint agency is the sole source of normativity. The 
requirement to be epistemically responsible befalls voters because they 
                                              
24 The idea that those who perform an epistemic act without taking care to have the 
appropriate agential capacities are negligent is well explained in Sosa 2015, 69 - 73. 
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are jointly committed to a shared practical goal, and because the 
requirement flows from their role within the practice. What carries the 
load of the argument is the fact that voters are engaged in a common 
endeavour and, hence, owe each other conforming actions. Even if the 
requirement to be epistemically responsible consists in meeting a 
minimum of epistemic demands, it is binding because it represents the 
content of a non-epistemic civic duty.  
This is also important for understanding the relationship between 
practical and epistemic normativity within the civic argument. The civic 
argument is, primarily, an argument about the practical normativity of 
voting. This is what is at stake in it. At least for the purposes of this 
work, epistemic responsibility in voting is not conceived as a self-
standing epistemic norm. In other words, epistemic responsibility in 
voting is a practical normative requirement with an epistemic content. 
Recall, in this sense, that the parallel between epistemic responsibility 
in voting and the epistemic normativity of assertions is meant to be just 
that: a parallel and not an equivalence.  
Both these points highlight the difference between the civic 
argument and other contributions in the literature on the ethics of 
voting and on epistocracy. In my view, what gives value to being 
informed, careful, competent and attentive in voting is primarily the 
fact that it represents a normatively appropriate response to the fact 
that we are trying to accomplish something together. This is a non-
instrumental point. Whether and how much being epistemically 
responsible also contributes instrumentally to the quality of political 
outcomes is of secondary importance. Obviously, this is not to deny that 
epistemic responsibility in voting can also be valuable from this point 
of view. This is just to say that, unlike other contributions in the 
literature, the civic argument does not need to take up the contentious 
instrumental commitments already criticized in chapter 1. I shall say 
more about the advantages of this approach in [4.1]. 
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[3.4] Epistemic Responsibility in Voting: Morality, Willingness 
and Underlying Awareness 
Before spelling out why I believe that the civic argument justifies 
epistemic constraints on voting, let me say a few words on some 
important details of the argument. In particular, I have yet to discuss 
how the account of voting presented thus far satisfies the conditions, 
mentioned in the previous chapter, that are preliminary to incurring 
civic duties. 
As anticipated in section [3.1], since civic duties are obligations 
grounded in joint agency, they are incurred only if a few preliminary 
conditions obtain. The same applies to the civic duty of epistemic 
responsibility in voting. I have already discussed how the shared goal 
condition is met --i.e. the practice of voting generates civic duties only 
if there is a common objective or shared practical goal to which voters 
become committed upon participation. However, I have not yet 
discussed how the other conditions are met in the context of voting. Let 
me briefly mention them again. Civic duties are incurred only on the 
following conditions: 
 The practical goal of the joint practice 
must not be morally repugnant. Call this 
the morality condition. 
 The parties to the joint practice must 
have willingly expressed some readiness 
to participate. Call this the willingness 
condition. 
 The parties to the joint practice must be 
aware of the fact that they are taking on 
a role in a collective institutional practice 
with a shared practical goal. Call this the 
underlying awareness condition. 
95 
 
Let me start with the morality condition. Recall the position defended 
in the previous chapter. In my view, there are no civic duties if a joint 
practice is immoral or repugnant. I have already granted that the 
normativity of joint agency is trumped by moral considerations in those 
circumstances in which the collective practice ends up supporting 
morally repugnant actions. The same applies to voting. Even though, in 
fact, the practical goal of the practice of voting – the determination of 
which course of political action the community will pursue – is not per 
se morally repugnant, there might be conditions under which engaging 
in this collective practice might represent a morally repugnant action. 
For instance, voting practices might end up lending support to morally 
repugnant courses of political action. Or there might be circumstances 
under which phenomena such as political corruption or collusion with 
organized crime might make engaging in collective political decision-
making practices a morally repugnant thing in the first place. I have 
little to add to the remarks offered in the previous chapter. I am happy 
to concede that, under the circumstances just mentioned, there are no 
civic duties and no obligation to be epistemically responsible voters. 
The second condition to be discussed is willingness. Applied to 
voting, willingness states that voters incur a civic duty to be 
epistemically responsible only if they willingly express readiness to 
participate in the practice of voting. As above, my intention is to offer a 
straightforward claim. The willingness condition is met because it is 
possible for voters to perform certain actions – such as registration to 
vote or going to the ballot – that clearly entail their willingness to 
participate in the decision-making practice. In other words, the claim is 
that performing actions such as registering to vote or going to the ballot 
count as signalling willingness to participate. 
This claim might look simplistic to some. Even if voting is mostly a 
voluntarily performed action25, choosing to participate in a specific 
                                              
25 I am assuming a non-compulsory voting system. 
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instance of voting need not entail any acceptance of the practice of 
voting as a whole, including all its structural features, characteristics 
and, indeed, roles and demands. 
This perplexity can be overcome. Recall that, as argued in the 
previous chapter, the willingness condition is the result of the attempt 
to accommodate one of the staples of the voluntarist critique of role-
based normativity – the idea that institutional roles and the correlated 
civic duties cannot be simply imposed on an agent regardless of their 
will – without having to endorse an excessively strict interpretation of 
voluntarism. Willingness does not require consent and it is weaker than 
standard voluntarist requirements. In virtue of this middle-ground 
approach, the willingness condition requires only that an agent become 
a participant in the practice as a result of a willing exercise of their 
agency. In the case of voting, insofar as V becomes a ‘voter’ as a result 
of a willingly performed action, V is bound to her civic duties and hence 
ought to be epistemically responsible. If we bear in mind that 
willingness does not require an explicit contractual pledge nor an act of 
consent, then the actions mentioned above – registering to vote, 
showing up at the polling station, etc. – seem to satisfy this condition. 
By performing them, it seems quite clear that V is signalling that she is 
ready to ‘opt-in’ to the practice, thereby entering the boundaries of an 
institutional role. Again, it might be argued that these actions signal 
only acquiescence, rather than an actual commitment to participating 
in the political decision-making practice and to contribute to it. 
However, a reply to this kind of worry has already been offered in [2.5]. 
Suppose an agent performs an action that effectively results in 
becoming involved in an institutionally defined practice – with its 
dynamics and set of rules – and then denies having become obligated 
by claiming that he was merely ‘going along’. We would rarely exculpate 
such an agent. 
The third and last condition, underlying awareness, is the one that 
deserves the most attentive discussion. It states that those acting in an 
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institutional capacity can incur a civic duty only if they are aware of the 
fact that they are becoming obligated. This can entail two layers of 
awareness. The first layer consists in being aware of the fact that they 
are taking on a role in a collective institutional practice with a shared 
practical goal. The second layer consists in being aware of the 
obligations that are placed on them because of their role. Applied to 
voting, this would mean that the civic duty to be epistemically 
responsible applies to voters only insofar as they are aware of both the 
fact that they are incurring a role within a collective practice with an 
underlying goal and of the fact that such a role entails certain epistemic 
requirements. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that this condition applies only in a 
limited sense. More precisely, only the first layer of awareness is truly 
necessary for incurring a civic duty; the second layer is not, for the 
following reason. Civic duties regulate the performance of institutional 
roles. They require agents acting in an institutional capacity to uphold 
their roles in a thick sense. They require taking the role seriously and 
upholding the norms of action flowing from it in a way that is 
substantively faithful to the purposes of the role and of the institution 
of which the role is part. Hence I argued that, while awareness of having 
the role – of having been assigned a cluster of institutionally defined 
tasks and powers – is indeed necessary before one can incur a civic duty, 
once this first layer of awareness is in place, civic duties already apply. 
Having the first layer of awareness is enough to commit us to what 
follows from it. Being aware of the norms of action entailed by the role 
is not a condition without which a civic duty fails to apply. It is, instead, 
part of the civic duty itself.  
This led to the conclusion that, unless it is unreasonable to expect 
some degree of underlying awareness concerning what the institutional 
role consists in, failure to understand the norms of action that follow 
from it is not exculpating. It represents, rather, a further normative 
shortcoming. In exercising an institutional role without awareness of 
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the requirements that flow from it, one is already falling short of one’s 
civic duty. In the case of voting, the claim would be that unless we 
cannot reasonably expect voters to understand the fact that they have a 
certain role within a collective practice, failure to understand that they 
ought to be epistemically responsible is not exculpating.  
Admittedly, this line of argument creates an obvious issue. Whereas 
most institutional roles are clearly defined (they have clear tasks and 
powers associated with them, making the expectation of awareness 
straightforwardly reasonable), many might claim that being a voter is 
different. Being a voter lacks a clear definition as a role and, hence, the 
expectation of awareness is not straightforwardly reasonable or, at least, 
can appear controversial. In other words, we need to explain why it is 
indeed reasonable to expect voters to be aware of their role in a 
collective practice. 
I do not think that the issue is as weighty and controversial as it 
might appear at first glance.26 The normativity of joint agency requires 
voters to be aware of the fact that they are engaging in a collective 
practice, whereby they are committed to upholding a shared practical 
goal, and that they acquire a role to play in this sense. Now, I believe 
that this would be problematic only if we were to ask a very detailed 
and philosophically informed understanding of the practice of voting 
and of the role of voters. The account offered thus far has the advantage 
of relying on a rather minimalistic understanding of the practice of 
voting and of its purposes, according to which voting is nothing more 
than a joint decision-making endeavour whose overarching shared goal 
is determining what course of political action the community should 
pursue. From this standpoint, voters need only to be aware of the fact 
that they are engaged in making a political decision on behalf of the 
                                              
26 It might be worth pointing out how the implementation of epistemic constraints on 
voting, by making voting conditional upon undertaking competence-enhancing training, 
would make explicit that the role of voter comes with a requirement of epistemic 
responsibility attached to it. 
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whole community – a decision that will determine the pursuit of one 
political agenda rather than another – and that their role is to provide 
an input to the decision. The idea that a voter can justifiably fail to 
understand even the simple fact that she is acting as a political decision-
maker whose choice will support certain projects or agendas and 
contribute to determining a collective and (de facto) binding outcome 
seems implausible.27 Rather than exonerating the voter from their civic 
duties, it would count, again, as an instance of failure to meet them.  
Again, recall that we are not asking that voters understand, precisely 
in all its philosophical facets, that their role is to perform an act of 
political advocacy analogous to the uttering of epistemic assertions, and 
therefore warranted only upon meeting certain epistemic requirements. 
That would make it impossible to satisfy the conditional. We are asking 
that they are broadly aware of the fact that their role is to provide an 
input to a collective decision concerning what to do politically. Once 
this first layer of awareness is in place, voters are already under a duty 
to inform themselves and think carefully about their choice, regardless 
of whether they realize this latter fact or not. Let it be clear, in this 
sense, that I am not relying on the idea that voters in contemporary 
societies do have this level of understanding or awareness. That is an 
empirical claim that does not concern me. The claim is, rather, that 
voters should be generally aware of their responsibilities, because they 
are easily accessible upon reflection and because this is part of what it 
means to take their role seriously in the first place. 
[3.5] The Justification of Epistemic Constraints on Voting 
Let us recap the civic argument as I have argued for it thus far. I have 
put forward and defended the following premises: 
                                              
27 For instance, it might be argued that this would count as an instance of a negligent 
exercise of our rational agency. On this see Raz 2011, 231 - 242. 
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(A) When acting in an institutional capacity, an agent 
has a civic duty to uphold the norms of action entailed 
by the capacity in question. 
(a*) The duty is grounded in a quasi-
contractual interpretation of the 
normativity of joint agency; 
(a**) The duty consists in abiding by 
the norms associated with an 
institutional role in a thick sense. 
(B) The role of ‘voter’ consists in providing an input 
to a procedure of collective decision-making aimed at 
settling the political course of action that the 
community should pursue. 
(b*) These inputs are best understood 
as acts of political advocacy;  
(b**) Acts of political advocacy are 
structurally similar to the uttering of 
epistemic assertions and are hence 
warranted only if certain epistemic 
requirements are met. Call this being 
epistemically responsible. 
(C) Acting as ‘voter’, as an instance of participation in 
a collective practice, is bound by the normativity of 
joint agency. Voters have civic duties associated with 
their role and ought to abide by the norms of action 
entailed by it. 
(c*) In accordance with (b**), being 
epistemically responsible is part of the 
norms of action entailed by the 
institutional capacity of voter. 
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From these three premises, we have concluded that: 
Voters have a civic duty to be 
epistemically responsible when they 
cast their ballot. 
In this section, I will turn my attention to defending the last component 
of the civic argument, namely the justification of epistemic constraints 
on voting procedures. Recall that, in my account, the term ‘epistemic 
constraint’ identifies any institutional mechanism designed to ensure 
that voters uphold an epistemically responsible agency. These 
constraints on participation in voting will be modest, for reasons that 
will be made explicit below. I do not intend to commit to one specific 
institutional arrangement. The contingent social features of a political 
community – such as its economic development, literacy rate, etc. – 
might give us reason to prefer certain arrangements rather than others. 
What works best or is more desirable in Norway might not do in Italy 
and vice versa, for example. 
However, for clarity’s sake, I shall use the following as a standard 
example of epistemic constraint on voting. Suppose that citizens, prior 
to voting or as part of the registration process, are compelled to 
participate in mandatory competence-enhancing training delivered 
through means such as local public debates, information classes or 
deliberative exercises. Participation in these competence-enhancing 
training will serve as a proxy for compliance with the civic duty of 
epistemic responsibility in voting. Importantly, no further testing, 
selection or assessment of voters will be undertaken after that. By 
including in the decision-making practice each citizen who is willing to 
undertake the cost of going through a more demanding procedure 
without submitting them to further selection, this institutional 
arrangement would constrain participation in voting without going all 
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the way towards the exclusionary arrangements proposed by standard 
epistocrats.28 
But even if the constraints on voting supported by the civic argument 
are modest, their introduction into a public institutional procedure is 
something that, nevertheless, requires justification. The fact that voters 
have a civic duty to be epistemically responsible does not make them 
straightforwardly justified. Making participation in competence-
enhancing exercises part of the process of registration for voting means 
imposing these exercises on all the members of the political 
community. It is a form of compulsion. And, as much as moving from a 
mere obligation to φ to being compelled to φ is a move that needs to be 
defended, the same applies here. 
I shall proceed as follows. I will defend the claim that, within the 
normative framework defended thus far, it is generally legitimate to 
demand compliance with civic duties. The reason is that participants in 
an institutional practice have, in virtue of the relationship of mutual 
answerability that they enjoy as people who are jointly committed to an 
overarching shared goal, the standing or right to put pressure on each 
other’s agency and demand compliance with their civic duties. Limited 
mechanisms for the enforcement of civic duties can be thus generally 
justified. Once the general features of this argument have been laid out, 
I shall apply them to voting and explain what kind of institutional 
mechanisms this justifies. 
The core of this argument is the idea that participants in an 
institutional practice enjoy a shared right to advance forceful demands 
on each other. This is a further implication of the normativity of joint 
agency inspired by Gilbert and presented in chapter 2. Recall that, at its 
core, there is the idea that parties who are involved in the undertaking 
of an institutional practice – provided that the conditionals explained 
                                              
28 Even some institutional arrangements commonly regarded as epistocratic are compatible 




in [2.5] apply – become jointly committed to the pursuit of the 
overarching shared goal of the practice. Consequently, they ought to 
uphold the norms of action entailed by the specific roles that they 
occupy. As previously argued, this creates a relationship of mutual 
answerability between the participants. As a collective that is engaged 
in a certain endeavour, we are answerable to one another for how we 
behave within the boundaries of the joint practice and for how we 
perform our roles. This mutual answerability, I shall now suggest, 
entails already a certain degree of forcefulness and peremptoriness. 
The reason is that civic duties give rise to corresponding rights. If 
someone has a duty to φ, it is usually thought that others have a right 
to advance claims on the performance of that action and to call upon 
the relevant agent to φ.29 Duties that derive from occupying a role 
within a practice governed by certain internal norms, such as civic 
duties, are not different in this sense. They too seem to give rise to a 
corresponding right, enjoyed by those who are involved in the same 
system of norms, to demand the performance of the relevant actions.30 
In Gilbert’s account, this corresponding right is defined as a demand 
right.31 Gilbert’s idea is that if R1 has an obligation of joint commitment 
to φ, the implication is that R2 has a right, qua joint participant to the 
same practice, to demand that R1 does indeed φ. Having the right to 
demand something from someone means to have the standing, if not to 
compel, at least to insist on a certain performance and to exercise some 
forceful pressure to this effect.  
                                              
29 The correlation between rights and duties is a common topic in normative philosophy. 
The classical reference is Hohfeld 1919. 
30 See also Wenar 2005, 229 (“for every claim in A there is some B who has a duty to A. Your 
right that I not strike you correlates to my duty not to strike you”) and Wenar 2013, 210. 
31 Gilbert conceives demand rights as being stronger than Hohfeldian claim rights (Gilbert 
2018, 22 - 23). For Gilbert, demand rights represent a distinctive category of rights 
generated by joint commitments, and they cannot be understood as moral or legal rights. I 
shall not pursue these distinctions in my argument. 
104 
 
To rephrase this thought in the language of the civic argument, R1 
having a civic duty to φ entails further normative implications beside 
R1 being obligated to φ. It also entails that, when it comes to actions 
that are relevant to the success of the practice such as φ-ing, the other 
participants have as much normative authority over R1’s agency as R1 
herself. All the agents involved in the practice are in the position to 
legitimately insist that R1 perform φ, and so does R1 with respect to the 
duties of other participants. In other words, according to the normative 
considerations presented and defended in chapter 2, willing 
participation in an institutional practice entails that one is no longer 
immune from being called upon to perform the demands associated 
with one’s role. Complete authority over oneself has been, at least in 
what concerns actions performed within the boundaries of the role and 
of the practice, surrendered to other participants, who will now be in 
the position to advance peremptory requests concerning our agency 
and call for compliance with our civic duties. 
I shall further illustrate this point through an analogy. Take the 
example of a joint cooperative endeavour. Suppose, for instance, that a 
certain group of people constitutes a rowing team.32 This is an example 
of a practice where multiple agents are committed to the undertaking 
of a common goal – rowing the boat towards a certain direction, 
perhaps with the purpose of winning a competition – with a division of 
roles. The extent to which participants pertinently perform their part 
does matter for the success of the practice. All the rowers have a degree 
of responsibility that bears directly on the quality of the practice and all 
of them are jointly committed to contributing in the ways specified by 
their role. Consequently, they owe each other conforming actions – 
compliance with their civic duties – and are answerable to one another 
for how they behave.  
                                              
32 I thank Sameer Bajaj, Mathew Coakley, David Estlund and Gen Fukushima for suggesting 
this and similar analogies to me. 
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The reason for which this mutual answerability entails reciprocal 
rights to demand a conforming behaviour lies in the interdependence 
that characterizes the rowers’ commitments to the practice.33 At least 
as long as they are acting within the boundaries of the joint practice, 
R1’s commitment to rowing is not isolated from the commitment of R2, 
R3 and R4 to do the same. On the contrary, it depends on a certain 
degree of reciprocation by them. Now, suppose that R1 joined the team 
willingly and is aware of the shared goal of the practice, but is now 
rowing lazily and is thereby jeopardizing a successful undertaking of the 
practice. If the interdependence characterizing joint commitments is 
true, it has a precise implication in this case. Namely, that the other 
participants (R2, R3, R4, etc.) have the authority to call R1 to answer and 
do something about it. If R1 is rowing lazily, he cannot claim any 
immunity from being reproached by other participants. If R1 entered 
the practice willingly and in understanding of his role, R1 took it upon 
himself to properly contribute to the rowing of the boat. The fact that 
he is now defaulting on his commitment jeopardizes the practical goal 
to which the other rowers were originally committed. In other words, 
R1’s defaulting affects R2’s ability and reason to uphold the 
commitment. Subsequently, R2 can legitimately do things such as 
calling attention to the suboptimal quality of the performance or insist 
on R1 doing his bit, for instance by asking him to undertake further 
training. 
Now, suppose that this correlation between civic duties and a parallel 
right to demand compliance with them is correct, as both Gilbert and I 
believe it to be. Is this a consideration strong enough to support 
institutional mechanisms aimed at securing such compliance? I believe 
that the answer is yes, at least as long as we correctly frame what type 
and degree of compulsion can be justified through this normativity. 
                                              
33 Gilbert explains this point through the notion of interdependent performance rights 
(Gilbert 2018, 191 - 192). Supposing that an agreement or commitment between Q and R is 
in place, defaulting by Q can nullify the obligations of R and vice versa. 
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What is key, in this sense, is understanding the boundaries of the 
reciprocal authority that joint participation generates in a certain 
institutional practice. My suggestion is that such reciprocal authority 
has clear limits. We can see this point by going back to the analogy with 
the rowing team and to the example of R1, the lazy rower. Even if we 
have established that R1 is answerable to his boat mates for his 
misconduct, there are clear limits to what the other rowers are entitled 
to do in response to such misconduct. We have argued that they can 
legitimately insist on performance and apply a certain degree of 
pressure. This grants them the authority to do things such as requesting 
R1 to undertake further training. However, it does not necessarily give 
them the authority to threaten him with punishment or expel him from 
the team if he does not row fast enough.34 For the sake of clarity, I am 
not excluding that there might be circumstances under which this 
would be justified. The point is rather that it does not seem to be the 
most straightforward solution and I doubt that the mutual 
answerability generated by joint participation could suffice, without any 
further premise or consideration, to justify responses of this kind.35  
This has clear implications for our inquiry. Namely, it limits the type 
of institutional arrangements that the argument can support as well as 
their demandingness. But the fact that these institutional arrangements 
should be properly limited and avoid excessive demandingness does not 
mean that no institutional arrangement of the like can be justified. As 
we have argued, joining a certain institutional practice entails an 
implicit commitment to act in conformity with the goals of the 
                                              
34 Gilbert seems, at times, to entertain the thought that, unless there are sufficiently strong 
reasons to the contrary, the mutual authority of participants extends to the point of being 
in the position to legitimately exercise some punitive pressure (Gilbert 2018, 62 - 63). 
Differently from her, I will not rely on such a strong claim. I shall work instead under the 
reverse assumption, namely that threats of punishment should be avoided unless there are 
decisive reasons in their support. 
35 I thank the audience of the CELPA Seminar at the University of Warwick for an interesting 
discussion about this issue. 
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institution according to the tasks associated with one’s role and 
generates civic duties. The thought, at this point, is that this normative 
situation, even if it is not strong enough to support an excessive degree 
of compulsion into compliance, is nevertheless strong enough to 
support procedures aimed at giving a certain degree of security that 
occupants of institutional roles will take the demands associated with 
them seriously and comply with their civic duties.  
Any framework of rights and duties creates constraints on what 
individuals within it may or may not do as well as on what they may or 
may not demand of each other. But if such a framework does indeed 
establish that individuals within it may demand each other to φ, then 
the framework can subsist only insofar as there can be a baseline of 
assurance that such demands – as much as any other demand entailed 
by the framework – will be met. Subsequently, I suggest that the 
argument presented thus far is strong enough to provide a normative 
justification for setting up mechanisms of incentive or pressure aimed 
at providing a sort of institutional guarantee that those acting in an 
institutional capacity will fulfil the requirements associated with their 
role properly, and comply with the civic duties that apply to them. 
Recall that the mutual answerability that characterizes the 
relationship of joint participants in an institutional practice has an 
element of interdependence. If, as we have argued, the institutional 
practice depends on a certain degree of reciprocity between 
participants, some exercise of pressure so that reciprocity is ensured or 
made more likely is legitimate. Given that the normative considerations 
we have worked with thus far are supposedly quasi-contractual, it is 
perhaps opportune to go back to this analogy to support this point 
further. Those who are jointly committed in the pursuit of a collective 
endeavour are in a situation that is analogous to the one enjoyed by the 
contractors of a pact. They are in a position where they enjoy a 
relationship regulated by certain immanent terms, which grants each of 
them a degree of control and authority over each other’s agency. As 
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contractor of a pact, as long as my actions affect the terms of the pact, I 
cannot claim complete authority and discretion over what I do. The 
other contractors have an interest in my behaving coherently with the 
terms of the pact and enjoy the standing to call me to answer upon 
violation. 
Now, contractors of a pact do not obtain any right to obtain 
compliance with the pact at all costs. But they are in the position to ask 
for some guarantee or assurance that the pact will be effective. Think of 
the case of a pact where nothing provides any degree of security that 
contractors will comply. The thought is that this is hardly a pact at all.36 
None of its contractors would be able to safely assume that certain 
standards of conduct will be upheld, a situation which would 
undermine the rationale of subscribing to the pact in the first place.  
Mutatis mutandis, an analogous situation characterizes the 
normativity of joint agency and the practices to which it applies. A large 
scale and complex joint commitment such as that underlying 
institutions and their practices holds together only insofar as 
participants can have a certain degree of assurance that the terms of the 
commitment will be guaranteed, and that those occupying key roles 
within it will do their bit. Whether or not these people will comply with 
the obligations that follow from this – their civic duties – is not 
something that can be dependent entirely on their virtue or good faith; 
it is instead something about which other participants are entitled to be 
sure.37 If this is correct, then backing up the practice with an 
institutional mechanism that safeguards compliance with civic duties is 
perfectly consistent with the considerations provided thus far. 
                                              
36 This echoes the famous quote from Hobbes: “Covenants, without the Swords are but 
Words.” (Hobbes 1996, 117) 
37 This point - which entails the Kantian idea that a normative framework of rights and duties 
can subsist only insofar as there can be a baseline of assurance that the demands entailed 
by it are met - is well explained in Stilz 2009, 51; I have followed her own phrasing here. See 
also O’Neill 1996, 129 - 132 and Wenar 2013, 208 - 210. 
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Let us now look at how this whole argument applies to voting. The 
thought is the following. Epistemic constraints on voting are justified 
because participants in political decision-making have, in virtue of the 
mutual answerability that they enjoy as people who are jointly 
committed to the common practical goal of reaching a political 
decision, the standing to demand that they comply with their civic duty 
to act in an epistemically responsible way. 
We have argued that the mutual authority that they enjoy over each 
other as joint participants is limited, and that this excludes setting up 
excessively demanding institutional arrangements. The implication for 
voting is, I believe, quite clear. The civic argument can support only 
modest constraints on participation and cannot support any 
mechanism of full-fledged disenfranchisement. The premises of the 
civic argument support the thought that is legitimate to demand 
compliance with the civic duty of epistemic responsibility and to 
introduce institutional ‘guarantees’ to this end. But, from a prudential 
standpoint, these premises alone do not explain why a permanent 
exclusion from the decision-making practice or the loss of the right to 
vote should be the appropriate response to non-compliance. As 
explained above, the normativity supported thus far does not seem 
strong enough to support this. As voters, we might be mutually 
answerable to one another for how we vote, and we might have the right 
to make demands on each other in this sense. But exactly like in the 
case of the rowers, this mutual answerability does not necessarily entail 
that anyone has a right to permanently exclude someone else from the 
practice. Again, this might not always be unjustified, but it does not 
seem immediately supported by the normativity presented in my 
argument.38 
                                              
38 Although I will not pursue this line of argument here, it could be argued that it is implicit 
within the normativity of joint agency, which appeals to the value of voting as a joint 
practice, that there should be a presumptive (although not unconditional) right to 
participate in the practice. 
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That said, the fact that excessively demanding arrangements are 
excluded does not entail that we cannot do anything in order to ensure 
an epistemically responsible agency from voters. If, as argued in [3.1] 
and [3.4], voting is a practice that meets the conditions for generating 
civic duties, and if the considerations about their enforceability 
mentioned in this section are correct, then as a community engaged in 
deciding which course of political action to pursue, we can permissibly 
call each other to answer and advance demands concerning how we 
behave in the procedure that brings this decision about. This normative 
consideration might not be strong enough to support fully epistocratic 
decision-making procedures, but it seems strong enough to support 
arrangements that put a certain degree of pressure on voters, with the 
goal of ensuring an epistemically responsible agency on their part.  
In order to reach a decision over what course of action the polity 
should pursue, we entrust ourselves to the practice of voting. 
Participation entails an implicit commitment to contribute to the 
decision according to the prerogative tasks and powers that 
characterize our role in it. As a result, we incur a civic duty. Given the 
distinctively epistemic dimension of the role of voter, the content of this 
duty is given by epistemic responsibility. This obligation is 
interdependent with that of other participants and correlates to their 
right to demand that it is honoured. As much as the rationale of 
committing to the terms of a pact rests on having a certain degree of 
security that others will reciprocate, the rationale of the practice of 
voting rests upon having a certain degree of guarantee that voters will 
do their part properly and comply with their civic duty of epistemic 
responsibility. 
The civic argument might not be strong enough to support 
arrangements that deprive people of their right to vote. But it does seem 
able to justify less invasive procedures that go some way towards 
providing a better and stronger baseline of security that voters will 
comply with their civic duty of epistemic responsibility, and limit 
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participation accordingly. Recall what I take to be the standard example 
of an epistemic constraint on voting: either prior to voting or as part of 
the registration for voting procedures, the citizen is compelled to 
participate in competence-enhancing training delivered through means 
such as local public debates, information classes, etc. The practical goal 
of this arrangement would not be to test compliance or enforce it 
through threats of punishment. Its goal would be to act as a social 
guarantee that tries to make compliance more likely than in ordinary 
circumstances. This is still a layer of demandingness, but one that the 
civic argument seems strong enough to bear. As much as any other 
complex collective endeavour, deciding together which course of 
political action to pursue is a practice that holds together only insofar 
as participants behave appropriately. If we are to be jointly committed 
to this specific way of making political decisions, we must be able to 
expect – with a certain degree of assurance – that the terms of the 
commitment will be guaranteed, and that voters will be epistemically 
responsible. Compelling people to participate in competence-
enhancing training prior to voting would provide such a guarantee 
through a legitimate institutionalized arrangement. 
Let me conclude by pointing out how the introduction of 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements of this kind is far from 
uncommon. Again, recall that what we are trying to justify is building, 
around the exercise of the requirements associated with institutional 
roles, mechanisms of incentive or pressure that secure a proper 
behaviour from their occupants. We do concoct mechanisms of this 
kind quite often, through professional organizations, government 
agencies and so forth.  
I will illustrate this through an example that I believe to be 
particularly fitting. Recall Ceva and Ferretti’s paper mentioned in 
chapter 2.39 The case presented there focused on Italian doctors 
                                              
39 Ceva & Ferretti 2014 & 2018. 
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working for the SSN, the Italian national health-care system. The issue, 
recall, is that Italian doctors tend to abuse the discretionary powers 
granted to them by their role in order to sabotage the right of women 
to obtain an abortion. To put it in the language of civic duties, even if 
doctor D is allowed by Italian law to refrain from performing an 
abortion, this does not absolve D from his civic duty to act in ways 
compatible with the spirit of his role as provider of public health care. 
This civic duty demands, for instance, that he provide adequate 
information about different facilities. If, because of his religious or 
moral beliefs, D behaves manipulatively or cryptically in fulfilling this 
task, he is substantively violating his civic duty by acting contrarily to 
the rationale and practical goal in name of which his role exists.  
This example is helpful for our purposes. We have an institutional 
role that is part of an institutional set of practices with a clear collective 
goal (public health care). The agency of the doctors in the SSN is bound 
by a joint commitment to uphold that goal, which informs the 
responsibilities that doctors have a civic duty to fulfil. As explained, D 
violates one component of his civic duty. Now, doctor D has willingly 
opted into a practice with a non-repugnant collective goal, 
understanding that this places him under a duty to uphold the norms 
of action associated with his role (whose content he should understand 
as well). In virtue of his participation and role, a relationship of mutual 
answerability has been created between him and other participants in 
the institutional practice. This means that others have some degree of 
authority over his agency and are legitimately able to call him to answer 
and to demand that he performs his civic duties. 
Now, what we are looking for is a justification for moving from the 
claim that the doctor has certain civic duties, to the claim that there 
should be institutional mechanisms that ensure compliance with these 
duties. Let us take for granted that ‘examining’ the extent to which 
doctors act faithfully to the rationale of their role might be difficult and 
invasive. Suppose, however, that a law is introduced that compels 
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doctors to participate in further debates about applied ethics or that 
sets up mandatory courses on abortion and the rights of women. This is 
still a way to demand compliance but in a much weaker sense. What 
this arrangement would do is apply some ‘institutional pressure’ so that 
doctors do what they are supposed to do in the first place. 
This can indeed be justified by the idea that a complex and large-
scale joint commitment, such as upholding public health care, can hold 
up only insofar as there is a baseline of security that those who hold key 
responsibilities within it will do their bit, and contribute properly to the 
overarching shared goal of the collective practice as they are supposed 
to. If all participants in the commitment are entitled to have this 
baseline of security, then this quite clearly seems to override the 
potential burden endured by doctors – namely having to go through 
further institutional compulsive arrangements in the exercise of their 
role. 
Conclusions of Chapter 3 
In this chapter, I have defended the second part of the civic argument. 
First, I have applied the normativity of joint agency (in its Gilbertian 
interpretation) to the practice of voting. After having made clear how 
voting is a practice with an identifiable overarching shared goal that 
grounds civic duties for those who have a role in it, I have focused on 
explaining how the role of voters consists in contributing to public 
decision-making through the performance of an act of political 
advocacy. I then argued that, since performing an act of political 
advocacy is an action analogous to the uttering of an epistemic 
assertion, whereby the agent gives voice to their beliefs about the public 
issues at stake, it is bound by similar epistemic norms. I then concluded 
that voters are under a civic duty to exercise their decision-making 
powers in an epistemically responsible way (i.e. by exercising a cluster 
of basic epistemic capacities). 
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I then moved on to argue that the civic argument justifies epistemic 
constraints on voting, institutional arrangements designed for ensuring 
that voters uphold an epistemically responsible agency. This 
justification is rooted in the normative standing enjoyed by participants 
in political decision-making practices. In virtue of the mutual 
answerability that they enjoy as people who are jointly committed to 
the shared practical goal of reaching a political decision together, they 
have the standing to demand an epistemically responsible agency from 
each other. 
This concludes the reconstruction of my positive theory. The next 
and final chapter will discuss a specific set of potential objections. More 
precisely, I will discuss how the civic argument responds satisfactorily 
to some egalitarian concerns (i.e. public respect and relational equality) 
that are commonly raised against standard epistocratic theories.
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Chapter 4 - Egalitarian Objections to the Civic Argument 
In the previous two chapters, I have presented what I called the civic 
argument for epistemic constraints on voting. We can summarize it, 
roughly, as follows: 
1. Acting in an institutional capacity 
generates special obligations called civic 
duties, grounded in the normativity of joint 
agency. Civic duties require agents to 
uphold – in a thick sense – the norms of 
action entailed by their institutional role. 
2. The civic duties associated with voting 
have an epistemic dimension. Namely, since 
acting in the institutional capacity of voter 
consists in performing an act of political 
advocacy analogous to the uttering of an 
assertion, the role of voters is bound by a 
norm of epistemic responsibility.  
3. Since civic duties, including the ones 
associated with voting, generate a shared 
right to demand a certain degree of 
compliance between the participants in 
institutional practices, they are at least to a 
certain degree enforceable. 
Conclusion from (1 – 3): the civic argument 
justifies modest epistemic constraints on 
voting, institutional mechanisms aimed at 




In this final chapter, I will explain how the civic argument deals with a 
specific set of objections that are typically voiced against other 
epistocratic theories. I group them under the common label of 
egalitarian objections. According to these objections, political equality 
forbids us from giving any normative weight to differences in political 
competence among citizens and, since epistocratic arrangements use 
these differences to justify themselves, they are inherently1 
incompatible with this principle and ought to be rejected. 
My purpose, in this chapter, will be to analyse whether these 
objections apply to the civic argument and to its conclusions in favour 
of epistemic constraints on voting. Recall that the chief example of an 
epistemic constraint on voting is making the exercise of the right to vote 
conditional upon participating, either prior to voting or as part of the 
registration process, in additional competence-enhancing training. 
Even if epistemic constraints on voting of this kind are arguably more 
modest arrangements than those proposed by standard epistocratic 
theories, they are still an exclusionary mechanism potentially 
susceptible to egalitarian objections.  
Nevertheless, I will argue that egalitarian objections fail to 
undermine the case for epistemic constraints on voting. Once again, 
differently from standard arguments for epistocracy, I will pursue an 
argumentative strategy that makes no resort to instrumental 
considerations.  
Before entering the discussion, let me offer a methodological remark. 
Egalitarian objections to epistocracy stem from parallel justifications of 
democratic authority grounded, either entirely or partially, in a 
commitment to political equality and to the idea that democracy is the 
                                              
1 From this standpoint, the anti-egalitarian nature of epistocracy does not stem from its 
contingent implications. Rather, epistocracy is to be rejected because it embodies anti-
egalitarian values. In this chapter, I will offer some reasons to believe that this is not the 
case. Moreover, from an egalitarian standpoint, epistocratic arrangements are to be 
rejected even if they were to turn out to be demonstrably superior to democracy from an 
instrumentalist perspective (Estlund 2008, 42).  
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only political order compatible with it. Since this set of claims has been 
justified in countless different ways, there are countless different 
rejections of epistocracy that are motivated by egalitarian 
considerations. Dealing with all of them in detail would be impossible. 
I will hence focus on two mainstream ways of formulating the 
egalitarian objection – the disrespect objection and the hierarchy 
objection – and discuss how the civic argument can resist both. 
The chapter will be structured as follows:  
I will begin with a preliminary section, [4.1], that will reconstruct the 
main differences between the civic argument and the standard 
argument for epistocracy. The purpose of this section is to remind the 
reader of the distinctive features of the civic argument, and hence 
facilitate the discussion of the egalitarian objections to it. Section [4.2] 
will present and discuss the disrespect objection. From this standpoint, 
epistemic constraints on voting would embody the idea that the 
political judgements of those who do not undertake a previous 
competence-enhancing training are not worth paying attention to, 
thereby expressing disrespect towards these people and their capacity 
for political judgement. In response to it, I will argue that since my view 
does not rely on comparisons of political competence between citizens, 
the objection loses much of its bite when pitted against the conclusions 
of the civic argument. Section [4.3] will present and discuss the 
hierarchy objection. From this standpoint, the conclusions of the civic 
argument are to be rejected because epistemic constraints on voting 
would subjugate the people who do not undertake the training to the 
power of those who do, thereby instantiating a hierarchical relationship 
in which the former group of people stands as rule-takers, permanently 
subjugated to the power of the latter group. In response to it, I will argue 
that civic duties counterweigh the considerations about the standing of 
citizens in society that prompt the objection in the first place and that, 
consequently, a commitment to avoid hierarchical social relations does 
not necessarily outweigh these additional obligations. 
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[4.1] The Civic Argument & the Standard Argument for 
Epistocracy: a Recap 
In this section, I will recap the main differences between the civic 
argument and the standard argument for epistocracy.2 The substantive 
work that underpins the content of this section has already been 
conducted throughout the previous chapters. Nevertheless, there are 
two rationales for going over these issues again. The first is to remind 
the reader of some implications of the work conducted thus far. The 
second is to facilitate the work of the following sections, as these 
implications will play a significant role in explaining how the civic 
argument deals with the egalitarian objections commonly raised against 
epistocracy. 
The work conducted in chapter 1 led me to the conclusion that a 
plausible argument for constraining participation in voting practices on 
grounds of competence has to satisfy some key desiderata. More 
precisely, a theory with epistocratic ambitions needs to provide an 
account of the epistemic responsibilities of ordinary citizens in voting 
and to explain why failure to meet these responsibilities might 
legitimately result in excluding the prospective voter from participating 
in the ballot. I also argued that the standard argument for epistocracy 
is defective on both accounts, precisely in virtue of its commitment to 
a radical instrumentalism. More precisely, I have argued that the 
standard argument cannot attribute any positive epistemic 
responsibility in voting to ordinary citizens and, hence, that it cannot 
provide any justification for excluding incompetent decision-makers 
from participating in voting practices. 
I anticipated that the civic argument’s ambition is to serve as a non-
instrumental alternative to the standard argument for epistocracy. After 
the work conducted in chapters 2 and 3, we have the elements necessary 
to reconstruct with more precision what this means and why this 
                                              
2 Brennan 2016, Caplan 2007, López-Guerra 2014, Mulligan 2015 and 2018. 
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strategy, which avoids any reference to political outcomes, pays off. The 
distinctiveness of the civic argument comes from how the normativity 
of joint agency – which provides the grounds for civic duties – applies 
to voting. The normativity of joint agency instantiates mutual 
answerability between voters. What gives us reason to uphold the civic 
duties associated with voting is the fact that we are engaged with others 
in the endeavour to make a collective decision concerning what to do 
politically and we are hence mutually answerable for how we perform 
our role within such a practice.3 Being epistemically responsible voters 
is a positive requirement that we took upon ourselves to honour as 
agents who play a part within a collective practice that has a specific 
practical goal. If we fail in this respect, we fail to live up to what we owe 
each other as people who are jointly committed to that goal. The need 
to secure this mutual answerability is also what drives the justification 
of epistemic constraints on voting. As argued in [3.5], people who are 
jointly committed to the practical goal of political decision-making 
have the authority to demand from each other a conduct that serves the 
goal appropriately. As much as in the case of any other joint 
                                              
3 Notice how this equips the civic argument with better responses to some epistemic and 
instrumentalist objections to epistocracy as well. From the standpoint of the standard 
argument for epistocracy, voting in an epistemically irresponsible way is wrong because of 
the detrimental impact that it has on the quality of political outcomes and because of the 
risk of harm that it thereby imposes on others. Those who criticize epistocracy on epistemic 
grounds often argue that mechanisms of collective intelligence as well as various heuristics 
compensate for the risks associated with the epistemic shortcomings of individual voters. 
(Among many, see Christiano 2015, Goodin 2003, Goodin and Spiekermann 2018, 
Landemore 2012). Now, whereas the claims of standard epistocrats effectively depend on 
how we answer all sorts of questions about the impact of individual votes and about the 
risks associated with it, the civic argument can bypass these problems. The civic argument 
interprets lack of epistemic responsibility in voting as a violation of a positive duty to live up 
to the requirements that flow from acting in an institutional capacity. Hence, it does not 
need to concentrate itself on the impact of individual conduct on political outcomes or on 
the risks associated with it. What matters is the non-instrumental fact that an epistemically 
irresponsible voter fails to give a normatively appropriate response to the fact that she is 
involved in a common endeavour. This applies even when his vote has clearly no 
detrimental impact on the outcome nor any other risk associated with it, and even if it were 




commitment that underlies complex institutional practices, the one 
underlying voting can stand only insofar as the participants can have a 
certain degree of security that others will do their part by complying 
with their civic duties. Epistemic constraints on voting provide an 
institutional guarantee in this sense. 
This approach allows us to effectively provide a justification for 
constraining the exercise of voting powers on the basis of some criterion 
of political competence without having to appeal to the contentious and 
hardly verifiable claim that political outcomes will effectively be 
improved as a result of these constraints. From this standpoint, 
constraints on voting procedures are not justified because (and only 
insofar as) they maximize the quality of outcomes, but rather because 
(and insofar as) they safeguard the commitment to decide responsibly 
that voters take it upon themselves to honour by joining the practice. 
Epistemic constraints on voting have normative support because they 
provide the insurance of appropriate conduct upon which the joint 
commitment between people who share the goal of making a collective 
political decision depends, and that each participant is entitled to have. 
These differences will play an important role in defending the civic 
argument against the most common egalitarian objections that are 
usually raised against epistocratic theories. Whereas standard 
epistocrats respond to these challenges by insisting on the priority of 
political outcomes, the civic argument tries to respond to them on non-
instrumental terms, by explaining how the civic duties associated with 
voting counterweigh other non-instrumental concerns such as political 
equality. 
Before I move on to the discussion, let me reiterate a point that I 
anticipated in the introduction to this chapter. The egalitarian 
objections to epistocracy that will be considered in this chapter are part 
of broader theories aimed at justifying democratic authority. Their 
rejections of epistocracy are complementary to their support for 
democracy. Here, I will restrict the scope of my work to an analysis of 
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how the civic argument deals with the criticisms of epistocracy that 
these theories propose, without any ambition of providing a 
comprehensive assessment of their arguments in favour of democracy. 
[4.2] The Disrespect Objection 
Having reminded the reader of the main differences between the civic 
argument and the standard argument for epistocracy, I will now discuss 
how the civic argument deals with egalitarian objections to it. Recall 
that I use this term in a broad sense, grouping together a few objections 
that share a common concern, namely that epistocracy is inherently at 
odds with political equality. 
I will start by focusing on a first strand of objections, which I group 
under the label of disrespect objection. From this standpoint, 
epistocratic arrangements ought to be rejected because discriminating 
between the political judgements of citizens because of considerations 
of political competence violates a commitment to treat all citizens with 
proper respect. This objection rests on the idea that, in light of their 
moral equality, all people are owed a minimum of respect. In other 
words, given that persons should be regarded as having an equal moral 
status, the fact that X is a person determines that X ought to be treated 
with respect.4 Public institutions ought to be arranged in a way that 
reflects this commitment to equality and, hence, they ought to grant 
people the respect that is owed to them as a result of their equal moral 
status. This generally commands an equalization of rights and powers 
and, barring special considerations, it excludes any differential 
treatment. In the context of public decision-making practices, this leads 
to the idea that people are truly given the respect due to them (and they 
                                              
4 The idea of respect for persons has its forefather in Kant 1785 and it has since then played 
a significant role in several normative theories. For significant explorations of the topic see, 
among many, Darwall 2006, Frankena 1986, Hill 2000, Korsgaard 1996, Larmore 1987 and 
Rawls 1971.  
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are hence truly treated as equals) only if they are all given equal 
decision-making powers in the form of a vote. 
This latter claim is justified in various ways, but what seems to be key 
is the idea that people are paid proper respect only if their political 
judgements are taken seriously. Since all human beings share at least a 
basic capacity for moral reasoning and to advance normative claims or 
ideas, respecting them requires that we recognize the value of this 
common capacity for moral reasoning by heeding their judgements 
concerning issues of value.5 Judgements concerning how to shape the 
terms of our social and political coexistence are no exception. Treating 
other people as equals requires respect and respect requires that we 
take seriously their judgements in the context of public decision-
making. Now, in order to live up to this desideratum, we ought to start 
from an assumption of equal competence. Public decision-making 
institutions cannot truly reflect a commitment to equality if they start 
discriminating between the political judgements of people. 
Consequently, we ought to refrain from making any assessment of 
political decision-making capacities and act as if all citizens were 
equally competent.6  
This objection to epistocracy figures prominently in the accounts of 
democratic authority of several democratic theorists. Thomas 
Christiano, for instance, grounds the right to have an equal say over 
political decisions in a principle of publicity. This principle requires 
people to be able to see that public institutions treat them as equals. In 
the context of public decision-making institutions, this implies that 
people ought to be able to see that their judgements are given proper 
consideration, which in turn makes it impermissible to use differences 
                                              
5 Christiano 2008, 18 - 27. 
6 This is well put by Valeria Ottonelli: “the reason why all citizens have equal political rights 
[…] is not that each of them has an […] equally worthy political view, but rather that all of 
them have a right to be portrayed as capable of having one”. (Ottonelli 2012(a), 177) 
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in competence as a valid basis for justifying differential political power.7 
Allen Buchanan makes a similar point: “if the political system should 
express a fundamental commitment to equal consideration of persons, 
why shouldn’t this commitment be reflected in the processes by which 
laws are made and in the selection of persons to adjudicate and enforce 
the laws […]?”8 Jeremy Waldron also argues that excluding someone 
from a decision in which they have a stake is an offense to that person 
that effectively denigrates her sense of justice and that denies her status 
as our equal.9  
A similar commitment to refrain from giving any weight to 
considerations of differential competence motivates the rejection of 
epistocracy by public reason theorists. For instance, David Estlund10 
rejects epistocratic arrangements because they rely on ‘invidious 
comparisons’, a term under which Estlund groups any comparison 
between citizens that involves an assessment of their differential moral 
or political competence. These comparisons – which serve as the basis 
for a differential distribution of political power in most epistocratic 
                                              
7 Christiano 2008, 51.   
8 Buchanan 2002, 712. 
9 Waldron 1999, 238 - 239. 
10 Estlund’s framework - epistemic proceduralism - is meant to enrich traditional 
proceduralist views with an epistemic element. The starting point of the project is the idea 
that it is not possible to ground the authority of democracy merely on procedural values, 
such as the intrinsic fairness of one person-one vote. As Estlund famously puts it, if political 
decisions were to draw their legitimacy only from the fairness of the procedures through 
which they are determined, then democratic voting would hold no advantage over flipping 
a coin (Estlund 1997 and 2008, 82 - 84). Contrary to the worries of proceduralists, Estlund 
argues that admitting epistemic considerations in debates about the justification of political 
authority does not represent a danger for democracy. On the contrary, democracy has 
legitimacy precisely because it displays significant epistemic qualities alongside procedural 
virtues. More precisely, according to epistemic proceduralism “democratically produced 
laws are legitimate and authoritative because they are produced by a procedure with a 
tendency to make correct decisions. It is not an infallible procedure, and there might be 
even more accurate procedures. But democracy is better than random and is epistemically 
the best among those that are generally acceptable” (Estlund 2008, 8). As anticipated in the 
introduction of the thesis, I will not discuss instrumentalist arguments in favour of 
democracy. Hence, I will not discuss this facet of Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism. 
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theories – are excluded by a criterion of qualified acceptability, 
Estlund’s own elaboration of a principle of liberal legitimacy common 
in the tradition of political liberalism.11 At the core of this acceptability 
claim there’s the idea that considerations about the exercise of political 
authority have to meet a special burden of justification.12 Namely, any 
claim that concerns the justification of coercive political institutions or 
exercises of power – such as the claim that a certain procedure yields a 
decision that is owed obedience – must be acceptable to all reasonable 
citizens.  
Charles Larmore explains how the notion of respect plays a key role 
in these remarks.13 If we impose a rule over someone without any form 
of consideration for their judgement about that rule, we disrespect that 
person because we act as if their distinctive capacity for reason has no 
value at all. Hence “to respect others as persons in their own right when 
coercion is at stake is to require that political principles be as justifiable 
to them as they presumably are to us.”14 What follows is, again, that in 
the context of procedures that shape coercive laws we should act on an 
assumption of equality among political agents and decision-makers. 
Political decision-making procedures are justified only if they are 
arranged in a way that treats each citizen as being as entitled and as 
capable of engaging in the exchange of valid political claims and in 
formulating valid political judgements as anyone else.  
It is quite clear that epistocratic arrangements, in virtue of their 
attempt to distribute political power according to competence, go 
against this commitment. From the standpoint of these objections, the 
                                              
11 Its most authoritative formulation is Rawls 1993, 137: “Our exercise of political power is 
fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of 
which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason”. 
12 Some (like Gaus 1996, 252) argue that any political arrangement that departs from 
equality needs to be conclusively justified. 
13 Larmore 1999 and 2008. 
14 Larmore 2008, 148 - 149. 
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very idea that comparisons of competence between people could count 
as legitimate normative considerations is inherently problematic. A 
political arrangement that imposes coercive political decisions through 
a procedure that is insensitive to the views and judgements of some 
people on grounds of their alleged incompetence would be an 
arrangement that fails to show proper consideration for the capacity for 
judgement of these people and, with this, for their status as rational 
human beings worthy of consideration and respect. Epistocratic 
arrangements are unacceptable because any such arrangement would 
inherently embody the idea that some people are not sources of valid 
judgements concerning how to administer our social and political 
coexistence, and hence would violate a commitment to treat these 
people respectfully. In setting up this discrimination between people 
who exercise their political agency properly and people who do not, an 
epistocratic arrangement would express the idea that only the former 
are worthy of being listened to, whereas the latter are not, thereby 
failing to treat the two groups with the same degree of respect.15 
In what remains of this section, I will argue that the disrespect 
objection to epistocracy does not convincingly apply to the conclusions 
of the civic argument. The civic argument does not rely on disrespectful 
assumptions of differential competence nor on invidious comparisons, 
at least not according to the more plausible interpretation of these 
notions. More precisely, I argue that the civic argument cannot be 
accused of relying on any impermissible disrespectful or invidious 
comparison because it does not resort to any consideration about 
competence that would not be acceptable also to proponents of the 
objection. 
Let me explain this claim. What ultimately decides whether a certain 
decision-making procedure P is objectionable on grounds of respect is 
the kind of justification that is offered in its support. If, at any point of 
                                              
15 Christiano 2008, 92 - 93. 
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the justification or argument for P, we resort to competence-based 
comparisons between citizens then we are making an impermissible 
move from the standpoint of public respect. Most arguments for 
epistocracy do indeed grant normative significance to the fact that 
people differ in their capacity for political judgement. In making this 
move – calling upon differential political or moral competence as a 
legitimate ground for justifying a discrimination between rulers and 
non-rulers – they violate a demand of respect. The same goes for the 
epistemic constraints on voting argued for in this thesis. If the civic 
argument resorts, at any point of its justification for them, to 
competence-based comparisons between citizens, then the civic 
argument is to be rejected on grounds of disrespect.  
Thus, the question is indeed whether the civic argument makes this 
impermissible move. My sense is that it does not, at least if we frame 
what counts as a disrespectful consideration in a plausible way.16 It is 
crucial, in this regard, to define the scope of impermissible comparisons 
and to specify the considerations of competence that cannot be 
appealed to on grounds of disrespect. There are two possibilities in this 
sense. A first, more restrictive option, would be to count considerations 
of competence as disrespectful only if they are formulated in relative 
terms. That is, only if they involve explicit comparative assessments of 
the political competence of citizens, assessments that are meant to 
inform a differential distribution of voting powers. A second, broader 
option, would be to count as disrespectful even considerations of 
competence that are formulated in absolute terms. From this 
                                              
16 I will not pursue this issue here, but it is perhaps worth noticing that the disrespect 
objection seems to rest - at least in some accounts - on a specific interpretation of voting 
powers, according to which they represent a personal resource rather than a public 
responsibility (Christiano 1995). As it is probably obvious, from the standpoint defended 
throughout this thesis such a view is reductive and fails to take into account the fact that 
voting represents an individual contribution to a collective endeavour and the normative 
considerations that follow from this fact. For critical discussions of the interpretation of 
votes as personal resources, see Gaus 1996, 248 - 251 and Wall 2007, 418 - 420. 
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standpoint, the very fact of employing the notion of political 
competence in the first place – or at least the idea of recognizing 
normative significance to it or to similar concepts – would be 
problematic. 
Let me start with the first interpretation. From this standpoint, the 
considerations of competence that count as disrespectful, invidious and 
unacceptable are only those that are formulated in relative terms. This 
interpretation rules out as disrespectful any attempt at measuring, 
singling-out or assessing which members of the political community 
qualify as politically competent and to differentiate between them on 
such basis. These considerations are widely employed in standard 
arguments for epistocracy. Standard epistocrats believe that it is a 
discernible fact that people display wide differences of political 
competence. Moreover, they believe that this fact has normative 
relevance in the context of political decision-making practices. From 
their standpoint, we should employ whatever reliable proxy is available 
to us – empirical studies, scholarly education, literacy, etc. – to assess 
how citizens fare in terms of political competence relatively to one 
another and differentiate the distribution of political decision-making 
power on this basis. For instance, empirical studies about the 
competence of average voters are a key driver in Jason Brennan’s 
argument for epistocracy.17 His conclusions rest on the idea that, in light 
of this evidence, it would be reckless to grant ordinary citizens with 
political decision-making powers. Going back to more classical 
contributions, Plato assumed that only philosophers have the right kind 
of intellectual and moral virtues that determine a wise ruler18 and John 
Stuart Mill assumed that people with no scholarly education would be 
far less prepared and capable of contributing to public decision-making 
than more educated ones.19 All these arguments display an attempt at 
                                              
17 Brennan 2016, 23 - 53. 
18 Plato 2000. 
19 Mill 1977. 
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distinguishing which subset of the citizenry is more competent on the 
basis of some proxy that is regarded as a reliable indicator in this sense. 
This attempt at ‘measuring’ competence through some form of 
comparative assessment of citizens plays a key role in driving the 
conclusions in favour of epistocracy of these arguments and it is 
perceived by most critics as contemptuous. The reason being that it 
submits people to a scrutiny of their capacities as political decision-
makers (and consequently of their capacities for reason) with the 
purpose of singling out those who fall short of the desired criteria, 
thereby allocating people along some imaginary ranking of 
competence. This makes the theories vulnerable to the disrespect 
objection. 
Suppose we take this first interpretation and accept that resorting to 
considerations about differences in competence among the citizenry 
formulated in relative terms is an impermissible move on grounds of 
disrespect. My response is quite straightforward: if we employ this first 
interpretation, then the civic argument is immune to the disrespect 
objection. The civic argument does not make such a move, in that it 
does not rely on any disrespectful consideration of this kind. The civic 
argument does not involve any attempt at assessing and comparing the 
political competence of people. The core of the argument is the idea 
that when people engage together in making a collective political 
decision, they owe each other and have a standing to demand of each 
other that they act in a way that conforms to their civic duty of 
epistemic responsibility. Advancing this claim does not entail that those 
citizens who happen to be less competent should be singled out as such 
and placed on the lower tiers of some imaginary competence ranking. 
Whether people are currently competent, who amongst them is more 
likely to be competent, what are the differences between them in this 
respect are all tangential issues in the context of the civic argument. 
Whatever the answers to these questions might be, the point remains 
the same: we must ensure, through a viable proxy, that all those who do 
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choose to participate in political decision-making practices meet at 
least a certain threshold of epistemic responsibility. Beyond this, any 
further difference or consideration of relative political competence is 
not pertinent to our purposes and plays no relevant justificatory role at 
any stage of the argument.  
This point emerges more strikingly if we look at the specific 
institutional arrangements that the civic argument is meant to justify, 
epistemic constraints on voting. These are meant to ensure an 
epistemically responsible agency in voting. Making voting conditional 
upon undertaking a competence-enhancing training serves as a proxy 
for epistemic responsibility, and not as a proxy to assess or test the 
competence of voters. Under an arrangement of this kind, once a voter 
displays a commitment to acquire and cultivate the minimum of 
epistemic capacities required by their civic duty, they are included in 
the decision-making process. There is no further selection, assessment, 
or comparison of their judgements nor any attempt at distinguishing 
who is more competent than whom. In my view there is no attempt at 
placing voters on some kind of competence ranking either. Voting 
under the epistemic constraints envisioned by my theory would be a 
political decision-making procedure that effectively constraints the 
exercise of political authority on epistemic grounds without resorting 
to any comparative assessment of the political competence displayed by 
ordinary citizens. If these are the considerations that are impermissible 
on grounds of respect, it is not clear why the disrespect objection should 
apply to the civic argument in the first place. 
So much then for the first interpretation. But what about the second? 
Under this second interpretation, considerations of political 
competence are disrespectful even if they are formulated in absolute 
terms. From this standpoint, public respect requires not only that we 
don’t make a comparative assessment of the political competence of 
citizens. It requires, at least in the context of debates about legitimacy 
and authority, that we deny any place or normative significance to the 
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notion of political competence in the first place, no matter how the 
notion is fleshed out. If we accept this interpretation, the civic argument 
is indeed in trouble. Even though it makes no use of relative 
comparisons about competence in justifying epistemic constraints on 
voting, the civic argument nevertheless calls upon the requirement of a 
minimum of epistemic responsibility by voters. In doing so, it 
incorporates and gives normative significance to some notion 
analogous to political competence. More precisely, the civic argument 
is committed to the idea that the justifiability of a practice like voting 
rests upon a certain degree of security that voters will comply with their 
civic duty to be epistemically responsible. This implies that there are 
indeed epistemic conditions or qualifications on the commitment to 
take seriously the judgement of a voter. Not everything goes. Namely, 
the judgement of a voter should not be recognized as a valid 
contribution to the political decision at stake unless it meets the 
requirement of epistemic responsibility in voting, understood as the 
requirement to exercise a cluster of basic epistemic capacities. The civic 
argument might not be resorting to the same considerations of 
competence of standard epistocratic accounts, but some considerations 
of competence do matter, and they still play a role in justifying some 
constraints on participation in voting. These constraints exclude some 
people, namely those who do not make an attempt at acquiring the 
minimum of epistemic capacities required by their institutional role.20 
Under this second interpretation, the civic argument would effectively 
be vulnerable to the disrespect objection.  
However, the interpretation according to which even considerations 
of competence formulated in absolute terms should be rejected as 
                                              
20 In other words, even if it does not take on the radical instrumentalist commitments of 
standard epistocratic views, the civic argument nevertheless endorses the key claim of 
epistocratic theories, the anti-authority tenet (Brennan 2016, 17): failure to meet the 




disrespectful is implausible, as it extends the range of what counts as 
impermissible considerations in an overinclusive way. If it were to be 
adopted, it would require that we ban any notion of political 
competence, no matter how it is fleshed out, from discussions about 
political authority. But this would spell trouble also for the proponents 
of the disrespect objection, as their own theories do make room for 
some analogous requirement of modest political competence. 
For instance, David Estlund’s argument against epistocracy rests on 
the qualified acceptability criterion, according to which coercive rules 
and political arrangements have to be acceptable to those who hold 
qualified points of view.21 Without any presumption of being able to 
discuss this criterion nor the public reason liberalism from which it 
stems thoroughly, it is perhaps worth noting that the idea of ‘qualified 
acceptability’ has a certain ambiguity to it. Namely, the idea that 
political acceptability is ‘qualified’ does seem to imply that there is a 
range of properties that gives ‘qualification’ to the views that citizens 
have concerning the terms, norms and rules of our social and political 
coexistence. If we say that political arrangements and coercive norms 
ought to be acceptable to those who hold qualified views, we are saying 
that they ought to be acceptable to those who indeed possess the 
relevant range of properties. Conversely, we are conceding that there 
might be some perspectives on how we ought to live together that fail 
to meet the range of properties that would make them worthy of 
engaging with. In other words, the qualified acceptability criterion 
seems to implicitly build into its structure, at least formally, the same 
idea put forward by the civic argument: below certain conditions, some 
political judgements may not have what it takes to be worthy of being 
admitted in public deliberation and decision-making. Now, a lot 
obviously hangs on determining the content of the notion of ‘qualified’. 
                                              
21 As Estlund himself puts it: “no person can legitimately be coerced to abide by legal rules 
and arrangements unless sufficient reasons can be given that do not violate that person’s 
reasonable moral and philosophical convictions, true or false, right or wrong.” (2008, 43) 
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Depending on how we describe the range of relevant properties that a 
view ought to meet to be regarded as a qualified view, our conclusions 
may change. But my sense is that the account of epistemic responsibility 
in voting proposed in this thesis could very well be part of such a 
description, or at least be a criterion to which Estlund should be 
sympathetic. For one thing, the account follows from Estlund’s own 
idea that votes have advocative force and that they lend support to the 
political option for which they are cast, as I have argued in [3.2] and 
[3.3]. It’s this advocative aspect of votes, identified by Estlund, that 
drives the idea that acting as a voter requires the exercise of an 
epistemic agency analogous to the uttering of assertions. If Estlund is 
committed to an advocative interpretation of voting, he should be 
sympathetic to the idea that some epistemic requirements are inbuilt in 
the exercise of voting powers and to the idea that they might be part of 
the range of properties that define qualified points of view. 
Even democratic theorists who rest their case for democracy on 
stronger egalitarian commitments do employ some notion of political 
competence and end up making room for some modest requirements 
of this sort. For instance, Thomas Christiano limits the application of 
his principles of publicity – and hence the application of an equal 
respect for judgement – only to “minimally morally competent 
persons”.22 Curiously, in discussing how this criterion excludes children 
and insane adults from voting, Christiano admits that even though this 
might impact their standing as citizens, these considerations about 
their political competence entail no denial of their moral equality.23 
                                              
22 Christiano 2008, 128 - 129. The idea, more precisely, is that only once individuals are 
capable of “elaborating, reflecting on, and revising ideas about justice […] there is a basis 
for respect for the judgement of that person”. 
23 In this passage he claims that those who are excluded from participation “do have inferior 
status as citizens. But this in no way reflects a lesser moral status. They have an equal moral 
status with adults. Their interests are worthy of consideration and advancement as much 
as anyone else’s. It is just that they are not able, through participation, to advance those 
interests. Hence they do not have rights of participation”. (Ibid., 129, note 33)   
133 
 
These people are legitimately excluded from participation in the 
political decision-making procedure without any disrespect entailed. 
This seems to amount to a concession of the point that some sacrifices 
in terms of equality are acceptable on the basis of a modest requirement 
of political decision-making competence. 
Claims like these are not dissimilar from those that figure in the civic 
argument. Theorists like Estlund and Christiano argue that unqualified 
points of view are not owed political justifications and that human 
agents who lack the capacity to elaborate ideas of justice are not owed 
a political say. I argue that prospective voters who are not willing to do 
what it takes to be in the position to discharge their civic duties, for 
instance by undertaking a competence-building training, are not owed 
a say. The only relevant difference at stake is in terms of 
demandingness. Democratic theorists like Estlund and Christiano seem 
to conceive of the epistemic qualifications for an efficacious 
participation in political decision-making in a less demanding way than 
I do. Consequently, they conceive the group of the potentially excluded 
as being much more restricted. But the normative point we make is not 
that different as it might have appeared at first glance. If some agents 
cannot – or are not willing to – make an effort to exercise the minimum 
of epistemic capacities necessary for a meaningful exercise of political 
decision-making powers, there is no disrespect involved in not granting 
them a say.24 
To recap, the only precondition for taking seriously the political 
judgement of citizens envisioned by the civic argument consists in this 
commitment to at least make an attempt at exercising certain epistemic 
capacities before voting. Epistemic constraints on voting should be seen 
as an institutional device that is meant to provide some guarantee in 
                                              
24 This is especially true considering that the epistemic constraints on voting supported by 
the civic argument would not effectively deprive people of an equal opportunity to 
influence the outcomes of a political decision. See also the remarks offered here at pages 
141 - 144. 
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this regard, with no further assessment or selection of voters. Their 
justification rests on the idea that the joint commitment underlying 
collective political decision-making cannot hold without a certain 
degree of security that people who take it upon themselves to 
contribute to it will comply with the civic duties that apply to them, 
such as epistemic responsibility. None of these premises involves 
assuming, from the get-go, that some people are incapable of valid 
political judgements. If this is true, then the only way in which we can 
legitimately accuse the civic argument of making disrespectful 
argumentative moves would require us to include, in the latter category, 
considerations about the competence of voters that do not involve 
comparative assessments of their political competence, including a 
modest requirement such as that of attempting to master a minimum 
of epistemic capacities. This, however, would make the notion too 
broad and implausibly overinclusive, spelling troubles also for the 
proponents of the disrespect objection. Although much more work 
needs to be conducted, these claims suggest that the civic argument can 
muster some defence against the disrespect objection and that the gap 
between its conclusions and those of some democratic theorists is not 
as wide as it appeared at first glance. 
[4.3] The Hierarchy Objection 
I will now turn to a second strand of egalitarian objections to 
epistocracy. I group them under the common label of hierarchy 
objection. According to this view, the problem with any arrangement 
that denies some citizens a say over political decisions on grounds of 
political incompetence is not so much that this would be disrespectful 
towards them but, rather, that this would instantiate an inequality in 
power between them and other citizens and, with it, a hierarchical 
relationship in which they are subjugated to the authority of others. 
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The hierarchy objection starts25 from a relational interpretation of 
the commitment to political equality. From a relational standpoint, 
equality is a concept that regulates how we should relate to one another, 
rather than who should get what.26 The key to uphold the ideal of 
equality, from this standpoint, is conducting human relationships on 
equal terms. Certain normative considerations follow quite 
straightforwardly. A relational interpretation of equality commands 
that we display an equal concern for one another, that we take each 
other’s interests into equal consideration and that we relate to one 
another on the basis of the same scheme of rights and duties.27  
These elements, however, are not enough to make a relationship 
equal. Think of the following case, proposed by Daniel Viehoff.28 
Suppose X and Y are in a spousal relationship in which all the relevant 
decisions are taken by X. Even if X weighs Y’s interests properly in any 
of these decisions and even if the two interact on the same scheme of 
rights and duties, the relationship would still be unequal in an 
important sense. Namely, since X has disproportionate control and 
authority over the relevant decisions, it would be a relationship marked 
                                              
25 The hierarchy objection can also be grounded in the notion of freedom as non-
domination, as interpreted in the neo-republican tradition inaugurated by Philip Pettit 
(Pettit 1996 and 2012). In this tradition, we see the same commitment to guarantee equality 
of decision-making powers and the same commitment to secure an equal social standing 
between citizens. These commitments stem, however, not from a relational interpretation 
of equality, but rather from the idea that freedom requires someone’s agency to be 
protected from the arbitrary power of others. I will not deal with this tradition in the present 
thesis. Let me briefly point out two things, however. First, even though much more work is 
required to give full justice to the neo-republican view, the anti-hierarchical conclusions 
that it reaches are tentatively vulnerable to the same responses I will offer here (as evidence 
of the similarities between the republican view and the hierarchy objection to epistocracy 
criticized here, see Kolodny 2019). Second, republicanism’s attention to the duties of 
citizens is compatible with my account of civic duties. This could potentially represent a 
basis for conciliating our diverging conclusions. On the ambiguous relationship between 
republicanism and democracy, see Urbinati 2019. 
26 The most authoritative example of this interpretation of equality can be found in 
Anderson 1999. 
27 Viehoff 2014, 353 - 354. 
28 Ibid., 359 - 361. 
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by imbalance of powers. This leads us to the key premise of the 
hierarchy objection. Namely, relational equality commands that the 
parties to the relationship have equal powers in shaping and 
determining how the relationship ought to be conducted. If this does 
not happen, a hierarchy – a relationship that makes one party 
subjugated to the ruling of the other – is created.29 From this 
standpoint, what makes it impermissible that X has more power than Y 
in regulating the relationship between them is not so much the idea 
that this would be disrespectful towards Y. What is crucial is that this 
would result in a relationship in which X acts as ruler whereas Y acts as 
a mere subject to X’s authority.30 
This commitment to avoid hierarchical relations, in which one party 
stands in a position of superior power to others, is particularly 
important for what concerns the relationship between citizens or 
members of the same political community. This relationship has, in 
fact, a very peculiar and distinctive feature: its terms, expectations and 
rules are for the most part coercive. How we relate to one another as 
members of the same society is determined by political institutions to 
which we owe de-facto obedience. Whereas we can revise at will the 
terms of a friendship, the same is not true of the terms that regulate our 
social and political coexistence. The need to secure relational equality 
and avoid the instantiation of hierarchies is hence particularly poignant 
in this context.31 
The implications on political decision-making practices such as 
voting are quite clear. If we are to uphold relational equality and avoid 
hierarchy, we ought to have equal powers in all those processes by 
which we determine, shape and discuss the fundamental terms of our 
social and political coexistence.32 No one ought to enjoy a superior 
                                              
29 Viehoff 2014, 352. 
30 Kolodny 2014(b), 292 - 295. 
31 Ibid., 304 - 307. 
32 Viehoff 2014, 364 - 365. 
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authority over these decisions. From this standpoint, epistocratic 
arrangements are to be rejected. But, again, they are to be rejected not 
so much because they would be disrespectful towards the people who 
would be excluded. The reason would be, rather, that epistocratic 
arrangements would submit people who end up excluded from voting 
to a relationship of subjugation to their ‘wiser’ or ‘more competent’ 
fellow citizens. A society that makes political decisions through an 
epistocratic procedure would be a society that is effectively split 
between rule-givers and rule-takers. Similar to a spousal relationship in 
which one of the partners takes exclusive control over all the relevant 
decisions, the social relationship between members of such a  political 
community would be hierarchical, in that the citizens who are denied a 
say in voting practices would relate to those who were allowed to vote 
as their rule-givers and, ultimately, as their social superiors.33 
As I anticipated in the introduction to the chapter, I believe that this 
kind of egalitarian objection to epistocracy is also unsuccessful when 
pitted against the civic argument. I will offer a two-pronged response to 
the hierarchy objection. First, I will argue that the sacrifices in terms of 
equality imposed by the civic argument’s conclusions rest on justified 
grounds. The civic duties illustrated in chapter 2 represent additional 
obligations that supervene egalitarian considerations. In the context of 
voting, the implication is that the civic duty to be epistemically 
responsible supervenes relational equality and, hence, that the 
conclusions of the civic argument are not decisively undermined by the 
hierarchy objection. Second, I will argue that the civic argument and its 
conclusions impose a very modest burden on the commitment to secure 
an equal relationship or standing between citizens anyway, given that 
epistemic constraints on voting do not deprive citizens of the 
opportunity to vote and do not entail any form of permanent 
                                              
33 Kolodny 2014(b), 294 - 295. 
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disenfranchisement. Consequently, the objection that they would imply 
social hierarchies loses much of its strength. 
Before getting into the details of my response, let me briefly 
comment on the general argumentative strategy that I want to pursue. 
I will not deny that there is value in relating to one another as equal 
citizens. I will argue that, in the context of voting, this value conflicts 
with another important normative consideration – the civic duty to be 
epistemically responsible – and that, on this basis, we might 
consequently call into question whether we are always and 
unconditionally owed a say over political decisions. In terms of 
structure, my reply to the hierarchy objection is therefore not dissimilar 
to the one offered by the standard argument for epistocracy. The aim, 
in both cases, is to show that there are other things that matter beside 
political equality and that we cannot assume that, when they come in 
tension, equality wins out. What is significantly different – and what I 
believe makes for a more convincing reply – is how this argumentative 
structure is articulated in terms of content. Differently from standard 
epistocratic accounts, I am not contrasting the value of equality with 
the value of political outcomes and arguing that the latter dimension 
makes the former meaningless. I am contrasting it with another set of 
non-instrumental norms that are meant to regulate our interaction as 
citizens. In my view, egalitarian considerations about how we should 
relate to one another as citizens in general come in tension with other 
non-instrumental considerations about how we should relate to one 
another as citizens who are engaged in a very specific activity and 
common endeavour. Both pertain to important dimensions of our 
interactions as citizens and it is not clear why the former should be 
given overriding priority over the latter. 
With these specifics in place, let me explain the details of the 
response. The hierarchy objection to epistocracy rests on the idea that 
relational equality is the central norm according to which our 
coexistence as members of the same political community should be 
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regulated. But a great part of this coexistence takes place in the context 
of participation in institutional practices. As soon as our actions take 
place within the boundaries of these practices, other normative 
considerations pertaining to joint agency supervene. In general, the 
normativity of joint agency pertains to the normative considerations 
based on which people can hold each other accountable, advance 
demands, attribute responsibilities, etc. when they are acting together 
towards a shared goal. It establishes that, as people who are jointly 
committed to this goal, they owe each other and have a standing to 
demand of each other actions that are conforming to it. In the specific 
case of institutional practices, it establishes that we have civic duties: 
provided that the institutional practice is not utterly immoral, we owe 
each other and have a standing to demand of each other to contribute 
to the shared goal of the practice in compliance with the requirements 
associated with our role. In other words, as a result of the normativity 
of joint agency, additional obligations emerge and we become 
answerable to each other for how we fulfil whatever specific 
responsibility we have been entrusted with, at least as long as we act 
within the boundaries of the practice. 
Now, no one denies that equality matters in the context of our social 
and political coexistence. But if the claims just mentioned are correct, 
and the normativity of joint agency does apply to participation in 
institutional practices, then we cannot reduce the normative 
considerations that apply to this coexistence to relational equality. If 
participation in institutional practices does generate the additional 
obligations that I defined as civic duties – and I have provided plenty of 
reasons to believe that it does – then these additional obligations are as 
much part of the norms that should regulate our social and political 
coexistence as relational equality is. 
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Think about it in terms of the following analogy.34 Think about the 
case of housemates that share the same household. It might be true 
that, as members of the same household, they should relate to one 
another as equals. But living together as a household entails further 
considerations beside the ones pertaining to our standing to one 
another. For instance, it entails having to make common decisions and 
having, sometimes, to engage in common endeavours. If this does 
indeed generate further reciprocal duties, why should the 
considerations of standing prevail over these duties in case of conflict? 
A similar reasoning applies in the context of our communal coexistence 
as citizens or members of the same political community.35 It might be 
true that, as citizens, we should enjoy an equal standing to one another. 
But if our social and political coexistence involves and creates further 
duties, such as the ones that stem from acting within institutional 
practices, it is by no means clear why – in case of conflict – 
considerations of equality should cancel these additional duties and 
their implications.  
In the case of voting the implications of these two sets of norms, both 
pertaining to important dimensions of our political coexistence, come 
indeed in tension with one another. A norm of equality commands an 
equal standing and equal powers over political decisions. But once we 
step in the context of the specific practice by which political decisions 
are reached, another set of normative considerations supervenes. These 
considerations command ensuring that participants act in an 
epistemically responsible way through epistemic constraints. In other 
words, this latter normativity commands something that requires some 
sacrifice in terms of equality. It is far from clear why this should imply 
that its conclusions ought to be rejected. Perhaps it is unfortunate that 
the commitment to secure an epistemically responsible agency in 
                                              
34 I thank Carline Klijnman for a helpful discussion on this point. 




voting comes at a price in terms of political equality. But this price is 
not imposed because of whimsical considerations. It stems from norms 
that are part and parcel of a very important dimension of our communal 
life as citizens. It stems from the fact that, as a collective engaged in 
making a decision, we are entitled to a certain degree of security that 
this endeavour will be conducted in ways that are conforming to its 
practical goal. Rejecting the weight of these normative considerations 
because we deem any compromise or risk in terms of equality to be 
beyond the pale would amount to a rather crude restatement of 
egalitarian commitments that simply pushes aside the significance of 
these additional obligations that voting generates. This seems 
somewhat implausible even for relational egalitarians like Viehoff, who 
claims explicitly that certain usages of voting powers undermine the 
authority of egalitarian procedures and that this entails “a demanding 
account of the duties that citizens, and their representatives, have to 
exercise their vote conscientiously”.36 
Now, proponents of the hierarchy objection might be reluctant to 
accept these conclusions. They might concede that some sacrifice in 
terms of equality is acceptable if alternative normative considerations 
emerge. Yet they could maintain that the price in terms of equality that 
my view asks us to pay is still too steep. Not all sacrifices in terms of 
equality are unacceptable. It is my specific view that goes too far 
because, in the context of voting, the normativity of civic duties might 
be seen as undermining equality altogether rather than merely 
conflicting with it. My conclusions still entail differences in power over 
political decisions and some people being subjected to political 
decisions over which they had no say and this is enough to put the case 
for epistemic constraints on voting to rest.37 Any normative 
                                              
36 Viehoff 2014, 374. 
37 Proponents of the hierarchy objection could also use the coerciveness of the decisions 
reached through voting as a reason to treat the case of voting differently. My understanding 
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consideration that is at risk of completely undermining the 
commitment to secure an equal standing among citizens ought to be 
side-lined or, at least, we should refrain from giving it any priority. In 
other words, proponents of the hierarchy objection might argue that 
even if the normative considerations that supervene on equality would 
otherwise be valid, their implications ought to be resisted if they 
represent an existential threat to our standing as equals.38 
This claim, however, does not seem convincing and leads us to the 
second prong of my reply. We have to keep in mind that the civic 
argument is, in this regard, quite different from standard arguments for 
epistocracy and it supports different arrangements. My point here is 
simple: the epistemic constraints on voting supported by the civic 
argument, since they do not imply any permanent exclusion from 
participation in political decision-making practices, impose only a very 
limited burden on the equal standing of citizens and this burden does 
not imply any social hierarchy.  
Let us go back to the analogy between living together as citizens and 
living together as housemates. Suppose that we have to decide the 
energy provider for our household. Suppose that we organize a few 
meetings to go over the various options. Suppose that one of my 
housemates refuses to take part in the meetings and I, in response, insist 
that if he wants to have a say over the final decision, he ought to take 
part in the meetings. My justification for this insistence rests on the idea 
that it is part of his responsibilities as a member of the household to put 
some effort into contributing to a responsible choice. Now there is no 
denying that my insistence might end up with my housemate not 
getting a say over the final decision. But to say that this would 
                                              
is that this would represent a weak reply: it could be argued that, precisely because the 
decisions we reach through voting are coercive, priority should be given to the civic duties 
associated with voting. 
38 Daniel Viehoff, for instance, argues that valuing a relationship calls for excluding 
normative considerations that do not sustain the relationship and that might undermine it 
(2014, 359 - 361). For a similar point, see also Darwall 2006, 256 - 257. 
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completely undermine his standing as an equal member of the 
household, represent an existential threat to reciprocal equality, or 
submit him to a hierarchical relationship would be to stretch things. 
After all, he is given the opportunity and the power to contribute to the 
decision. What is demanded of him in return for this power is just to 
live up to the responsibility that he has, as a member of the household, 
to take seriously our collective endeavour and to properly contribute to 
it. Given that what we are dealing with is an important issue which will 
impact how we will live together, and given that I am not threatening 
him with a permanent exclusion from any collective decision that we 
will make in the future, it is not clear what exactly would imply that he 
is now my subject or that our relation is now hierarchical. 
With this analogy in mind, let us now look at voting. Niko Kolodny, 
one of the most important proponents of the hierarchy objection, 
argues that someone enjoys influence over a decision “to the extent that 
the decision is reached by a process that is positively sensitive to one’s 
choice or judgement”.39 If this is correct, then to say that the epistemic 
constraints on voting supported by the civic argument would deprive 
citizens of the power to influence the outcome of a political decision 
would be to stretch things. As already specified in chapter 3, I agree that 
ensuring an epistemically responsible behaviour in voting does not 
represent a reason weighty enough to justify the permanent 
disenfranchisement of people. But forcing citizens to undertake a 
training as part of the voting procedure does not effectively result in 
taking away their right to vote and hence their opportunity to influence 
the outcome of a voting procedure. It merely raises the cost of this 
opportunity. The price for accessing decision-making powers is a 
commitment to live up to a responsibility that is inbuilt in the role of 
public decision-makers that we are taking it upon ourselves to perform 
upon participation. But if the only conditional that the civic argument 
                                              
39 Kolodny 2014(b), 309. 
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places on the exercise of voting powers is the willingness to prepare for 
the task of influencing that decision or outcome in a way that is 
conforming to our civic duty40, there seems to be no hierarchical 
consideration at stake, at least in line of principle. As Kolodny himself 
admits, “if I have the same opportunity as you have to influence a 
decision, but choose not to take it, then there is no hierarchy or 
subordination between us, at least with respect to the making of that 
decision”.41 
Conclusions of Chapter 4 
This analysis, although limited for reasons of space, has hopefully 
shown that there is a plausible case to be made for restrictions to 
participation in voting that, once faced with egalitarian concerns, can 
resort to more than merely insisting on the value or priority of political 
outcomes. 
Precisely because of its non-instrumental nature, the view defended 
in this thesis also represents a novel challenge for proceduralists of all 
kinds. Proceduralists accuse epistemic approaches to issues of political 
legitimacy of misinterpreting fundamental values such as political 
equality. Some of them, like Nadia Urbinati, go as far as to say that any 
epistemic consideration, no matter how it is framed, disfigures the 
procedural and participatory nature of democracy.42 From such a 
standpoint, the substantive values associated with political 
participation allegedly make the lack of epistemic competence of 
individual citizens something normatively marginal and that is not 
particularly significant for the legitimacy of political decision-making 
procedures such as voting.  
                                              
40 If anything, if properly instantiated, epistemic constraints on voting would make the 
epistemic resources that are necessary for a meaningful exercise of voting powers 
accessible to anyone who wishes to use them. 
41 Kolodny 2014(b), 309 - 310. 
42 Urbinati 2014. 
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But the view offered in this thesis, precisely because it is not an 
instrumentalist view, has the resources to show how this would be a 
hasty conclusion. It is precisely because of a non-instrumental 
commitment to the value of proper political participation that 
epistemic responsibility in voting matters. Once properly framed, 
competence in political decision-making acquires a value that extends 
beyond its impact on the outcomes of the decision-making process. 
Competent participation has a value that stems from the fact that is part 
of the civic duties that we have as people who are trying to make a 
decision together. If my argument in this section is correct, this is a 
normative consideration that weighs on our interaction as citizens as 
much as political equality. On these grounds, I hope to have provided a 
normative justification for epistemic constraints on participation in 
voting practices and on the exercise of voting powers that can resist the 
typical egalitarian objections against epistocracy and to have shown 
that arrangements alternative to democratic voting are not inherently 
unjustifiable from a normative standpoint. 
That said, and as I explicitly recognized in the introduction, 
egalitarian concerns about disrespect and subjugation might remain 
very much alive in the context of actual states and in real-world 
circumstances. Just to make an example, if epistemic constraints on 
voting were to be applied here and now, they would likely discourage 
demographics who are already politically vulnerable from participating 
in voting procedures. Whether the epistemic constraints on voting 
envisioned in this thesis can be successfully implemented in a way that 
does not cause social and political inequalities to worsen remains to be 
seen and it is an issue that might represent, for many, a powerful source 
of concern. I will not deal with this problem here. While this reluctance 
in considering the political implications of the view defended thus far 
might disappoint many, as I explained in the introduction, I doubt that 
it counts as a reason to undermine the conclusions of this work. The 
fact that many downstream questions about the political implications 
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and possible implementations of my theory remain open does not imply 
that my conclusions ought to be rejected. It just implies that more work 
needs to be done in this regard. 
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Conclusions: an Epistemic Civism? 
In this thesis, I have assessed the epistocratic challenge to democracy. 
Epistocrats look favourably upon the idea of formally restricting access 
to political decision-making powers on grounds of political 
competence. In contemporary accounts, this core idea takes the shape 
of an argument in favour of restricting participation in voting practices.  
After rejecting the standard argument for epistocracy as untenable 
in light of the radical and implausible instrumentalism that underlies it, 
I have reconstructed and defended a non-instrumental alternative: the 
civic argument for epistemic constraints on voting. The civic argument 
relies on the normativity of joint agency and on the idea that voting is 
an agency with distinctive epistemic features analogous to assertion-
making.  
The former shows that, as participants in a joint practice, voters incur 
a civic duty to contribute to the overarching goal of the practice in 
accordance with the requirements associated with their role within it. 
They are mutually answerable with respect to this normativity and have 
a shared right to demand compliance with it. The latter shows that, 
among the civic duties associated with the role of voters, there is a 
requirement of epistemic responsibility, understood as the requirement 
to exercise a cluster of basic epistemic capacities. 
On these bases, I have constructed a justification for modest 
constraints on participation in voting practices. If an epistemically 
responsible agency in voting is part of the normative considerations 
that should regulate our interaction as members of a political 
community whenever we are engaged in shared institutional practices, 
this framework of mutual obligations and shared rights justifies a 
modest attempt at ensuring epistemic responsibility in voting, for 
instance by making voting conditional upon participation in a 
competence-enhancing training. This approach resists the most 
common egalitarian objections raised against standard epistocratic 
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accounts, because it does not rely on disrespectful comparative 
assessments of the political competence of citizens and because it 
counterweighs concerns about equal standing in society with other 
non-instrumental considerations. 
The view defended in this thesis is best understood as a middle-
ground position between epistocracy and democracy. On one hand, the 
view does not entail some of the standard components of epistocratic 
arguments: it does not entail political instrumentalism, nor the 
disenfranchisement of incompetent citizens and it requires only a 
modest degree of political competence. On the other, the view is clearly 
in tension with certain democratic values, as it does nevertheless lend 
support to institutional arrangements that limit access to participation 
in voting on the basis of an epistemic criterion. Even though this 
approach might invite criticisms on both sides of the debate, it 
nevertheless represents a novel contribution to it, as the arguments in 
support of the conclusions reached here usually do not take a non-
instrumentalist shape. 
Obviously, I do not presume to have settled all issues that I have 
touched upon conclusively. What I nevertheless hope to have shown is 
that the concerns of epistocrats about epistemically responsible 
political decision-making can be accommodated without having to 
accept some of the more disingenuous remarks commonly associated 
with their theories. There is a way to take seriously the epistocratic 
challenge to democracy without having to accept the idea that granting 
political decision-making powers only to a small subset of educated 
elites or experts would solve all the issues that afflict liberal democracies 
and their public spheres. In this sense, the pitfalls of standard 
arguments for epistocracy leave the work conducted here unscathed. 
The idea that experts or intellectual elites will save the day and that all 
the problems of democracy can be traced back to the contemptuous 
claim that people are not able to make sensible political decisions has a 
certain disingenuousness to it. But this does not change the fact that 
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anyone who does choose to participate in political decision-making 
ought to do so according to the requirements that are immanent to the 
practice in which they are engaged, including the requirement of 
epistemic responsibility, and that this should be secured as much as 
feasible.  
As anticipated in the introduction, how my conclusions fit in the 
broader context of the debate around political legitimacy is an issue that 
I have not dealt with explicitly. In this regard however, certain implicit 
commitments emerge from my view. The conclusions of this work 
entail a hybrid stance on legitimacy, according to which considerations 
of epistemic quality matter for political legitimacy but these 
considerations apply to the procedures by which political decisions are 
reached rather to the correctness of the decisions themselves. More 
precisely, the conclusions reached in this thesis support the idea that 
only political decisions reached in an epistemically responsible way are 
legitimate and normatively justified, even in those circumstances in 
which they may lead to incorrect or unjust outcomes. 
In this sense, the work conducted here suggests a new research 
agenda. In particular, it suggests the possibility of developing a 
framework for political legitimacy that incorporates its core ideas: reject 
political instrumentalism, give proper recognition to the value of civic 
participation in the shaping of political decisions and yet maintain that 
this participation can have the value that it is meant to have only if 
certain conditions of epistemic responsibility are maintained and 
secured. This approach to legitimacy, which we can tentatively label 
epistemic civism, would incorporate requirements commonly 
associated with epistemic approaches within a non-instrumentalist 
framework centred on the pragmatic normative requirements 
generated by participation in institutional practices.  
Developing this rough idea, however, is a task that falls outside the 
scope of this work. For the time being, it is enough to keep in mind the 
upshot of the research conducted here. The upshot of this work is not 
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that we need to be ruled by a small group of knowers. Rather, the upshot 
is that having the people ruling over themselves is a valuable thing only 
insofar as we can ensure that they do so as knowers and on epistemically 
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